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Abstract
This thesis examines the effect of financial reporting transparency for securitization on
banks’ mortgage lending decisions. Prior research (e.g., Mian & Sufi 2009, Keys, Mukher-
jee, Seru & Vig 2010) shows that securitization reduces banks’ incentives to screen and
monitor borrowers. I posit that transparency plays a significant role by affecting bank
stakeholders’ ability to monitor and discipline bank lending decisions. I identify three
specific channels for monitoring and discipline, namely corporate governance, regulatory
oversight, and market discipline by uninsured depositors. I hypothesize that transparency
affects bank risk-taking in mortgage lending, and that monitoring and discipline from
external stakeholders moderates this effect.
I test my hypotheses using difference-in-differences tests around five FASB pronounce-
ments relating to securitization, issued since 1996, of which one decreases and the others
increase transparency. I obtain loan-level data to construct new measures of bank risk-
taking in mortgage lending based on the borrower income, loan amount and property
location. I validate the proposed measures using bank-level future mortgage delinquencies
and charge-offs.
The main results generally do not support my hypotheses. I find that, in most cases, the
effect of transparency on risk-taking is either insignificant or in the opposite direction of the
prediction. These findings are robust to multiple sensitivity tests. However, I find some
evidence supporting my hypotheses when comparing bank lending decisions during the
least transparent period to those during the most transparent period within my sample.
As a whole, my findings support the null hypothesis that transparency does not affect
banks’ risk-taking in their mortgage lending decisions. This conclusion is counter-intuitive
and contrary to the commonly held view that transparency promotes better stakeholder
monitoring of bank risk-taking. I identify alternative explanations for the null results,
including: (i) whether the accounting pronouncements affect transparency as expected,
(ii) the complexity of the setting, and (iii) potential noise in the data sources and the
development of my measures.
This thesis contributes to the literature in multiple ways. The proposed risk-measures
might prove useful to future researchers examining risk-taking in mortgage lending. My
findings are also relevant to the branches of literature examining the effect of securitization
on bank lending decisions, the effect of transparency on bank risk-taking, and the real
effects of accounting standards. This thesis might also be useful to standard setters and
regulators in their attempt to improve financial reporting quality and to promote better
decision making.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The financial crisis of late 2000s has motivated an ongoing discussion about the effect of
financial reporting transparency (FRT) on banks’ real operating and financing decisions,
and on systemic stability. Morgan (2002), Nier & Baumann (2006), and Acharya & Ryan
(2016) argue that opacity can allow excessive bank risk-taking to go undetected, and that
transparency can expose bank risk-taking to discipline from external parties.1 Prior liter-
ature (e.g., Bushman & Williams 2012, 2015) examines the effect of FRT on overall bank
risk exposure, using market-based risk measures, which aggregate risk-taking from all oper-
ating activities together with leverage, and other stock market and macroeconomic factors
that may affect these market-based measures. However, these studies do not examine the
effect of FRT on banks’ risk-taking in specific operating decisions, such as mortgage lend-
ing, which is the focus of this thesis. Dou, Ryan & Xie (2018) examine mortgage lending
decision around FAS 166 & 167, and they find that banks that recognize more securitized
assets following FAS 166 & 167 exhibit larger decreases in mortgage approval rates and
larger increases in mortgage sale rates. Unlike Dou et al. (2018), I examine the risk profile
of mortgages originated or purchased by banks.
The role of securitization in the financial crisis is a significant part of the discussion
about transparency and bank risk-taking. Prior literature (e.g., Pennacchi 1988, Gorton &
Pennacchi 1995, Loutskina & Strahan 2009) argues that securitization can reduce banks’
incentives to screen and monitor borrowers by enabling them to transfer loans to investors
thereby reducing their exposure to the risk of these loans they originate. Consistent with
this theory, Mian & Sufi (2009), Keys et al. (2010), and Wang & Xia (2014) find that,
1See Beatty & Liao (2014) and Acharya & Ryan (2016) for more discussion about the role of trans-
parency in the banking sector.
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in the pre-crisis period, banks decreased their lending standards more for loans that were
easier to securitize. This literature, however, focuses on the general association between
securitization and bank lending decisions, taking the FRT of securitization as a given.
Despite the widely held view that opacity was to blame for the role of securitization in the
crisis (e.g., Kiff, Jobst, Scarlata & Kisser 2009), prior literature does not directly examine
the role of transparency in this setting.
This thesis explores the role of securitization transparency, as opposed to the secu-
ritization activity, on banks’ risk-taking in their mortgage lending decisions. I investi-
gate whether and how FRT for securitization (hereafter, transparency) affects securitizing
banks’ risk-taking in their residential mortgage lending decisions (hereafter, risk-taking). I
examine residential mortgage securitizations because: (i) residential mortgages make up a
large portion of bank loans throughout my sample period (see Figure 1.1), (ii) residential
mortgages are a significant component of the overall U.S. economy (see Figure 1.2), and
(iii) residential mortgage securitizations make up a large portion of banks’ securitization
activity (see Figure 1.3). Moreover, I can identify the origination year for residential mort-
gages, which is crucial to my research design that depends on measuring risk in terms of
lending decisions before and after transparency shocks.
2
Figure 1.1: Major Loan Types on U.S. Banks’ Balance Sheet
This figure presents different types of loans on U.S. commercial banks’ balance sheet as a
percentage of total loans for the period 2004-2012. The black broken line shows the
percentage of residential mortgages, which is the largest loan group on banks’ balance
sheet. The other lines represent commercial real estate loans, commercial loans, consumer
loans, and other loans and leases. The data are from the Federal Reserve website
(https://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Choose.aspx?rel=H8).
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Figure 1.2: Total Outstanding U.S. Single Family Mortgages
This figure shows the outstanding US residential mortgages backed by single-family
property (black solid line) and US GDP (red dashed line) for the period 1994-2015.
Following Barth & Schipper (2008), I define transparency as the extent to which finan-
cial reports reveal the underlying economics of securitization in an understandable way.
By revealing the underlying economics of securitization, transparency allows bank stake-
holders to observe assets the securitizing bank controls, liabilities it has incurred, and risks
it faces due to retained interests in the securitization.2 This allows stakeholders to mon-
itor banks’ exposure to the risk of securitized loans, and to discipline risk-taking that is
not aligned with their preferences. I hypothesize that greater transparency affects risk-
taking through three channels for monitoring and discipline, namely market discipline by
uninsured creditors, regulatory oversight, and corporate governance (i.e., shareholder disci-
pline). Transparency may fail to affect risk-taking if securitization transfers substantially
all the risks to investors. Accounting standards that attempt to improve transparency
may fail to do so, if banks restructure securitization transactions to subvert new reporting
requirements, as Bens & Monahan (2008) document for asset-backed commercial paper.
To test the above-hypothesized channels, I investigate whether transparency has a larger
2Bank stakeholders include directors, shareholders, investors, creditors, and regulators.
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effect for banks with weak corporate governance, banks with low regulatory capital ratios,
and banks with more uninsured depositors.
Figure 1.3: Mortgage Securitization vs Total Securitization by BHCs
This figure presents the amounts of BHCs mortgage securitizations relative to their total
securitizations. The dollar amounts of “total assets securitized or sold” and “total
mortgages securitized or sold” are presented on the left-hand side scale. The scale on the
right-hand side corresponds to the percentage of “total mortgages securitized or sold”
relative to “total assets securitized or sold”.
I obtain a sample of securitizing bank holding companies (BHCs) from the Federal
Reserve’s FR Y-9C database for the period 1996-2015. I focus on BHCs because consoli-
dation at this level ensures proper aggregation of all securitization and mortgage-banking
activities, which are often conducted by different subsidiaries. I propose four new mort-
gage lending risk measures (MLRMs) at the BHC-year level, which I develop based on
mortgage-level and local area characteristics for mortgages approved by the BHCs in a
given year.
I obtain mortgage application-level data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) database, and combine it with location-specific socioeconomic information from
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a variety of other U.S. government sources to create a mortgage-level risk score.3 I identify
24 different characteristics, such as borrower income, the ratio of borrower income to the
amount of the loan, and the local area unemployment rate, that can reflect the riskiness of
individual mortgages. I add them to create a composite risk score (MRSCORE) for each
mortgage.
I validate the mortgage lending risk measures including all the 24 individual compo-
nents, using BHC-level mortgage portfolio outcome measures such as delinquencies and
charge-offs. I also show that most of the 24 individual component characteristics used to
create the composite measures are positively associated with mortgage delinquencies and
charge-offs in future years, and that they are associated positively with mortgage yield.
I then examine changes in lending decisions by securitizing BHCs around significant
transparency shocks caused by five securitization accounting pronouncements (hereafter,
the pronouncements or the standards).4 I argue that the first pronouncement decreases
transparency and the other four increase transparency. The pronouncements affect trans-
parency because they determine: (i) accounting policies such as the sales treatment of
securitization and the measurement of retained interests, or (ii) disclosure requirements re-
lated to securitization activity. The use of five accounting standard changes issued at four
different times mitigates the concern that factors other than the transparency shocks drive
the results, and allows me to provide more comprehensive evidence. I identify securitizing
BHCs as those with outstanding amounts of assets securitized or sold with recourse.5 I use
a propensity-score matched sample of non-securitizing BHCs to control for size and other
factors (e.g., industry and macroeconomic) that can affect lending decisions. The match-
ing alleviates concerns that endogenous factors that affect the decision to securitize drive
the risk-taking differences between treatment and control BHCs. I also perform additional
analyses using coarsened exact matching based on the three most important covariates in
the propensity score model, to ensure that my results are not driven by a specific matching
method.
The results generally do not support my hypothesis that transparency affects bank
risk-taking in mortgage lending. Except in a few cases, all the estimated effects are either
3Census data are available at the census tract level. The U.S. Census Bureau defines census tracts as
“small, relatively permanent statistical subdivisions of a county”, with “an optimum size of 4,000 people”.
More information can be found at https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_ct.html Personal
income and unemployment data are available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of
Labor statistics at the county level, respectively. House price indexes are available from the Federal
Housing Finance Agency at the metropolitan statistical area-level.
4FAS 125 (1996), FAS 140 (2000), FIN 46(R) (2003), FAS 166 (2009), and FAS 167 (2009)
5Prior to 2001Q2, FR Y-9C filings did not distinguish between securitized assets and assets sold with
recourse. They simply reported the combined outstanding amount.
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indistinguishable from zero or go in the opposite direction of the predictions. This finding,
which is robust to various sensitivity tests discussed in detail in chapter 5, suggests that
transparency as defined in this thesis does not affect bank lending decisions in the predicted
manner. However, it is also possible that the null results are driven by measurement error
in the proposed mortgage lending risk measures, or weakness in the research design’s ability
to identify the hypothesized relationships. I discuss potential ways to address these issues
in chapters 5 and 7.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the institutional
background, reviews related literature, and develops the hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes
the data sources, sampling procedure, and the research design. Chapter 4 develops and
validates the proposed mortgage lending risk measures. Chapter 5 presents the empirical
results. Chapter 6 discusses five large securitizing BHCs excluded from the main sample.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background and Hypothesis
Development
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a discussion of the institutional and financial reporting environment
of securitization, a review of related literature, and the hypotheses development. The first
part of section 2.2 discusses the structure of securitization, comparing the classical banking
model (Diamond 1984) and banking with securitization. The second part of section 2.2
formally defines financial reporting transparency of securitization. The last part of section
2.2 discusses the financial reporting of securitization per GAAP and regulatory reporting
requirements. I present the evolution of GAAP and regulatory reporting since the early
1990’s. Section 2.3 presents a review the related literature. Finally, section 2.4 presents
the hypotheses development.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Securitization
2.2.1.1 Classical Banking
In the classical banking model without securitization, illustrated in Figure 2.1, banks act
as financial intermediaries between many dispersed lenders (primarily depositors) and bor-
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rowers. These parties cannot interact directly because of transaction costs and information
asymmetries (Diamond 1984, Boyd & Prescott 1986).1 Information asymmetries between
lenders and borrowers can arise both before the origination of loans (i.e., adverse selection)
and after the origination of loans (i.e., moral hazard). Diamond (1984) shows that unco-
ordinated screening and monitoring by a large group of individual lenders can be costly
due to duplication of efforts. It can also result in a free rider problem where no individual
lender screens and monitors borrowers because their share of the benefits is too small.
Banks can solve the information asymmetry and coordination problems by screening
and monitoring borrowers on lenders’ behalf. However, Leland & Pyle (1977) argue that
banks cannot simply act as information intermediaries that sell information about borrower
creditworthiness, because users who cannot distinguish between good and bad information
would not buy. Thus, banks act as financial intermediaries that collect deposits (i.e.,
borrow from depositors) and lend to borrowers, creating and holding illiquid loans. In this
case, banks are exposed to the risks in the loans that they originate, and thus have an
incentive to avoid excessive risk by screening and monitoring borrowers.
Bank stakeholders monitor banks’ overall loan performance instead of the individual
borrowers. Shareholders can align bank risk-taking behavior with their risk preferences
through corporate governance. Uninsured creditors, who wish to protect their investment
in banks’ liabilities, can “‘punish’ banks for greater risk-taking by demanding higher yields
on those liabilities” (Nier & Baumann 2006, p. 333), or in the case of uninsured depositors,
by withdrawing or withholding their deposits.2 Regulators can use bank inspections and
regulatory constraints to minimize the likelihood of both individual bank and systemic
failures.
1I focus on the information asymmetry problem because it is more relevant to this thesis.
2Prior research Merton (1977), Holod & Peek (2007) shows that deposit insurance significantly reduces
insured depositors’ incentive to monitor banks.
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Figure 2.1: Classical Banking Model
This figure presents a graphical depiction of the classical banking model (Diamond 1984). In this model,
banks acts as a financial intermediary between depositors and borrowers by financing loans through
deposits. In this process, banks are typically the end lenders and they hold the loans they originate until
maturity. Other Bank stakeholders include shareholders, other creditors (e.g., bondholders) and bank
regulators.
2.2.1.2 Banking with Securitization
Securitization changes the traditional banking model by providing banks with an additional
avenue for financing their lending activities. While there are many types of securitization
structures with varying degrees of complexity, I focus on a basic form of securitization to
emphasize the major differences with the classical banking model. A typical securitization
allows banks to convert less liquid loans into more liquid asset-backed securities (ABS)
that can more easily be sold to investors. As shown in figure 2.2, a bank transfers a pool
of loans to a securitization entity, which issues securities backed by the loans received from
the bank. The proceeds from ABS sales are then transferred to the originating bank.
In principle, securitization allows banks to transfer risk to investors, who would become
the effective end lenders that collectively hold the loans on their balance sheet.3 Prior
literature Greenbaum & Thakor (1987), Pennacchi (1988), Barth, Ormazabal & Taylor
(2012) suggests that risk transfer is among the primary motivations for securitization.
In this case, banks have less incentive to screen and monitor borrowers because they no
3In some cases, banks securitize loans and hold all or a significant portion of the resulting ABS on
their balance sheet under assets held for sale, thus swapping loans for ABS on their balance sheets. This
practice can provide banks with more financial flexibility as ABS are easier to sell than the underlying
loans.
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longer hold the risk of the loans they originate. Cortes & Thakor (2015) argue that
securitizations that transfer risk to outsiders reduce the benefits to banks of borrower
screening and monitoring, without reducing the costs. For similar reasons, stakeholders’
incentives to monitor and discipline bank lending decisions decreases when they believe
that banks transfer risk through securitization.
However, securitizations are complex and opaque transactions that do not necessarily
transfer all risks and rewards to ABS investors. Securitizing banks often retain signifi-
cant interests in securitized loans. Common types of retained interests include servicing
rights, recourse obligations, and liquidity and credit guarantees for securitization entities.
Transparency can increase stakeholders’ ability to observe the extent of risk transferred
through securitization (i.e., where the underlying risk of securitized loans lies, within the
gray shaded area in figure 2.2). If the risk transfer is not observable, stakeholders cannot
effectively monitor and discipline bank risk-taking, which in turn affects banks’ risk-taking
incentives in securitizable loans.
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Figure 2.2: Banking with Securitization
This figure presents a graphical depiction of banking with securitization. Securitization provides banks
with an alternative way to fund loans, represented by the shaded area. Banks can transfer the loans they
originate to third parties by selling or securitizing. Banks are no longer the end lenders if they transfer
the loans to outsiders without recourse.
2.2.2 Financial Reporting Transparency
Accounting policy choices, measurement principles, and additional disclosures are among
the primary determinants of transparency. For instance, accounting policies that allow
derecognition of securitized assets while the transferor retains significant interest in the
assets, or prohibit derecognition when the assets are transferred, reduce financial reports’
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ability to reveal underlying economics.4 Securitized assets are derecognized and securiti-
zation income is recognized, if the transaction qualifies for sales treatment and the utility
is not consolidated.5 If the transaction does not qualify for sales treatment or the utility
is consolidated, the securitized assets remain on the balance sheet and the proceeds from
the transaction are recognized as a liability.
Measurement principles can affect transparency because they determine the accuracy
of reported values. For instance, measurement of retained interests affects the allocation of
carrying value between the transferred and retained part of the securitized pool, and there-
fore can affect securitization gain or loss. Additional disclosures about specific accounting
policies, assumptions, and estimates used in accounting for securitization can affect both
revelation of underlying economics, and understandability.
Financial reports without adequate supplemental disclosure, even when they apply
appropriate accounting policies and measurement methods, cannot communicate the un-
derlying economics in an understandable way.
2.2.3 The Financial Reporting of Securitization
Accounting standards and regulatory disclosure requirements shape accounting policies,
measurement principles, and disclosure by financial institutions. Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles (GAAP) and regulatory disclosure for securitization have evolved sig-
nificantly over the last couple of decades. Figure 2.3 presents the timeline of GAAP and
regulatory accounting changes for securitizations considered in this thesis.
Over the last 25 years, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued five
major pronouncements relating to securitization, namely SFAS No, 125 (1996), SFAS No.
140 (2000), FIN 46 (R) (2003), SFAS No. 166 (2009), and SFAS No. 167 (2009). FASB
issued the accounting pronouncements to enhance transparency through their effect on
accounting policies, measurement principles, and disclosure. For instance, in the statements
of the standards, FASB emphasizes its aim to ensure that each party to the transaction
recognizes assets it controls and liabilities it has incurred, and derecognizes assets only
when control has been surrendered and liabilities only when they have been extinguished.6
The standards can also influence transparency through their impacts on regulatory
reports (e.g., FR Y-9C) and on regulatory capital ratios such as Tier 1 leverage, Tier 1
4Schipper & Yohn (2007) identify the derecognition of securitized assets as the primary securitization
accounting policy issue.
5FAS 125, FAS 140, and FAS 166 describe the criteria for sales treatment of securitization transactions.
6SFAS No. 125 (1996, par.6), SFAS No. 140 (2000, par.5), and SFAS No. 166 (2009, par.5)
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capital, and total risk capital ratios.7 Regulatory accounting and disclosure requirements
for securitization also changed significantly over the same period, with major expansions in
disclosure requirements in 2001 and 2010. These expansions in regulatory disclosure mirror
expansions in GAAP disclosure requirements, generally with lag. While regulatory filings
contain more standardized (and more disaggregated prior to FAS 166 & 167) financial
information than GAAP reports, they are typically prepared per GAAP.8 For instance,
off-balance-sheet treatment for securitizations and recognition of securitization income in
regulatory filings typically follow GAAP. Recognizing securitization income in Tier 1 capital
increases the numerator of Tier 1 leverage, Tier 1 capital, and total risk capital ratios.
Increasing regulatory capital ratios, when banks retain significant interest in securitized
assets, fails to reveal the underlying economics. Off-balance sheet treatment can increase
Tier 1 capital and total risk capital ratios because the risk-weighted total amount of the off-
balance-sheet assets can be lower than the risk-weighted total amount the underlying loans
had they not been securitized, decreasing the denominator.9 Off-balance sheet treatment
also increases the Tier 1 leverage ratio because off-balance-sheet assets are not included in
the denominator (average total assets).
In addition to containing more disaggregated information than GAAP reports, reg-
ulatory reports provide information that is not required by GAAP. In the 1990s, Y-9C
filings contained the outstanding amount of assets sold with recourse, which includes se-
curitized assets that are treated as sales per GAAP. Regulatory reports also contain the
maximum contractual value of recourse, which is used instead of fair values in calculating
risk-weighted assets.
This thesis focuses on FASB pronouncements that affect BHC-level financial reports,
i.e., the bank’s (originator’s) financial reports in 2.2. I do not examine the effect of in-
formation environment in ABS markets, i.e., the transparency of securitization utilities to
investors (the end lenders in figure 2.2) on bank lending decisions as I believe this is a
7See appendix A.2 for definitions of regulatory capital ratios.
8Acharya & Ryan (2016) state that “Although banks appear to respond more to regulatory capital
requirements than to financial reporting standards, regulatory reporting and thus capital requirements
often are based on financial reporting standards.” (p.322)
9The Risk-based Capital Guidelines published on November 29, 2001 state that “Highly rated
investment-grade positions in securitizations receive a favorable (less than 100 percent) risk-weight. Below-
investment-grade or unrated positions in securitizations would receive a less favorable risk-weight (generally
greater than 100 percent risk-weight). A residual interest retained by a banking organization in an as-
set securitization (other than a credit-enhancing I/O strip) would be subject to this capital framework.
Therefore, if the external rating provided to such a residual interest is investment grade or no more than
one category below investment grade, the final rule affords that residual interest more favorable capital
treatment than the dollar-for-dollar capital requirement otherwise required for residuals.”(p.59619)
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closely related but separate research question. Regulation AB, which was effective in 2006,
enhances transparency in ABS markets by requiring periodic pool-level performance dis-
closures by SEC-registered ABS. I do not expect Reg AB to confound my analyses because
it does not fall in any of the test periods around the standards.
The remainder of this subsection discusses the major securitization accounting stan-
dards, their effect on transparency, and instances where GAAP and regulatory accounting
differ. In the discussion below, I focus on reporting standards that apply to securitization
of residential mortgages.
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Figure 2.3: Timeline of GAAP and Regulatory Changes
This figure presents a simplified timeline of U.S. GAAP and regulatory accounting changes relating to
securitization over the period 1994-2012. Lighter shades represent more transparency.
* While I focus on the elements of the standards that apply to securitization of residential mortgages, the
standards apply for all types of transfers of financial assets.
** Regulatory disclosures increase in various ways after the crisis. Most of these changes, mandated by the
Dodd-Frank Act, did not become effective in my test window around FAS 166 & 167.
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2.2.3.1 Pre-FAS 125
Accounting standards prior to FAS 125 in 1996 followed an all-or-nothing approach to
securitization accounting. This approach treated financial assets as indivisible units, and
it relied on the legal form and predominant characteristics of the transaction to determine
sales treatment for securitizations. FAS 125, in its description of pre-FAS 125 practice,
states that “For example, whether a transfer “purported to be a sale” was sufficient to
determine whether the transfer was accounted for and reported as a sale of receivables
under one accounting standard or as a secured borrowing under another.” (FAS 125
par.5). If the transaction purports to be a sale, the securitization is treated as a sale
if it meets the conditions in FAS 77.10 FAS 77 addressed neither the consolidation of
securitization entities nor retained interests other than recourse obligations and servicing
rights.11 A securitization is treated as a secured loan if the transaction does not meet FAS
77 requirements, or if it purports to be a loan, in which case Bulletin No. 85-2 applies.12
When a securitization is treated as a sale and the securitization entity is not consoli-
dated, the associated gain or loss is recognized in net income. Kane (1995) reports that
regulatory accounting diverged from GAAP by allowing securitization income in Tier 1
capital only for securitizations with no recourse. Kane (1995, 1997) argues that the all-or-
nothing approach can lead to opacity because: (i) banks can easily manipulate the legal
form of securitization to fit the desired accounting, and (ii) because they are not required
to recognize all assets and liabilities created as a result of securitization. To justify FAS
125, FASB states that previous approaches were difficult to apply and produced inconsis-
tent and arbitrary results (FAS 125, par.7) and do not provide an appropriate basis for
developing consistent and operational standards (FAS 125, par.8).
2.2.3.2 FAS 125
FASB issued FAS 125 in 1996 to improve the accounting for transfer of financial assets
by eliminating inconsistencies and confusions that resulted from previous standards and
accounting practice (FAS 125 par.97). In FAS 125, FASB concluded that an objective of
10FAS 77 deals with transferors’ accounting for transfers of receivables with recourse. A transfer is
treated as a sale if (i) the transferor surrenders control of the assets (i.e., no option to repurchase), (ii)
the recourse to the transferor can be reasonably estimated, and (iii) the transferee cannot require the
transferor to repurchase the assets except through recourse provisions (FAS 77, par.5).
11The consolidation of securitization entities was covered by existing standards for consolidated financial
statements, ARB No. 51 (1959) as amended by FAS 94 (1987).
12Bulletin 85-2 deals with accounting for collateralized mortgage obligations.
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securitization accounting is for each party to the transaction “to recognize only assets it
controls and liabilities it has incurred, to derecognize assets only when control has been
surrendered, and to derecognize liabilities only when they have been extinguished.” (FAS
125 par.5). This is consistent with enhancing transparency by revealing the underlying
economics of the securitization transactions.
The following are the main elements of FAS 125. First, it introduced the financial-
components approach in which the transferor decomposes securitized assets into multiple
asset and liability components (e.g., interest-only strips, servicing rights, and letters of
credit), and accounts separately for each component. Second, it provided control-based
qualification criteria for sales treatment of securitization transactions. Sales treatment ap-
plies per FAS 125 if the transferor surrenders control over the securitized assets.13 Third,
FAS 125 created a special class of securitization entities, qualifying special purpose entities
(QSPEs) that are exempt from consolidation. QSPEs are passive entities that are demon-
strably distinct from the transferor and that can only engage in a predetermined set of
activities. While FAS 125 is generally silent about the consolidation of securitization enti-
ties, the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) reached a consensus that FAS 125’s definition
of control should be applied in assessing consolidation of QSPEs, allowing transferors to
avoid consolidation of QSPE.14
When a securitization is treated as a sale and the conduit is not consolidated, the orig-
inal assets are derecognized, and all assets obtained and liabilities incurred in association
with the securitization are recognized. The carrying amount of the original assets is al-
located between the sold and retained components based on their fair value proportions,
and the difference between the proceeds and the carrying amount allocated to the sold
part is recognized as a gain or loss on the income statement. The retained components
are initially recognized at their fair value, if a reasonable measurement is possible. If it is
not practicable to estimate the fair values of retained assets and liabilities, the assets are
recorded at zero, and the liabilities at the greater of (i) the net fair value of other assets
obtained and liabilities incurred less the carrying amount of the transferred assets, and
(ii) the amount that would be recognized per FAS 5 “Accounting for Contingencies” as
interpreted by FIN 14 “Reasonable Estimation of the Amount of Loss”. FAS 5 requires
recognition of estimated loss from loss contingencies when it is probable that an asset had
been impaired or a liability had been incurred and the loss can be reasonably estimated.
13The transferor surrenders control if (i) the assets are isolated from the transferor even in bankruptcy,
(ii) the transferee has the right to pledge or exchange the assets, and (iii) the transferor does not maintain
effective control over the securitized assets through arrangements other than cleanup calls.
14EITF Issue No. 96-20 “Impact of FASB Statement No. 125 on Consolidation of Special-Purpose
Entities.” was issued only three months after FAS 125.
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FIN 14 deals with cases where only a range of loss can be reasonably estimated. In this case,
“When some amount within the range appears at the time to be a better estimate than any
other amount within the range, that amount shall be accrued. When no amount within
the range is a better estimate than any other amount, however, the minimum amount in
the range shall be accrued.”(FIN 14, par. 3)
In contrast to the pre-FAS 125 era, beginning with the adoption of FAS 125, regulators
included securitization income in Tier 1 capital regardless of recourse to the transferor.
Regulators discontinued this practice later and prohibited large or internationally active
BHCs (i.e., those following the Basel II Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework) from
including non-cash securitization gains in Tier 1 capital in 2008, and all other BHCs with
at least $500 million in total assets in 2014.15
In principle, FAS 125 can enhance transparency by allowing securitizing entities to
recognize only assets they control and liabilities they have incurred and not extinguished.
Securitizations are typically complex transactions that do not fit the all-or-nothing ap-
proach, as a portion of the risk in the underlying loans is transferred while the rest is
retained by the transferor. The financial-components approach would ideally allow the
transferor to account separately for the transferred and retained parts, derecognizing the
transferred assets, retaining on its balance sheet only the assets it still controls, and recog-
nizing only the liabilities it has incurred. However, due to the complexity of securitizations,
it can be difficult to reliably measure the distinct components, and to provide sufficient
disclosure that enables external stakeholder to understand and value the components.
FAS 125 and the financial-components approach can increase opacity for several reasons.
First, as O’Brien (2011) argues, the underlying risk in securitized assets (e.g., mortgages) is
not separable, so creating synthetic components that are accounted for separately obscures
the underlying economics. Second, measurement errors or biases in fair-valuing retained
interests can obscure the transferor’s true exposure to the securitized assets and misrepre-
sent the securitization gain. This approach is susceptible to measurement errors and biases
because retained interests are not tradable (O’Brien 2011), which necessitates reliance on
discretionary non-market inputs. Last, while purporting to be a sale is no longer sufficient,
15The “Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy FrameworkBasel II; Final Rule”
published in 2007 and effective in April 2008 states that “Under the proposed rule, a bank would deduct
from tier 1 capital any after-tax gain-on-sale. Gain-on-sale was defined as an increase in a bank’s equity
capital that resulted from a securitization, other than an increase in equity capital that resulted from the
bank’s receipt of cash in connection with the securitization.” The “Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory
Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action,
Standardized Approach for Risk-weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, Ad-
vanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule” published in 2013 contains
a similar provision.
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legal form remains a key element in determining sales treatment. For example, QSPEs are
immune from consolidation. Banks can manipulate the legal form and structure of securi-
tization transactions to fit their desired accounting outcome, while maintaining significant
interest that exposes them to significant risk if the QSPE is in trouble. As discussed in the
previous paragraph, the financial-components approach can, in ideal cases, lead to greater
transparency than the all-or-nothing approach. However, I argue that the accounting and
disclosure practice established by FAS 125 were less than ideal.16
While no prior research systematically examines the transparency effects of FAS 125, a
stream of literature provides evidence that suggests the major elements of FAS 125 reduce
transparency. Niu & Richardson (2006), Landsman, Peasnell & Shakespeare (2008), Barth
et al. (2012), and Dou, Liu, Richardson & Vyas (2014) show that equity and bond markets
on average treat securitizations as if they were secured loans, suggesting that investors
believe the sales treatment is not consistent with the underlying economics.17 Hence, stan-
dards that allow sales treatment of securitization instead of secured loan treatment may
reduce transparency. Karaoglu (2005), Dechow & Shakespeare (2009), Dechow, Myers &
Shakespeare (2010), and Acharya, Schnabl & Suarez (2013) show that banks use securitiza-
tions to manipulate earnings and regulatory capital, again suggesting that the accounting
does not mirror the underlying economics.
2.2.3.3 FAS 140
FAS 140, issued in 2000, carries forward most elements of FAS 125 with the following ex-
ceptions. First, FAS 140 strengthened qualification requirements for QSPEs by restricting
the activities they conduct, financial assets they hold, and the type and timing of asset
sales. Second, FAS 140 prohibited the consolidation of QSPEs. Third, FAS 140 required
more disclosure including: (i) the characteristics of securitizations, (ii) accounting policies
and key assumptions in measuring retained interests, (iii) sensitivity analyses for fair val-
ues of retained interests, (iv) cash flows between the conduit and the transferor, and (v)
total principal amounts, delinquencies, and credit losses for outstanding securitized assets.
This expansion in disclosure requirements was followed by a similar increase in regulatory
disclosure requirements with a one quarter lag.
16I leave for future researchers the question of whether the financial components approach dominates
the all-or-nothing approach under an ideal disclosure regime for both approaches.
17Chen, Liu & Ryan (2008) find that the relation between securitizing banks’ equity risk and their
securitized assets depends on the type of securitization. For example, the relation is strong when the
securitized loans have higher or less externally verifiable credit risk.
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FAS 140 can enhance transparency because it requires extensive disclosure, and because
it tightens the qualification criteria for QSPEs, which can reduce their use for purely
accounting purposes. However, FAS 140 carries over the financial-components approach
and the QSPE concept from FAS 125, and it prohibits consolidation of QSPEs. Thus, FAS
140’s overall effect on transparency depends on the extent to which the expanded disclosures
and tightening of QSPE qualification, in practice, offset the transparency-decreasing effects
of the financial-components approach and non-consolidation of QSPEs.
2.2.3.4 FIN 46 (R)
Prior to FIN 46 (R) in 2003, variable interest entities (VIEs) were effectively consolidated by
the entity that held the majority of voting rights.18 Under FIN 46 (R), a VIE is consolidated
by the primary beneficiary, the entity holding the majority of the VIE’s expected losses or
rewards. FIN 46 (R) expanded disclosure requirements for parties involved in a VIE. It
required the primary beneficiary of a VIE to disclose: (i) the nature, size, purpose, and
activities of the VIE, (ii) the carrying amount and classification of consolidated assets used
as collateral for the VIE’s obligations, and (iii) lack of recourse if the primary beneficiary
has no recourse obligations to other parties in association with the VIE.19 FIN 46 (R) also
required a party that holds a significant interest in a VIE but is not the primary beneficiary
to disclose item (i) above, the nature and timing of its involvement in the VIE, and the
maximum exposure to the loss of the VIE.
FIN 46 (R) can enhance transparency if the expected risk and rewards approach to
VIE consolidation better reflects underlying economics than the voting rights approach.
For example, consolidation of a VIE based on voting rights would not reveal the underlying
economics if the voting and cash flow rights are separate, or if the VIE has no voting class.
Consolidation of VIEs per FIN 46 (R) can also affect transparency through regulatory cap-
ital because it increases the risk-weighted capital base of the entity exposed to the majority
of the expected risks. The enhanced VIE disclosures would improve transparency by pro-
viding more information about the extent of risk exposure by the parties with significant
involvement in a VIE.
However, FIN 46 (R) may fail to enhance transparency. Bens & Monahan (2008) show
that some U.S. banks, especially those with binding regulatory constraints, structured
transactions to avoid consolidation of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits
per FIN 46 (R). Bank regulators exempted consolidated ABCP conduits from inclusion in
18FIN 46 (R) section “Reasons for Issuing This Interpretation’, p.3, par.1.
19FIN 46 (R) par.23
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the risk-weighted asset base (ABCP exclusion) seven months after FIN 46 (R) was effective.
Banks retaining substantial risks in ABCP conduits continued to avoid consolidation of
these conduits and to exclude the conduits from risk-based capital ratios, so the accounting
did not reflect the underlying economics. Hence, the ultimate effect of FIN 46 (R) on
transparency is uncertain. On balance, I conjecture that FIN 46 (R) enhances transparency
for mortgage-related securitizations because: (i) the evidence suggests that transaction
restructuring was concentrated among banks with binding regulatory constraints, (ii) the
regulatory exception is only for ABCP conduits, not for all securitization entities, and (iii)
the regulatory exception did not allow exclusion of ABCP conduits from the Tier 1 leverage
ratio.
2.2.3.5 FAS 166 and FAS 167
FAS 166 and FAS 167, issued in 2009, represent the most extensive changes to securitization
accounting. These standards eliminate the QSPE concept, thereby require existing QSPEs
be considered for consolidation, tighten the criteria for determining the primary beneficiary
of a VIE, and enhance required disclosures regarding securitization activities. Under FAS
166 & 167, the primary beneficiary of a VIE is the entity with (i) the power to direct
the VIE’s activities that most significantly impact the VIE’s economic performance, and
(ii) the obligation to absorb significant losses of the VIE or the right to receive significant
benefits from the VIE. Unlike FIN 46 (R), there is no requirement to hold the majority of
expected risks and rewards of the VIE.
FAS 166 & 167 can enhance transparency by tightening the criteria for off-balance-sheet
treatment of securitizations and by requiring additional disclosures. Moreover, similar
disclosure requirements in regulatory filings followed within a year. Following FAS 166
& 167, regulators also eliminated the ABCP exclusion established in response to FIN 46
(R), limiting banks’ ability to bolster their regulatory capital ratios through securitization.
Supporting the claim that FAS 166 & 167 enhance transparency, Oz (2016) shows that
information asymmetry, as measured by bid-ask spread, declines more for securitizing
banks than non-securitizing banks after the adoption of FAS 166 & 167.
2.3 Related Literature
This section discusses two streams of literature related to my thesis. The first stream ex-
amines the effects of accounting standards and transparency on banks’ operating decisions,
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and the second stream deals with the effects of securitization on banks’ lending decisions.
I discuss the contribution of my thesis relative to these two streams of literature.
2.3.1 Transparency and Bank Operating Decisions
My thesis is closely related to the growing stream of literature examining the real effects of
accounting policies and disclosure on banks’ operating decisions (e.g., Bushman & Williams
2012, 2015, Xie 2016, Dou 2017, Ertan, Loumioti & WITTENBERG-MOERMAN 2017,
Dou et al. 2018, Neilson, Ryan, Wang & Xie 2018, Schmidt & Zhang 2018). Of these
studies, Ertan et al.’s (2017) study examining the effect transparency on loan quality is
the most closely related to my thesis. Ertan et al. (2017) exploit new reporting standards
introduced by the European Central Bank (ECB) in 2013. Under the new reporting regime,
banks that use ABS as collateral to borrow from the ECB are required: (i) to disclose the
structure of ABS used as collateral, and (ii) to collect and disclose detailed loan- and
borrower-specific information for loans backing the ABS. Ertan et al. (2017) use loan-level
data on securitized loans to SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) that are reported
under the new ECB requirement and find that greater loan-level disclosure increases loan
quality.
This thesis differs from Ertan et al. (2017) in the following ways. First, my thesis
examines a related but distinct type of transparency. In contrast to ECB’s loan-by-loan
disclosures examined in Ertan et al. (2017), I focus on the transparency of BHC-level
financial reports (i.e., financial statements and supplemental disclosures) filed with the SEC
and banks regulators. While the ECB disclosures about a specific securitization provide
information about the risk profile of the underlying loans, it does not reveal whether and
how much risk is transferred through the securitization– a central focus of this thesis.
Referring to figure 2.2, the ECB disclosure reveals the riskiness of the loan pool in the
securitization entity, and financial reporting transparency reveals whether and how much
of this risk is transferred to external parties. As a result, my study answers a different
question than Ertan et al. (2017). Their study answers the question of whether banks would
improve their lending decisions when they are required to disclose detailed information
about individual loans. In contrast, my thesis addresses whether banks would improve
their lending decision when they are required to provide more transparent financial reports
that summarize their operating activities.
Second, my thesis examines different mechanisms through which transparency affects
lending decisions than Ertan et al. (2017). As discussed in section 2.4, financial reporting
transparency affects bank lending decision through its effect on bank stakeholders’ ability
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to observe bank risk exposures. I specifically identify three distinct types of stakeholders,
namely shareholders, uninsured creditors, and regulators, and examine how transparency
affects their ability to monitor bank lending decisions. In contrast, Ertan et al. (2017)
examine the effect of the ECB’s ABS reporting standard on bank lending decisions through
its effect on banks’ information collection process and on ABS investors’ ability to observe
the underlying loans.
Last, in addition to the primary differences discussed above, I examine my research
question in a different setting than that of Ertan et al. (2017). I use a U.S. residential
mortgage setting as opposed to the European SME loan setting in Ertan et al. (2017). Ac-
counting, regulatory, and other institutional differences between the European Union and
the United States may result in differential responses by EU and U.S. banks to changes in
transparency. Moreover, banks may have different lending models for SMEs and residential
mortgage borrowers because of differences in their underlying economics. Hence, results in
one of these settings may not generalize to the other.
Schmidt & Zhang (2018) and Neilson et al. (2018) examine the effect of Regulation AB
(2006) and Regulation AB II (2016) on ABS markets, respectively. These regulations re-
quire issuers of SEC-registered structured instruments to provide periodic pool-level (Reg
AB) and asset-level (Reg AB II) disclosure about the performance of the underlying as-
sets starting in 2006 and in 2016, respectively.20 Schmidt & Zhang (2018) document an
increase in trading activity and liquidity in the ABS market around the filing dates of Reg
AB disclosures (form 10-D). Neilson et al. (2018) find that asset-level disclosures after Reg
AB II improve investors’ valuations of ABS, and improve credit rating agencies’ evalua-
tion of ABS. This thesis differs from these studies because it examines financial reporting
transparency of BHCs, as opposed to disclosures by securitization utilities that are not in-
cluded in the BHCs’ financial reports, and because it examines lenders’ decision-making, as
opposed to that of ABS investors and credit rating agencies. My thesis examines a dimen-
sion of the securitization market and associated disclosures not explored in these studies
(Schmidt & Zhang 2018, Neilson et al. 2018), and hence it complements them. Schmidt &
Zhang (2018) and Neilson et al. (2018) focus on disclosures by securitization entities and
their effects on ABS investors and credit rating agencies. In contrast, I examine BHC-level
transparency and its effect on BHCs’ lending decisions.
Xie (2016), Dou (2017), and Dou et al. (2018) examine the effect of specific accounting
policies on bank operating decision. Xie (2016) finds no evidence that fair value accounting
has procyclical effects on banks’ supply of credit to residential borrowers. Dou (2017) and
20Reg AB does not fall in any of the test periods around the pronouncements, and Reg AB II was not
in effect during my sample period.
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Dou et al. (2018) show that consolidation of VIEs per FAS 166 & 167 leads to lower supply
of credit to residential mortgage borrowers and small business, respectively. My thesis
differs from these studies because I examine financial reporting transparency across several
accounting standard changes as opposed to a single such event, and because I examine
the riskiness (or quality) of bank lending decisions instead of the quantity of credit supply
(e.g., mortgage approval rate). While the quantity of credit supply is an important lending
decision, it does not completely capture banks’ risk-taking in their lending decision. For
instance, an increase in the proportion of applications for high-quality mortgages can lead
to higher approval rates, without necessarily increasing risk.
Bushman & Williams (2012) and Bushman & Williams (2015) examine the relation
between the transparency of loan loss provisioning and bank risk. Bushman & Williams
(2012) use a sample of banks from 27 countries to examine whether the transparency of loan
loss provisioning affects external monitoring of bank risk-taking. They find that forward-
looking discretionary provisioning designed to smooth earnings (smoothing) dampens ex-
ternal discipline of bank risk-taking and that forward-looking discretionary provisioning
reflecting timely recognition of expected loan losses (forward-NPL) enhances external dis-
cipline of bank risk-taking.21 Bushman & Williams (2015) examine a sample of U.S. banks
over the 1993-2009 period and find that greater delay in loan loss recognition (DELR) is
associated with greater stock market illiquidity risk and stock market down side risk.22 My
thesis differs from these studies because I focus on bank risk-taking in a specific operat-
ing activity, namely residential mortgage lending decisions, as opposed to bank-level risk,
which allows me to better identify the effect of transparency. Bank-level risk measures used
in prior literature are not limited to risk-taking in operating activities, as they capture only
the aggregate effect of all types risk the bank takes, including leverage.
21They estimate smoothing as γ1 and forward-NPL as γ2 from the following regression.
LLPitj = γ0 + γ1Ebllpitj + γ2∆NLPit+1j + γ3∆NLPitj + γ4∆NLPit−1j + γ5∆NLPit−2j +
γ6CAPit−1j + γ7SIZEit−1j + γ8∆GDPij + itj
where LLP stands for loan loan provisions, NPL stands for non-performing loans, Ebllp stands for earnings
before loan loss provisions and taxes, CAP is equity capital to total assets, and SIZE is the the natural
logarithm of total assets.
22Bushman & Williams (2015) use two measures of down-side risk, namely the value-at-risk and condi-
tional value-at-risk of stock returns
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2.3.2 Securitization and Lending Decisions
This thesis is also related to prior studies that examine the effect of securitization on bank
lending decisions (e.g., Mian & Sufi 2009, Keys et al. 2010, Agarwal, Chang & Yavas 2012,
Jiang, Nelson & Vytlacil 2014b). This stream of literature documents that securitization
leads to banks reducing their screening and monitoring of borrowers, which results in
greater bank risk-taking. The literature identifies risk transfer through securitization as
the primary mechanism for this effect. I extend this literature by examining the effect
of transparency on risk-taking. By comparing securitizing banks’ lending decisions before
and after a transparency shock, I can disentangle the effect of the securitization activity
from the effect of transparency.
2.4 Hypotheses Development
Securitization can affect bank lending decisions through three non-mutually exclusive chan-
nels. First, as discussed in section 2.2.1.2, securitization can enable banks to transfer the
risk of the underlying loans they originate to ABS investors. Regardless of transparency,
true risk transfer leads to lower borrower screening and monitoring incentives because
it reduces banks’ exposure to the loans they originate, assuming reputation alone is not
sufficient to motivate banks to screen and monitor borrowers.
Second, securitizations, when treated as sales, enable banks to record gains upon secu-
ritization in lieu of periodic income over the life of the securitized assets. Securitization
gains immediately increase GAAP earnings and Tier 1 capital throughout my sample pe-
riod, except for large and internationally active banks that were required to exclude certain
types of securitization gains from their Tier 1 capital beginning in 2008. Securitizations
can also enable banks to reduce their risk-weighted asset base because off-balance-sheet
securitized assets often receive lower risk-weights. All else equal, lowering risk-weighted
assets decreases the amount of capital required to meet the minimum regulatory capital
and leverage ratios. Karaoglu (2005), Dechow & Shakespeare (2009), and Dechow et al.
(2010) provide evidence of earnings and regulatory capital management through securiti-
zation income. Acharya et al. (2013) document that banks used ABCP conduits to lower
their risk-weighted asset base. These accounting and regulatory advantages can change
banks’ focus from quality to quantity of loan origination to increase securitization vol-
ume, if banks and their stakeholders believe that securitization transfers risk to investors
(Acharya & Ryan 2016).
The magnitude of securitization gain, the difference between the consideration received
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and the carrying amount of the sold components, is in principle a function of the risk
transferred through securitizations. Higher fair valuation of the retained components,
ceteris paribus, leads to higher securitization gain. The bank allocates the carrying value
of securitized loans between sold and retained components based on their proportional
fair values. Given fixed proceeds for the sold components, higher fair valuation of the
retained components leads to lower carrying value allocation to the sold components, and to
higher securitization gain. All else equal, higher fair valuation of the retained components
indicates lower retained risk. Higher valuation arises from either higher cash flow forecasts
for a given discount rate or a lower discount rate for a given cash flow forecasts. Off-balance-
sheet securitized assets receive lower risk weights, because regulators believe that banks
transfer risk through securitization. Thus, the extent of perceived risk transfer affects the
extent to which securitization enables banks to manage earnings and regulatory ratios, and
securitization accounting can influence stakeholders’ perception of the risk transferred.
Last, Pennacchi (1988), Schipper & Yohn (2007), Loutskina & Strahan (2009), and
Nadauld & Sherlund (2013) show that securitization can reduce banks’ cost of funding
securitizable assets. The Federal Reserve’s BHC Supervision Manual (2016, sec. 2128.02)
states that “securitized issues often carry a higher credit rating than that which the banking
organization itself could normally obtain and, consequently, may provide a cheaper form
of funding”. Thus, securitization can transform relatively high-risk loans with negative
net present value (NPV) under traditional funding methods into positive NPV loans. All
else equal, this leads to an increase in the riskiness of banks’ loan originations. The cost
of raising funds through securitization depends on securitization investors’ risk preference
and the extent of risk transferred to these investors. Thus, for a given level of investor risk
preference, banks’ ability to lower funding cost through securitization depends on investors’
perception of risk transfer through securitization.
2.4.1 Transparency and Securitization-driven Bank Risk-taking
Bank transparency can affect bank risk-taking if it enhances stakeholders’ ability to mon-
itor banks’ risk exposure. The Bank for International Settlements (2012) and Plosser
(2014) suggest that greater transparency increases stakeholders’ ability to discipline banks
by making the inherent risks more visible.23 The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Bank
Examination Manual (2016, sec.4030.1) states that “well informed investors, depositors,
creditors, and other counterparties can provide a BO [banking organization] with strong
incentives for maintaining sound risk management systems and internal controls.”
23Charles I. Plosser was the President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia from
2006-2015.
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Securitization can affect banks’ risk-taking incentives when originating securitizable
assets. For all the three channels identified above, the effect of securitization on risk-
taking is a function of the extent of risk transfer, and transparency affects the accuracy
of observed risk transfer. In figure 2.2, transparency sheds light on the gray shaded area,
allowing bank stakeholders to observe how much risk remains with the bank. The specific
effect of transparency on bank risk-taking depends on managers’ and stakeholders’ relative
risk preferences, as stakeholders only discipline risk-taking that is not aligned with their
preferences. Based on potential conflicts of interest among managers and stakeholders, I
explore three channels through which transparency can affect bank risk-taking.
2.4.1.1 Manager-Shareholder Alignment
Transparency can affect bank risk-taking through corporate governance when bank man-
agers and shareholders have conflicting risk preferences, and if transparency helps to align
their preferences. Following Stulz (2014), I assume that the primary goal of bank gover-
nance is to maximize shareholder value subject to regulatory constraints, and that good
governance strives to align managers’ risk preferences with those of shareholders. Based
on these assumptions and prior evidence (Laeven & Levine 2009), I characterize bank risk-
taking as a function of the relative powers of managers and shareholders within the cor-
porate governance structure, and focus my discussion on manager-shareholder alignment.
Greater transparency can affect the power balance between managers and shareholders in
the governance structure in favor of shareholders, if observability of banks’ activities affects
shareholders’ ability to align managers’ actions with their preferences. (Bushman 2014,
p. 387) argues that “transparency plays a fundamental corporate governance role in all
industries” by supporting monitoring by directors and by enhancing protection of investor
rights.
The direction of the effect of transparency on risk-taking through this channel depends
on managers’ and shareholders’ relative risk preferences. Greater transparency leads to
lower risk-taking if shareholders prefer less risk than managers do, and to higher risk-
taking if shareholders prefer more risk than do managers. Prior research provides evi-
dence that the average bank shareholder prefers more risk than do managers. Saunders,
Strock & Travlos (1990) and Laeven & Levine (2009) show that shareholder-controlled
banks, as measured by managerial ownership or ownership concentration, take more risk
than manager-controlled banks. Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2011) show that banks with better
manager-shareholder alignment, as measured by managerial ownership and CEOs’ equity
portfolio sensitivity to stock price changes, performed worse during the financial crisis than
banks with poor manager-shareholder alignment, suggesting that banks with better align-
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ment took more risk prior to the crisis. John, Litov & Yeung (2008) examine the effect
of corporate governance, as measured by investor protection, on corporate risk-taking us-
ing an international sample of non-financial firms, and find that the quality of investor
protection is positively associated with corporate risk-taking.
The literature identifies several reasons for bank managers to prefer lower risk than
do shareholders. First, Saunders et al. (1990), Laeven & Levine (2009), and Stulz (2014)
argue that managers’ wealth is less diversifiable than that of shareholders because it mostly
depends on bank- or industry-specific human capital. Thus, managers exhibit more risk-
averse behavior than their diversified do shareholders. Second, Saunders et al. (1990),
Laeven & Levine (2009), Bebchuk & Spamann (2010), and Stulz (2014) argue that bank
shareholders, with limited liability, have an incentive to increase bank risk because the value
of their call-option-like equity claims increases with the volatility of bank assets. Moreover,
Bebchuk & Spamann (2010) argue that limited liability implies bank shareholders have no
incentive to minimize the magnitude of loss given default. These moral hazard problems,
which also exist in non-bank firms, are stronger for banks because deposit insurance and
explicit or implicit government guarantees reduce depositors’ and other bank creditors’
monitoring incentives (Saunders et al. 1990, Bebchuk & Spamann 2010), and because
small and dispersed bank creditors lack resources to monitor banks (Bebchuk & Spamann
2010). Lastly, Demsetz & Lehn (1985), John et al. (2008), and Laeven & Levine (2009)
suggest that risk-taking is negatively related with managers’ expected private benefits of
control. John et al. (2008) argue that private benefits that arise from diverting cash and
other corporate resources for personal benefit, prior to settling the cash flow claims, may
be easier to detect during periods of poor firm performance and make managers behave
like senior debtholders.
While the literature discussed above provides theory and evidence suggesting bank
shareholders prefer more risk than managers, it does not rule out cases where managers
may prefer more risk than their shareholders. For instance, option-based compensation,
intended to align managers’ incentives with those of shareholders, can lead managers to
prefer higher risk than shareholders (Bebchuk & Spamann 2010). In this case, transparency
could curtail managers’ risk-taking. However, even in this case, Bebchuk & Spamann (2010)
argue that it is unlikely that risk-taking decreases to the “social optimal” level because
shareholders generally prefer more risk than is socially optimal.
2.4.1.2 Market Discipline
Market discipline refers to the use of available information by market participants to mon-
itor and discipline banks’ risk-taking behavior (Bushman & Williams 2012, 2015). Prior
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literature shows that market discipline provides banks with ex ante incentives to avoid
excessive risk-taking and that the effectiveness of market discipline relies on transparency.
Goldberg & Hudgins (2002) and Nier & Baumann (2006) show that uninsured creditors
shy away from failing banks, which forces banks to raise funds in more expensive equity
markets. Bushman & Williams (2012, 2015) argue that investors will demand higher ex-
pected returns from banks with excessive risk. Plosser (2014) argues that transparency
enhances the availability of useful information that allows markets to better price banks’
inherent risks. I study how transparency, by allowing stakeholders to observe the risky
activity, affects bank risk-taking.
Transparency can also assist market discipline by increasing the likelihood and extent of
regulatory actions. Bushman & Williams (2012, 2015) argue that non-regulator outsiders’
ability to observe bank risk-taking can affect regulator’s willingness and ability to withhold
regulatory actions on risky and poorly performing banks. Gallemore (2013) shows that
bank opacity, measured by delays in loan loss provisioning, enables bank regulators to
forbear on systemically important banks to prevent contagion without attracting non-
regulator outsiders’ attention.
2.4.1.3 Regulatory Oversight
Bank regulators and supervisors oversee banks’ activities to ensure the safety and soundness
of individual banks and the banking system.24 Greater transparency can reduce bank risk-
taking if it improves bank regulators’ and supervisors’ ability to observe the risk profile
of individual banks. Bank regulators develop and implement regulations, such as those
requiring periodic reporting and the maintenance of regulatory capital ratios. As discussed
in section 2.2.3, GAAP accounting policies influence regulatory accounting and disclosure
rules. Therefore, greater transparency in banks’ financial reporting can help regulators in
developing and implementing bank safety and soundness regulations. For example, to the
extent that GAAP securitization gains are included in Tier 1 capital and those gains do not
accurately capture the economics of the transaction, transparency can affect regulators’
ability to ensure banks maintain adequate regulatory ratios.
Bank supervisors evaluate the safety and soundness of individual banks by performing
on-site examinations and off-site monitoring.25 Transparency can influence supervisors’
24https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/bsrstaff.htm and http://www.frbsf.org/
education/teacher-resources/what-is-the-fed/supervision-regulation/#Supervision (accessed
on August 16, 2016).
25http://www.frbsf.org/education/teacher-resources/what-is-the-fed/
supervision-regulation/#Supervision (accessed on August 16, 2016).
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ability to observe and evaluate banks’ securitization activities. For example, the Fed-
eral Reserve’s BHC Supervision Manual (2016, sec.1000.0) indicates that supervisors use
SEC filings such as quarterly and annual reports in their preliminary risk assessments. The
Federal Reserve’s Commercial Bank Examination Manual (2016, sec.4030.2) states that su-
pervisors are responsible for ensuring banks’ activities are properly accounted for on banks’
books and are correctly reported on regulatory filings. As part of this responsibility, they
verify models, assumptions, and estimates used in accounting (GAAP) for retained inter-
ests in securitizations. The supervision manuals advise bank examiners to pay attention
to the fact that current regulatory rules may not fully incorporate the economic substance
of banks’ securitization-related risk exposure, and encourage the supervisors to examine
closely the economic substance of securitizations (Commercial Bank Examination Manual,
2016, sec.4030.1). These examples demonstrate that transparency can improve regulators’
and supervisors’ ability to ensure the safety and soundness of individual banks and the
banking system.26
2.4.2 Hypotheses
Section 2.4.1 argues that transparency can reduce bank risk-taking by: (i) allowing unin-
sured creditors to discern banks’ risk exposure and discipline their suboptimal risk-taking,
(ii) improving bank regulators’ and supervisors’ information set, and (iii) decreasing the
likelihood and extent of regulatory forbearance. On the other hand, if shareholders pre-
fer more risk than managers and other non-shareholder outsiders do, transparency can
increase bank risk-taking by increasing existing shareholders’ ability to observe and align
bank risk-taking with their risk preference. However, if managers prefer more risk than
shareholders do, transparency reduces risk-taking by allowing shareholder to mitigate the
mis-alignment. Since the regulatory oversight and the market discipline channels predict
a negative relation between transparency, and the manager-shareholder alignment channel
could go either way, I expect that the average effect of transparency is to reduce bank
risk-taking. Transparency may fail to affect bank risk-taking in their mortgage lending
if securitizing banks can truly transfer the underlying risk to ABS investors, which can
happen for two reasons. First, ABS investors with high risk-appetite (e.g., hedge funds)
may knowingly take the underlying risk and encourage greater risk-taking in the origina-
tion of mortgages. Second, transparency, as defined in this thesis, may not sufficiently
reveal the riskiness of the securitized mortgages. In this case, banks can transfer the risk
to unsuspecting ABS investors. Disclosure of the securitization structure and loan- and
26Similar to Plosser’s (2014) argument for market signals and supervisory assessments, my argument is
not that GAAP reports are superior to regulatory reports, but that they complement each other.
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borrower specific information (e.g., current delinquency status) for the securitized loans,
such as the disclosure requirements for sec-registered ABS per Reg AB and Reg AB II and
the ECB reporting requirement that is examined in Ertan et al. (2017), can address the
second issue. Based on this discussion, I hypothesize that securitizing banks’ risk-taking
varies inversely with transparency.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). As transparency increases, securitizing banks decrease their risk-
taking in mortgage lending more than non-securitizing banks.
As discussed in section 2.4.1, manager-shareholder alignment is more likely to moder-
ate the relation between transparency and bank risk-taking incentives when managers and
shareholders have conflicting risk preferences. Transparency enhances shareholders’ ability
to align managers’ risk-taking incentives with their preferences by increasing the observ-
ability of bank risk-taking. Transparency would not play a significant role for banks with
strong manager-shareholder alignment because managers’ and shareholders’ risk-taking in-
centives are already aligned. However, transparency can significantly affect banks with
weak alignment by tipping the power balance in favor of shareholders. Based on theory
and past empirical evidence discussed in section 2.4.1.1, I assume that shareholders prefer
higher risk than managers do.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). As transparency increases, securitizing banks with low manager-
shareholder alignment increase their risk-taking more than securitizing banks with high
manager-shareholder alignment.
Section 2.4.1.3 argues that transparency affects bank risk-taking through the regulatory
channel if it affects regulators’ ability to observe risk-taking behavior, or if it reduces
regulators’ flexibility to refrain from taking regulatory action on banks with high risk
exposure. In both cases, the effect of transparency on risk-taking should be greater for
banks that are more likely to face regulatory action. However, transparency may not reduce
risk through this channel if regulators believe transparency improves the efficiency of ABS
markets, and the underlying risk is revealed and priced properly, which leads to better
risk-sharing among banks and investors. In this case, regulators may be comfortable with
greater risk-taking because it might not increase systemic risk.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). As transparency increases, securitizing banks with low regulatory
ratios decrease their risk-taking more than securitizing banks with high regulatory ratios.
Section 2.4.1.2 argues that transparency affects bank risk-taking through the market
discipline channel if it enables investors and creditors to observe bank risk-taking and
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penalize banks that take greater risk. Since such market discipline works through the cost
of raising additional funds or capital, its effect is more significant for banks that rely on
uninsured deposits or corporate bonds to a greater extent, or that need to raise additional
capital from equity markets.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). As transparency increases, securitizing banks that face stronger mar-
ket discipline decrease their risk-taking more than securitizing banks that face weaker market
discipline.
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Chapter 3
Research Design and Sample
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the research design and sample. Section 3.2 presents the difference-
in-differences design used to test the effect of transparency around the four securitization
accounting pronouncement events. Section 3.3 introduces the primary data sources, in-
cluding the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database that contains loan-level
residential mortgage information and the FR Y-9C database that contains BHC-level fi-
nancial information. Section 3.4 presents the sampling procedure.
3.2 Difference-in-Differences Design
I use a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design, comparing securitizing BHCs with
a matched sample of non-securitizing BHCs, pre- and post- the adoption of each of the
five securitization accounting pronouncements discussed in section 2.2.3. A key feature
of this design is that it exploits five accounting pronouncements that form four distinct
transparency treatments, of which one decreases transparency and the others increase
transparency.1 This feature increases confidence in transparency as the causal influence.
I use three alternative test windows for each pronouncement. The first test window
spans two years where the post-period is the first calendar year for which the pronounce-
ment is effective, and the pre-period is the calendar year prior to post-period. For example,
1FAS 166 and FAS 167 provide only one treatment because they have the same effective date.
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for FAS 125 the pre-period is the calendar year 1996 and the post-period is the calendar
year 1997. FAS 125 was issued in June 1996 and was effective for securitizations occurring
after December 31, 1996. This narrow test window mitigates the possibility that changes
in lending behavior are driven by factors other than the effective change in transparency.
In the second test window, I use the calendar year prior to the adoption year as the pre-
period because BHCs may change their lending behavior in response to the adoption of
a pronouncement when it is issued and before the effective date. Continuing the above
example for FAS 125, the post-period remains the calendar year 1997 while the pre-period
is now the calendar year 1995. The third test window spans four years with the first two
calendar years for which the pronouncement is effective forming the post-period (e.g., 1997
& 1998 for FAS 125) and the two calendar years immediately preceding the post period
forming the pre-period (e.g., 1995 & 1996 for FAS 125).
Section 2.2.3 presents the case for why FAS 125 decreases transparency, and why the
other pronouncements increase transparency. This section provides several reasons to sup-
port my claim that the adoptions of the first three of the pronouncements are plausibly
exogenous to my research question. First, suboptimal risk-taking in primary mortgage
markets was not a major concern in the pre-crisis period. In the pre-crisis period, many
commentators (e.g., Laderman 2001, Gramlich 2004) focused on the benefits of securiti-
zation in promoting competition in the sub-prime markets and in increasing the flow of
funds to borrowers in this market. Second, FASB provides no indication in its discussions
that it issued these pronouncements because previous standards failed to reveal bank risk-
taking, which it does for FAS 166. This is in line with FASB’s intent to write standards
that neutrally reflect underlying economics, without attempting to directly influence the
economic activity. Last, even FIN 46 (R), which was issued in response to Enron’s high-
profile accounting scandal, did not directly target bank lending decisions. However, there is
likely endogeneity around the adoption of FAS 166 & 167. The role of sub-prime mortgage
securitizations in the financial crisis plausibly motivated these pronouncements.
While the first three pronouncements were not issued as a direct response to bank
risk-taking, it is possible that other economic events that preceded or occurred contem-
poraneously with these pronouncements can affect bank risk-taking. For example, FAS
125 was issued during the early stages of the securitization market, when it was growing
rapidly. FAS 140 was preceded by the 1998 Russian debt and hedge fund crisis. Many
subprime mortgage lenders either failed or were acquired by larger banks, and subprime
mortgage securitization volume declined following the 1998 Russian debt/hedge fund crisis
(Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross 2006). As discussed in the previous paragraph, FIN
46(R) was issued as a response to the Enron scandal. It is possible that these events affect
bank risk-taking, and do so more than transparency affects bank risk-taking, making the
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effect of transparency a second order effect and difficult to disentangle from the effect of
these economic events. However, to the extent that these events affect both securitizing
and non-securitizing banks, my DiD design with non-securitizing banks as a control group
should isolate securitization-related transparency as the treatment.
I use non-securitizing BHCs, which are not affected by securitization accounting pro-
nouncements, as a control group to account for changes in bank risk-taking driven by other
factors, such as changes in economic and market conditions, government policy, industry
practice, and regulatory policy in the same period. To alleviate selection problems that
arise if the factors that cause BHCs to securitize also drive their differential risk-taking rel-
ative to non-securitizing BHCs, I form a propensity score-matched control group.2 I form
a distinct test sample of matched treatment-control pairs for each transparency event.
I employ the following procedure to create a matched pair of treatment and control
BHCs. I first estimate a logistic propensity score model of the probability of securitization,
conditional on characteristics observable in the year immediately prior to the treatment,
separately for private and publicly traded BHCs.3 I then match each public (private)
securitizing BHC to the public (private) non-securitizing BHC with the closest propensity
score. I perform the matching with replacement and imposing a 10% caliper. While
it is common in the accounting literature (e.g., Casu, Clare, Sarkisyan & Thomas 2013,
Lawrence, Minutti-Meza & Zhang 2011, Oz 2016) to use a caliper width < 5% to reduce the
likelihood of matched pairs with drastically different propensity scores, I choose a relatively
wider caliper to reduce the number of observations lost in the matching process.4 King &
Nielsen (2016) show that pruning more observations can result in greater biases and model
dependence.
The primary dependent variable is bank risk-taking in mortgage lending as reflected by
the risk profiles of mortgages originated or purchased by each BHC. All else equal, more
aggressive risk-taking corresponds to looser lending standards and origination or purchase
of riskier mortgages. Chapter 4 discusses validation of the specific measures of risk-taking
used in this thesis.
2To reduce the likelihood that my results are driven by this particular matching method, I test the
robustness of my findings to using other matching techniques in section 5.5.
3Appendix C discusses the propensity score matching in greater detail, including a description of the
ex ante observable covariates, which I selected based on prior literature (e.g., Minton, Sanders, Strahan
et al. 2004, Uzun & Webb 2007, Affinito & Tagliaferri 2010, Cardone-Riportella, Samaniego-Medina &
Trujillo-Ponce 2010) that examines determinants of securitization, and Oz (2016) who performs a similar
propensity score matching of securitizing and non-securitizing BHCs around FAS 166 & 167.
4I test the sensitivity of my results to using other caliper width. See appendix C for more details.
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3.2.1 Securitization Indicator
I define a given BHC-year as securitizing if the BHC has a stock of outstanding securitized
mortgages in the three-year period ending in the current year. I use a three-year period to
identify securitizing banks because some BHCs securitize sporadically. I define mortgages
as securitized if they are: (i) “sold with recourse” for the 1993-2000 period, and (ii) “sold
and securitized” or “sold with recourse but not securitized” for the 2001-2015 period.5
While mortgages “sold with recourse but not securitized” are not directly securitized by
the reporting BHC, they likely represent participations in securitizations by other entities
such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and unaffiliated private securitization conduits. More-
over, these types of financial asset transfers are within the scopes of all the accounting
pronouncements explored in this study.
3.3 Data Sources
3.3.1 The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Database
I obtain data about individual mortgage applications from the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) database, which covers most mortgage lending institutions in the United
States, beginning 1993. HMDA requires covered institutions to file loan-level information
about the loan, borrower, and property characteristics annually for all new residential
mortgage loans and applications (hereafter, loans). Figure 3.1 shows HMDA coverage over
the 1990-2012 period. The number of institutions varies between 7,652 in 2001 and 9,880
in 1994. The total number of loans and applications varies from 11.2 million in 1995 to 41.6
million in 2003. I supplement the mortgage-level information from the HMDA database
with census, demographic, income, house price, mortgage term, and other economic data
from other sources, as discussed in section 3.3.3. This combined dataset allows me to
construct mortgage lending risk measures, discussed in chapter 4, at the BHC level.
5The information about securitized mortgages is from the FR Y-9C data base discussed in detail in
section 3.3.2. That section also explains why it is necessary to define securitized assets differently before
and after 2000.
38
Figure 3.1: HMDA Coverage
This graph presents the HMDA coverage for the 1993-2015 period. The dashed red line represents the
total number of mortgage loan applications in each year. The solid dark line represents the number of
lending institutions in the HMDA database in each year. Both the number of institutions and the number
of loans are for the entire HMDA sample, before I applied any of the filters in the sampling procedure.
3.3.2 FR Y-9C Database
I obtain all financial data for BHCs from the FR Y-9C dataset, available from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago. The Federal Reserve uses form FR Y-9C to collect detailed
financial information on a quarterly basis from all large BHCs and all multibank holding
companies that engage in non-banking activities or that have outstanding public debt.
Form FR Y-9C contains a consolidated balance sheet and income statement along with
additional disaggregated disclosure about on- and off-balance-sheet activities including se-
curitization. These data allow me to identify securitizing BHCs, to create loan portfolio
performance measures such as delinquencies and net charge-offs, and to create the covari-
ates for the propensity score model.
Prior to 2001Q2, the Federal Reserve required BHCs to disclose their outstanding
assets sold with recourse, disaggregated by three asset classes: residential mortgages, small
business obligations, and other assets. Assets “sold with recourse” include assets securitized
by the reporting entity and assets sold with recourse to third parties including securitization
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conduits sponsored by other entities. Beginning 2001Q2, the Federal Reserve requires more
detailed information about securitized assets. The new disclosure requirement splits assets
from the “sold with recourse” category into “assets sold and securitized” and “assets sold
with recourse but not securitized” categories. For both categories, BHCs disclose detailed
information about the outstanding transferred assets, disaggregated by seven asset classes.
For each category and asset class, they disclose the outstanding amounts of assets sold or
securitized and the maximum contractual credit exposure, unused liquidity commitments,
past due amount, charge-offs and recoveries in relations to these activities.
3.3.3 Other Data Sources
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) provides the
HMDA/Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) census data at the Metropolitan Statis-
tical Area (MSA) and Census tract levels for use with the HMDA and CRA databases.
This census database contains select demographic, income, population, and housing data.
While most of the data are from the preceding decennial census, the FFIEC updates the
HMDA/CRA census database annually to reflect estimated changes to MSA boundaries, in-
come estimates developed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
and to include CRA distressed/underserved tracts as announced by the federal bank reg-
ulatory agencies. The HMDA/CRA census and BEA (described below) databases contain
multiple local area income characteristics. The HMDA/CRA census database contains
median household and family income at the census tract level and median family income
at the MSA level.6
As an alternative to the HMDA/CRA census database, which can become less accurate
overtime, I obtain additional local economic data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) annual regional GDP and personal income database and local area unemployment
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BEA database contains information
about the per capita personal income, the proportion of the population employed, and the
average earnings per job at the county level. Furthermore, the database provides per capita
personal income disaggregated by the source of income such as wages, dividends, interest,
and government benefit. Combining the BEA and BLS databases with HMDA mortgage
data allows me to identify whether a given mortgage is in high-risk county or whether the
borrower income is lower than the local area average personal income. I define a high-risk
6The U.S. Census Bureau defines a household as a group of people occupying a sin-
gle housing unit and a family as a household of individuals related by birth, marriage,
or adoption. See https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/technical-documentation/
subject-definitions.html (accessed on May 4, 2017).
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county as one with low per capita personal income, high unemployment rate, or high per
capita government assistance.
I obtain house price indexes from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) House
Price Index (HPI) database.7 The HPI database provides MSA-level house price indexes
that reflect average price changes based on repeat sales or refinancings on the same proper-
ties. The house price indexes allow me to estimate the local area median house value, which
is useful in estimating the loan-to-value ratio for a given mortgage, one of the mortgage
lending risk measures discussed in chapter 4.
For the publicly traded BHCs, I obtain stock market data from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) and analyst following data from Institutional Brokers’ Estimate
System (IBES). The CRSP and IBES variables are used in the propensity score matching
model. I use the linking table from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to match the
Federal Reserve identification number (RSSD ID) used in the FR Y-9C database to CRSP
identifier (PERMCO).8
3.4 Sample Selection Procedure
Table 3.1 presents a summary of the sampling procedure. I start with 23,123 financial
institutions with over 499 million residential mortgage loans in the HMDA database and
4,021 large BHCs with 33,141 BHC-year observations in the FR Y-9C database, both
over the period 1993-2015. I focus on large BHCs because regulators require them to
file detailed financial information in form FR Y-9C (see section 3.3.2), which allow me to
construct variables relevant to my tests. In comparison, the regulatory filing requirement
for small BHCs are less detailed.9 I apply the following screens to obtain the final sample.
First, I restrict the mortgage sample to single-family (1-4 family) home purchase loans
to have a more economically homogeneous sample of mortgages. Mortgages secured by
multifamily properties (5 or more families) are economically different from those secured
by single-family properties. Multifamily properties (5 or more families) such as apartment
buildings are more likely to be investment properties than single-family properties. Bor-
rowers of multifamily mortgages are more likely to be companies than those of single-family
7Available at https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads (accessed on March 29, 2017).
8https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html (accessed on Novem-
ber 27,2015.)
9Large BHCs are those with total assets of $150 million or more for the period prior to 2006, $500
million or more for the period 2006-2014, and $1 billion or more for the period after 2014.
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mortgages. Unlike single-family mortgages, HMDA does not require the borrower income
to be reported for multi-family mortgages. Home purchase loans are also economically dif-
ferent from home improvement loans, mortgage refinancing, and home equity loans. This
filter results in approximately 194 million observations for 22,631 distinct institutions. The
large drop in the number of loans is due to the exclusion of refinancing loans, which make
up 53% of the mortgages in the HMDA database.
Second, I restrict the mortgage sample to conventional home purchase loans because
BHCs have minimal risk exposure to non-conventional mortgages, which are insured or
guaranteed by U.S. government agencies such as the FHA, VA, FSA, and RHS.10 The
resulting sample contains 151 million observations for 22,514 distinct institutions.
Third, I restrict the mortgage sample to observations with valid location ID, valid loan
amount, and non-missing values for variables used to construct the mortgage lending risk
measures discussed in chapter 4, resulting in 118 million observations for 22,095 distinct
institutions.
Fourth, I restrict the BHC sample to only top-tier BHCs, resulting in 30,506 BHC-year
observations for 3,725 distinct BHCs. I identify top-tier BHCs using the Regulatory High
Holder ID in the FR Y-9C dataset. This variable contains the RSSD ID of the highest
holding company in a tiered BHC structure, and is set to zero if the BHC is the top-
tier BHC. Analysis at the top-tier BHC-level is appropriate because consolidation at this
level ensures proper matching of all related securitization and mortgage-banking activities,
which can be performed by different subsidiaries, and avoids double-counting.
Fifth, I further restrict the BHC sample to observations with non-missing loan perfor-
mance measures, which are used to validate the mortgage lending risk measures in chapter
4. This screen results in 30,502 BHC-year observations for 3,723 unique BHCs.
Sixth, I combine the two samples to form a sample of 24,999 BHC-year observations for
3,106 unique top-tier BHCs with 52 million mortgage loans or applications in the HMDA
dataset, filed by 7,128 distinct branches or subsidiaries. HMDA filings are at the subsidiary
or branch level, and they do not identify the top-tier BHC. I describe the procedure for
identifying branches and subsidiaries of the BHCs, and the procedure for matching the FR
Y-9C and HMDA databases in Appendix B. This filter results in a large drop in the number
of loans/applications, and in the number institutions with HMDA filings. I believe that
this drop is primarily driven by small BHCs and independent (i.e., non-BHC) mortgage
lenders, both of which are not included in my sample. As I explained at the beginning of
10FHA = Federal Housing Association, VA = Veterans Association, FSA = Farm Service Agency, and
RHS = Rural Housing Service.
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this section, small BHCs are not included in my sample because they are not required to
file FR Y-9C. As a result, the loans/application in HMDA associated with their branches
and subsidiaries are dropped at this stage in the sampling process. Similarly, independent
mortgage lenders such as mortgage brokers and their loans/applications are not included
in my sample because they are not required to file FR Y-9C.
While I exclude small BHCs and independent mortgage lenders, I acknowledge that
this filter biases my sample to large financial institutions. I do not assume that risk-
taking by small BHCs and independent institutions is irrelevant. Rather, I exclude these
institutions because of limited data availability, and because I focus on loan origination and
securitization within the same organization. I expect the effect of the bias to be limited
because most active securitizers tend to be large BHCs.
Finally, I exclude the top five securitizing BHCs (Bank of America, Citigroup, Coun-
trywide, JP Morgan, and Wells Fargo) because they are unique in terms of their size,
complexity, and extent of securitization activity. I dedicate chapter 6 to detailed analyses
of these banks because of their apparent economic significance. The final sample contains
24,902 BHC-year observations for 3,100 unique top-tier BHCs with 28,463,187 conventional
residential mortgage loans or application for home purchase. As evidenced by the change
in the number of loans, the top six BHCs are responsible for 45% of the loans.
Table 3.2 presents the composition of the final sample. The sample contains 1,064
(8,751 BHC-years) publicly traded BHCs and 2,242 (16,151 BHC-years) privately held
BHCs, of which 393 (2,495 BHC-years) and 446 (2,493 BHC-years) are securitizing, re-
spectively. About 25% of the private BHCs are registered with the SEC. Private BHCs
can be registered with the SEC, for example, if they have outstanding public debt. Over-
all, there are 2,833 securitizing BHCs (19,914 BHC-years) and 806 non-securitizing BHCs
(4,988 BHC-years).
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Table 3.1: Summary of Sampling Procedure
Number of
Selection Criteria
Bank Holding
Companies
(BHCs)*
BHC-year
Observations
Loans or
Applications
Institutions
with HMDA
filing*
Mortgage Sample
Initial HMDA sample for the period 1993-2015 499,374,046 23,123
Restrict to:
Single-family home purchase mortgages 193,972,086 22,631
Conventional home purchase mortgages 151,273,950 22,514
Observations with:
Valid location IDs 122,190,765 22,384
Valid loan amount 122,190,741 22,384
Non-missing value for variables used
to construct mortgage lending
risk measures 118,249,671 22,095
Bank Holding Company Sample
Initial BHC sample for the period 1993-2015 4,021 33,141
Restrict to:
Top-tier BHCs 3,725 30,506
Observations with non-missing values for
loan portfolio performance measures 3,723 30,502
Combined Sample
Top-tier BHCs with HMDA data 3,106 24,999 51,622,995 7,128
Remove the five largest securitizing BHCs 3,100 24,902 28,463,187 6,532
* The number of BHCs and lending institution in HMDA in these tables are the unique number of BHCs and lenders
available for at least one year during the period 1993-2015.
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Table 3.2: Sample Composition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8)
Public BHCs Private BHCs Total
BHC-year
Obs
Unique
BHCs
BHC-year
Obs
Unique
BHCs
BHC-year
Obs
Unique
BHCs
Securitizing BHCs 2,495 393 2,493 446 4,988 806
Non-securitizing BHCs 6,256 892 13,658 2113 19,914 2,833
Total 8,751 1,064 16,151 2242 24,902 3,100
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Chapter 4
Mortgage Lending Risk Measures
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I propose and validate measures of bank risk-taking in residential mortgage
lending in the United States (hereafter, mortgage lending risk measures, or MLRMs).
To construct the measures, I first review prior research and identify individual mortgage
characteristics that are associated with the underlying risk of the mortgages.1,2 Because I
am interested in the original lending decisions, I require that a characteristic be observable
by lenders at mortgage origination. To make my data analysis possible, I also require
that it be available publicly. I then create a mortgage-level high-risk indicator based
on each characteristic. I add the individual high-risk indicators to obtain a mortgage-
level composite risk score. Finally, I aggregate the mortgage-level composite scores across
mortgages to the BHC level to obtain the proposed BHC-level MLRMs.
1The phrases “mortgage risk” and “mortgage lending risk” have a closely related but distinct meaning.
Mortgage risk refers to the underlying risk of an individual mortgage such as default risk or prepayment
risk. Mortgage lending risk refers to the riskiness of a bank’s mortgage lending decisions such as increasing
the approval rate for mortgages with high default risk. For a given lender, mortgage lending risk increases
with more originations of riskier mortgages (i.e., mortgages with greater “mortgage risk”).
2The literature examines different sample periods, geographic areas, and types of mortgages. For
example, earlier studies (e.g., Morton 1975, Sandor & Sosin 1975, Vandell & Thibodeau 1985) use mortgages
from the 1960-1980 period, whereas others (e.g., Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, Hunt et al.
2010, Demyanyk, Koijen, Van Hemert et al. 2010, Jagtiani & Lang 2011, Chan, Gedal, Been & Haughwout
2013) study mortgages originated in the 2000s. These studies also differ in terms of how many factors they
consider and the measurement timeline of the factors relative to mortgage origination. These contextual
differences could affect the generalizability of their results to the context I examine.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the back-
ground of mortgage risk, focusing on the types of mortgage risks and their primary deter-
minants. Section 4.3 identifies specific mortgage characteristics associated with underlying
risk and constructs the proposed measures. Section 4.5 presents the validation tests. Sec-
tion 4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Background
Residential mortgage lenders face two major types of mortgage risk, namely interest rate
risk and mortgage termination risk. Interest rate risk refers to the uncertainty in the
fair value of lenders’ mortgage portfolios due to interest rate fluctuations.3 When interest
rates rise, the fair value of fixed-rate mortgages declines, which in turn results in loss from
the opportunity cost of having funds tied up in low interest mortgages. When interest
rates decline, borrowers can reduce their periodic mortgage payments by refinancing their
mortgages. I do not explore interest rate risk in this thesis because it is a macroeconomic
factor that does not vary across banks or borrowers. Moreover, banks’ exposure to interest
rate risk is not limited to residential mortgages, as banks engage in overall interest rate
risk management, making it impossible to isolate their exposure to interest rate risk due
to residential mortgages alone.
Mortgage termination risk arises from the uncertainty that borrowers may prematurely
terminate mortgages through default or prepayment.4 In mortgage defaults, lenders lose all
or part of principal and future interest on foreclosed mortgages, and incur the additional
costs associated with the foreclosure process. Mortgage termination via prepayment, a
full payment of the principal before the term ends, reduces lenders’ mortgage portfolio
yield because of the loss of future interest. Prior literature (e.g., Jackson & Kaserman
1980, Campbell & Dietrich 1983, Deng, Quigley & Order 2000, Elul et al. 2010) documents
that a combination of factors such as negative home equity, borrowers’ inability to make
payments (illiquidity), declining interest rates, and borrower mobility determine whether
and how borrowers terminate their mortgages.
Prior research (e.g., Jackson & Kaserman 1980, Campbell & Dietrich 1983, Vandell &
Thibodeau 1985, Elul et al. 2010, Campbell & Cocco 2015) examines the competing effects
3Interest rate fluctuations can also affect the demand for mortgages. For instance, high periodic mort-
gage payments due to high interest rates can lead to lower demand for mortgages. Conversely, low periodic
payments when interest rates are low can fuel mortgage demand. This study focuses on banks’ risk-taking
in mortgage lending, given aggregate mortgage demand.
4LaCour-Little (2008) provides a detailed review of the literature examining mortgage termination risk.
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of negative home equity and borrower illiquidity on default. The illiquidity hypothesis
predicts that borrowers default on mortgages when they can no longer make scheduled
payments. In contrast, the negative equity hypothesis predicts that borrowers default only
if they have negative home equity. Under the latter hypothesis, illiquid borrowers with
positive home equity would not default on their mortgages. They would rather terminate
their mortgage by selling the house and prepaying the remaining balance. Borrowers with
negative equity would default regardless of their illiquidity.
While earlier studies (e.g., Jackson & Kaserman 1980, Campbell & Dietrich 1983) find
evidence consistent only with the negative equity hypothesis, recent studies provide em-
pirical (e.g., Elul et al. 2010) and theoretical (e.g., Campbell & Cocco 2015) evidence
that supports both the equity and illiquidity hypotheses. One explanation for the mixed
findings is that these studies cover different types of mortgages from different time peri-
ods and geographic areas, with different economic and institutional conditions. Jackson
& Kaserman (1980) use a 5% random sample of FHA-insured loans originated in 1969,
Campbell & Dietrich (1983) use a sample of mortgages insured by the Mortgage Guaran-
tee Insurance Corporation between 1960 and 1980, and Elul et al. (2010) use a sample of
fixed-rate, owner-occupied, single-family mortgages originated in 2005 and 2006. Another
explanation is that the earlier studies do not control for many of the other factors that in-
fluence mortgage default decisions. For example, Jackson & Kaserman’s (1980) regression
model contains only three independent variables whereas Elul et al.’s (2010) regression
model contains over 30 independent variables. Both home equity and borrower illiquidity
are relevant in my setting because (i) Elul et al.’s (2010) empirical findings are based on
relatively similar sample of mortgages as this thesis, and (ii) predictions from Campbell &
Cocco’s (2015) equilibrium model are consistent with these empirical findings.
Deng et al. (2000) examine default and prepayment decisions simultaneously and pro-
vide theoretical and empirical evidence that mortgage terminations due to negative home
equity tend to be defaults, while terminations due to declining interest rates tend to be
prepayments. As discussed above, I do not explore prepayment risk due to declining inter-
est rates because interest rate conditions do not vary in my cross-sectional comparisons.
Besides declining interest rates, prior literature (e.g., Mattey & Wallace 2001) documents
that borrower mobility can also lead to mortgage prepayments. A borrower moving to a
new home may sell the previous home and terminate the mortgage. Changes in household
income or size can influence mobility within an area (e.g. city). Career factors and lo-
cal economic conditions can affect borrower mobility outside the local area. For example,
borrowers may move away from high unemployment areas to find better job opportunities.
In summary, mortgage lenders are exposed to risks that arise from fluctuations in
borrower income, home equity, market interest rates, and borrower mobility. I focus on
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risk factors that vary across individual mortgages or across individual banks at a point in
time to develop the proposed MLRMs. I exclude macroeconomic factors such as market
interest rates from the development of the proposed measures because they do not reflect
cross-sectional differences.
4.3 Constructing Mortgage Lending Risk Measures
This section develops the proposed BHC-level residential mortgage lending risk measures
using the following procedure. First, I review prior literature on the determinants of
mortgage termination and expected loss given termination to identify factors associated
with the underlying risk in individual mortgages. I categorize these factors into four
groups as borrower, loan, property, and local area characteristics, though some of them
(e.g. loan-to-value or mortgage payment-to-income) combine categories.5 I focus on the
characteristics that are observable by lenders at origination and that are available in the
public databases. I define each characteristic to be increasing in risk. I measure dollar-
valued characteristics relative to MSA medians to ensure comparability of mortgages across
areas with varying socio-economic conditions. For example, the amount of borrower income
required to afford a property can be significantly different across geographic areas due to
significant differences in house prices.6 Second, for each characteristic, I create a high-risk
indicator variable that equals one for mortgages that are riskier than the median mortgage
at the MSA-year level. For binary characteristics (e.g., existence of a coborrower), the
high-risk indicator variable equals one when the mortgage exhibits the riskier of the two
possible values of that characteristic (e.g., mortgages with no coborrower). I use I. at the
beginning of variable names to indicate that the variable is an indicator variable based on
the underlying characteristics. For example, I.NOCOBORR is an indicator for mortgages
with no coborrower and I.INCOME is an indicator for mortgages with borrower income
below the MSA median, i.e., the high-risk indicator based on borrower income. Third, I
add all the high-risk indicators to create a mortgage-level composite risk score. To the
extent that each individual high-risk indicator reflects the underlying risk arising from
the corresponding characteristic, I expect the composite score to reflect the overall risk
5Appendix D presents a more comprehensive summary of the determinants of mortgage risk, including
those not used in constructing my measures.
6While I use MSA as the definition of a local area, it is also possible define a local area more narrowly
as a county or a census tract. I prefer the MSA as the local are definition because some data (e.g. house
price index) are available only at the MSA level.
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underlying individual mortgages.7 Last, I use the mortgage-level composite score to create
the proposed BHC-level measures that reflect the riskiness of BHCs’ mortgage lending
activity in a given year.
4.3.1 Individual Mortgage Risk Characteristics
4.3.1.1 Borrower-specific Characteristics
Borrower illiquidity, which arises from shocks to or fluctuations of borrowers’ residual in-
come, is a primary borrower-specific factor affecting mortgage termination. Borrowers can
become illiquid if their income decreases (e.g., due to unemployment) or if their non-housing
non-discretionary expenses (e.g., medical expenses) increase, resulting in insufficient resid-
ual income to cover mortgage payment. Income volatility from seasonal employment can
increase the risk of borrower illiquidity off-season.
Prior literature (e.g., Morton 1975, Sandor & Sosin 1975, Vandell & Thibodeau 1985,
Elul et al. 2010, Demyanyk et al. 2010, Jagtiani & Lang 2011, Chan et al. 2013) examines
multiple characteristics that reflect borrower income (or illiquidity) risk. Some examples
include current income, employment status, employment history, length of employment in
current job, occupation, number of dependents, marital status, non-housing wealth, and
government assistance. The first four characteristics capture the level and stability of bor-
rowers’ income in the past, which can predict future income level and stability. The other
characteristics reflect non-housing non-discretionary expenses, which predict borrowers’
ability to withstand negative income shocks. Of these borrower illiquidity factors, I can
observe only borrower income at origination. I define INCOME as the ratio of the me-
dian borrower income at the MSA-year level to the individual borrower income. Borrower
income is in the denominator to ensure that it is increasing in risk. Illiquidity risk increases
as borrower income decreases relative to the MSA median income.8
Borrowers’ debt burden can affect their ability to pay back their mortgages. Everything
else equal, borrowers with greater debt burden are more likely to default on their mortgage
than borrowers with lower debt burden because they are more likely to become illiquid
over the mortgage term. Prior research (e.g., Elul et al. 2010, Demyanyk et al. 2010, Chan
7This aggregation assumes that all individual components are equally important, which can reduce the
quality of the composite risk score if some components are more important than others.
8In 5.5, I test the sensitivity of my results to defining INCOME relative to other local area income
benchmarks such as MSA median household income from the Census database and MSA personal income
per capita from the BEA database.
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et al. 2013) documents that indicators of borrower debt burden such as debt payment-to-
income, debt-to-income, credit card utilization, and existence of a second mortgage predict
mortgage defaults. Since I do not have access to information about non-mortgage debt, I
use the mortgage loan-to-income ratio, in lieu of debt-to-income ratio, as a proxy for debt
burden. I argue that this ratio captures overall debt burden to a reasonable degree because
a mortgage is typically the largest household debt. I define the mortgage loan-to-income
ratio (LTI) as the MSA median mortgage loan-to-income ratio divided by the borrower
mortgage loan-to-income ratio, where the MSA median mortgage loan-to-income is the
median loan-to-income for all mortgage applications in the MSA during the same year.
Other borrower characteristics associated with mortgage default include credit score,
age, existence of coborrower, and race, of which I can observe the last two. Households
with two earners are less likely to become illiquid if one earner experiences income shocks.
Consistent with this, Chan et al. (2013) find that loans with a coborrower are less likely to
default. I create an indicator variable I.NOCOBORR that equals one when a mortgage
has no coborrower, and zero otherwise.
Prior research (e.g., Berkovec, Canner, Gabriel & Hannan 1994, Firestone, Van Order
& Zorn 2007, Chan et al. 2013, Jiang, Nelson & Vytlacil 2014a) provides evidence of higher
likelihood of default for Black and Hispanic borrowers. Berkovec et al. (1994) use a sample
of FHA-insured mortgages originated over the period 1987-1989 and find that minority
borrowers are more likely to default, after controlling for other determinants of default.
Firestone et al. (2007) examine 3-year fixed-rate mortgages originated over the period 1993-
1997 and purchased by Freddie Mac, and they find that minority borrowers default at a
higher rate, even after controlling for other factors. Chan et al. (2013) document a similar
relation between race and mortgage default using a sample of first-lien adjustable-rate and
30-year fixed-rate mortgages originated in New York City between 2004 and 2007. Jiang
et al. (2014a) also find similar association between borrower race and default using loan-
level data for a sample of mortgages originated by a major national mortgage bank during
the 2004-2008 period.9 I create two indicator variables I.BLACK and I.HISPANIC for
borrowers’ race and ethnicity, respectively.
4.3.1.2 Loan-specific Characteristics
Prior research (e.g., Sandor & Sosin 1975, Morton 1975, Campbell & Dietrich 1983, Deng
et al. 2000, Elul et al. 2010, Jagtiani & Lang 2011, Chan et al. 2013, Elul 2016) documents
9None of these studies claim a causal link between borrower race and defaults, and Chan et al. (2013)
argue that the association between race and default may be driven by differential treatment of minority
borrowers by the mortgage industry or other unobservable factors correlated to race.
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an association between the likelihood of mortgage termination and loan characteristics
such as loan-to-value, mortgage payment-to-income, loan amount, the lack of proper docu-
mentation (e.g., missing borrower income), mortgage age, and term-to-maturity. Of these
characteristics, I can observe the loan amount, missing borrower income, and mortgage
age. In addition, I can construct a proxy for loan-to-value ratio. I do not use mortgage
age in my thesis because it is equal to zero for all mortgages at origination.
The size of the loan can affect the likelihood of mortgage termination because it affects
borrower’s home equity and periodic payments. Elul et al. (2010) and Elul (2016) find
that borrowers with larger loans are more likely to default than those with smaller loans,
and Jagtiani & Lang (2011) find that jumbo loans are more likely to be foreclosed. I
define LOAN as the ratio of the dollar amount of the mortgage loan to the MSA median
mortgage amount.
Lack of proper documentation can reflect lenders’ poor borrower screening that may
result in approval of riskier mortgages. Low documentation mortgages can be riskier if the
lack of documentation allows high-risk borrowers to obtain mortgages at more favorable
terms when they would otherwise not qualify for these mortgages. Consistently, Elul et al.
(2010) show that low documentation mortgages have greater default risk. I define an
indicator variable I.NOINCOME, which equals one if borrower income is missing, as a
proxy for loans with low documentation.10
The loan-to-value ratio (LTV), the ratio of the amount borrowed to the value of the
property, reflects home equity and the amount the lender can recover in case of default.11
An LTV greater than 100 percent (i.e., negative home equity) can trigger strategic defaults
by borrowers who do not want to pay loans that are worth more than the collateral. A large
literature (e.g., Sandor & Sosin 1975, Morton 1975, Campbell & Dietrich 1983, Deng et al.
2000, Elul et al. 2010, Jagtiani & Lang 2011) documents a positive association between
LTV and the likelihood of mortgage default. I use the loan-to-estimated median value ratio
(LTMEDV ), defined as the ratio of the loan amount to an estimated census tract median
house value, as a proxy for LTV. I adjust the census tract median value of owner-occupied
units from the decennial Census data using the changes in MSA-level house price indexes
from FHFA to obtain estimated median house values at the census tract level.
10Note that I.INCOME does not capture all possible types of low documentation mortgages such as
those without employment verification.
11LTV is one of the primary risk indicators used in practice. For example, borrowers are required to
make a minimum 20 percent down payment, which is equivalent to maximum of 80 percent LTV, to qualify
for uninsured conventional mortgages.
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4.3.1.3 Property-specific Characteristics
Property characteristics such as current and expected value, current condition, and whether
it is owner-occupied can affect mortgage termination risk, of which I can observe only the
last one. Chan et al. (2013) find that mortgages secured by an owner-occupied property
are more likely to default than mortgages secured by properties not occupied by the owner,
which include investment properties. A potential explanation for this finding is that mort-
gages secured by investment properties, unlike those secured by owner-occupied properties,
are less sensitive to income shocks because the property itself can generate rent income
to cover mortgage payments. Another explanation is that borrowers who buy investment
properties or second homes (e.g., vacation homes) are high-income borrowers unlikely to
default on their mortgage. However, in my validation tests (section 4.5), I find evidence
of the opposite relation between owner-occupancy and mortgage risk. I specifically find
that BHCs with more mortgages secured by owner-occupied properties have lower mort-
gage delinquencies and charge-offs and that owner-occupied mortgages are more likely to
have high interest rates. As a result, I reverse-coded the high-risk indicator variable for
owner-occupancy and creates the indicator variable I.NOTOWNOCC which equals one
if the property is not owner-occupied, and zero otherwise.
4.3.1.4 Geographic-specific Characteristics
Prior research (e.g., Sandor & Sosin 1975, Vandell & Thibodeau 1985, Elul et al. 2010,
Ghent & Kudlyak 2011, Chan et al. 2013, Anacker 2015) documents that mortgage ter-
mination risk is associated with local area characteristics such as current and expected
housing market conditions, median house value, home ownership rate, percentage of vacant
units, median house age, neighborhood life cycle, local area unemployment rate, median
income, minority percentage, and neighborhood desirability rating. I can observe all these
characteristic except for neighborhood desirability rating, which is a function of the other
geographic characteristics.
Local area housing market conditions affect property values, which in turn affect the
likelihood of negative home equity. Using census-tract-level data about foreclosure starts
during the period January 2007 to June 2008, Anacker (2015) documents that mortgages
in areas with low median house value are more likely to be foreclosed than those in areas
with high median house value. Anacker (2015) also finds that home ownership rate, va-
cancy rate, and median house age are positively associated with foreclosure rates, and that
census tracts in central cities and mature suburbs have greater default rate than those in
developing suburbs.
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I create the following variables to capture local area housing market condition.
MEDV ALUE is the average value of owner-occupied units, averaged to the MSA level,
divided by the median value of owner-occupied units in the census tract.12 I use the change
in MSA-level house price indexes over the previous one-year and five-year periods (∆HPI1
and ∆HPI5, respectively) as proxies for the local area housing market condition. I create
an indicator variable I.LIFECY CLE that equals one if a census tract is a central tract
or is in a mature suburb, and zero otherwise. A central census tract is one in the central
areas of a city, which are more mature than the peripheral and suburban areas. A mature
suburb is a suburban area with a median house age of 30 years or more. I group central
cities and mature suburbs together because Anacker (2015) finds that tracts in central
cities and mature suburbs exhibit similar mortgage foreclosure rate, which is higher than
for tracts in developing suburbs. Other proxies for local area housing market conditions
include the proportion of owner-occupied properties (OWNRATE) and the proportion of
vacant properties (V ACRATE).
Local area unemployment rate and economic condition can be associated with mortgage
risk if they reflect current and expected borrower illiquidity or housing market condition.
Elul et al. (2010) document that an increase in county unemployment rate is positively
associated with mortgage default. Chan et al. (2013) find that neighborhoods with lower
median income exhibit more defaults than those with higher median income.
I use the following variables to measure local area unemployment rate and economic
conditions. UNEMPRATE is the county unemployment rate from the BLS database, and
∆UNEMPRATE is the annual change in UNEMPRATE. I use the personal income
data from BEA to create four county-level local area income measures, namely PERINC,
EARPERJOB, NONHOUSWLTH, and GOV ASSIST . I use local area income data
from the BEA database instead of the HMDA/CRA census database because the BEA
database is updated annually and contains more up to date information. PERINC is the
MSA personal income per capita divided by the county personal income per capita. Simi-
larly, EARPERJOB is the MSA average earnings per job divided by the county average
earnings per job. NONHOUSWLTH is the MSA non-housing wealth per capita divided
by the county non-housing wealth per capita. GOV ASSIST is the county government
assistance per capita divided by the MSA government assistance per capita.
Chan et al. (2013) find that mortgage default rate increases with the percentage of
Black population in the neighborhood, after controlling for other default risk indicators.
12The MSA average value of owner-occupied is the census tract-level median value of owner-occupied
units averaged over all census tracts in the MSA, used as a proxy for the MSA median value of owner-
occupied units.
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They argue that this association “likely indicates the differential treatment of Black neigh-
borhoods by the mortgage industry” (Chan et al. 2013, p.100). To reflect the local area
minority percentage, I use the percentage of Black population (BLACKPERC) and His-
panic population (HISPANICPERC) in the census tract. The corresponding high-risk
indicators I.BLACKPERC and I.HISPANICPERC are equal to one if the census tract
has a majority of Black and Hispanic population, respectively.
Sandor & Sosin (1975) and Vandell & Thibodeau (1985) show that neighborhood de-
sirability rating is negatively associated with mortgage risk premium. While I do not have
access to such desirability ratings, I argue that the other geographic factors discussed above
proxy for neighborhood desirability. For example, current and expected housing market
conditions, unemployment rates, median income, minority percentage, and median house
value can all influence the desirability rating of a neighborhood. Krysan, Couper, Farley
& Forman (2009) show that a neighborhood’s social class and racial composition affect its
desirability, providing evidence supporting the claim that the above socio-economic factors
affect neighborhood desirability.
4.3.2 Composite Risk Measures
I create a mortgage-level composite risk score (MRSCORE) by adding all the 24 individual
high-risk indicators from the previous subsection. I use all the characteristics as compo-
nents in MRSCORE, despite some failing one of the validity test presented in section
4.5. None of the characteristics fails both validity tests, except owner-occupancy, which
I reverse coded, and neither validation test is superior to the other.13 MRSCORE is in-
creasing in mortgage risk because each component is defined to reflect high-risk mortgages
based on the underlying characteristic. I then aggregate MRSCORE across mortgages
within a BHC-year to obtain the BHC-level MLRMs.
I propose four alternative MLRMs designed to capture different types of bank risk-
taking in mortgage lending. BHCs can increase their risk-taking in mortgage lending
either by approving a higher proportion of risky mortgages from the pool of applications
they receive, or by actively seeking to attract risky applications, for example, through
branch locations or advertisements. In either case, the underlying risk of the portfolio
of approved mortgages increases. To the extent that MRSCORE reflects the underlying
risk of individual mortgages, greater risk-taking leads to more approved mortgaged with
13In section 5.5, I perform sensitivity analysis using alternative MLRMs constructed only from those
mortgage characteristics that passed both validity tests.
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high MRSCORE. This suggests the average MRSCORE for all mortgages approved by
a BHC in a given year (AV GMRSCORE) as the first BHC-level MLRM.
AV GMRSCORE reflects the overall risk profile of approved mortgages without con-
sidering the risk profile of the mortgage application pool. However, the risk profile of
mortgage application pools can vary significantly across BHCs because of exogenous factors
such as local area economic downturn which can lead to deteriorations in their mortgage
application pool. A BHC operating in areas experiencing difficult economic conditions is
more likely to receive and approve more high-risk applications than a BHC operating in
areas with better economic conditions. As a result, comparing any two BHCs’ mortgage
approval without considering their applicant pool can be misleading. To control for such
demand effect, I create SAV GMRSCORE as the average MRSCORE for all mortgages
approved by a BHC in a given year divided by the average MRSCORE for all applications
(including those denied, closed, etc.) for the same BHC-year.
SAV GMRSCORE does not capture a risky lending behavior that begins with deliber-
ately targeting high-risk borrowers. This kind of lending behavior results in a high-risk ap-
plication pool and a high-risk portfolio of approved loans. In this case, SAV GMRSCORE
does not reflect the risky lending decisions because the high-risk loans approved appear
normal relative to the high-risk application pool, which the BHC deliberately targeted.
I propose two other measures (NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK) that can reflect
risky lending decisions both through targeting potential high-risk borrowers and through
approving loans to more risky borrowers from a given applicant pool. These measures
focus on the risk profile of mortgages approved by a BHC relative to the risk profile
of all applicants in the MSA, which allows them to capture risk-taking both by actively
targeting high-risk borrowers in a given MSA or by approving riskier mortgages out of their
application pool. To create NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK, I first partition all loans
and applications in a given MSA into high- and low-MRSCORE groups based on the MSA
median MRSCORE. I then define NHIGHRISK as the number of high-MRSCORE
mortgages approved by a BHC in a given year, divided by the total number of mortgages
approved for the same BHC-year. Similarly, $HIGHRISK is the total dollar value of
high-MRSCORE mortgages approved by a BHC in a given year, divided by the total
dollar value of all approved mortgages for the same BHC-year.
4.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the individual mortgage risk characteristics,
the BHC-level composite MLRMs, and the BHC-level mortgage portfolio performance
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measures used in validating the risk measures.
Panel A contains the statistics for the whole sample. The mean (median) value of
8.731 (8.593) for AV GMRSCORE show that the average mortgage application approved
by the average BHC exhibits approximately 9 out of the 24 individual risk characteristics
that make up the composite score. The value of AV GMRSCORE ranges from 3 to
18, which shows that there is a considerable variation in the risk profile of mortgages
approved by different BHCs. The mean (median) value of 0.998 (0.999) for the scaled
version (SAV GMRSCORE) suggest that, on average, the risk profile of the portfolio of
mortgages approved by BHCs is comparable to that of their application pool. However,
SAV GMRSCORE ranges from 0.5–1.731, showing that BHCs vary in this dimension as
well. The mean and median values of NHIGHRISK are 0.439 and 0.405, respectively.
Approximately 40% of the mortgages approved by the average BHC are high-risk mortgages
relative to all mortgage applications in their MSA. NHIGHRISK ranges from 0 to 1,
suggesting that some BHCs approve only low-risk mortgages while other approve only
high-risk mortgages within an MSA. The observations for $HIGHRISK are similar to
that of NHIGHRISK.
Another observation from panel A is that there are apparent outliers for INCOME,
LTI, LOAN , and LTMEDV on the right-hand tails of their distributions. These outliers
do not affect the composite risk measures because their construction is based on median
splits of the individual risk characteristics and not their actual values.
Panel B shows the statistics separately for the securitizing and non-securitizing sub-
samples. For all variables except for AV GMRSCORE, at least one of the mean or median
differ significantly across the two subsamples. In many cases, both the mean and median
are significantly different across the two subsamples. Comparing the BHC-level composite
measures across the two subsamples reveals that non-securitizing BHCs take more risk
than securitizing BHCs. However, the magnitude of these differences is relatively small.
For example, the mean difference for NHIGHRISK is only 10% of the standard deviation
of NHIGHRISK for the combined sample.
4.5 Validation Tests
In this section, I assess the validity of the proposed measures for bank risk-taking in
residential mortgage lending. I specifically test whether the proposed MLRMs reflect the
riskiness of BHCs’ mortgage lending decisions in a given year. Since the composite measures
are only as good as the components they are made of, I first test the validity of the
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Whole Sample
N Mean St. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max
BHC-level MLRMs
AV GMRSCORE 24809 8.731 1.535 3 7.677 8.593 9.656 18.000
SAV GMRSCORE 24809 0.998 0.027 0.500 0.991 0.999 1.004 1.731
NHIGHRISK 24809 0.439 0.216 0 0.295 0.405 0.560 1.000
$HIGHRISK 24809 0.403 0.227 0 0.249 0.356 0.526 1.000
Individual Risk Characteristics
I.BLACK 24809 0.029 0.070 0 0 0.009 0.031 1.000
I.HISPANIC 24809 0.036 0.086 0 0 0.010 0.035 1.000
I.NOCOBORR 24809 0.431 0.172 0.000 0.325 0.419 0.516 1.000
I.NOINCOME 24809 0.102 0.173 0 0.000 0.034 0.115 1.000
I.NOTOWNOCC 24809 0.282 0.234 0.000 0.111 0.216 0.392 1.000
I.LIFECY CLE 24809 0.581 0.253 0 0.411 0.600 0.773 1.000
BLACKPERC 24809 0.077 0.089 0 0.021 0.049 0.098 0.984
HISPANICPERC 24809 0.062 0.092 0 0.014 0.030 0.070 0.944
MEDV ALUE 24809 1.085 0.232 0.225 0.967 1.051 1.164 6.257
OWNRATE 24809 0.601 0.108 0 0.536 0.613 0.679 0.960
POV ERTY 24809 9.661 4.331 0 6.74 8.947 11.659 56.365
V ACRATE 24809 0.083 0.049 0.000 0.055 0.072 0.096 0.827
INCOME 24618 1.093 0.479 0.011 0.917 1.068 1.216 24.316
LTI 24618 2.399 3.091 0.104 1.478 1.911 2.640 167.685
LOAN 24809 1.312 1.021 0.036 0.990 1.196 1.435 99.312
LTMEDV 24809 0.955 0.893 0.043 0.764 0.904 1.045 115.666
∆HPI1 24809 -0.040 0.055 -0.411 -0.061 -0.040 -0.013 0.371
∆HPI5 24809 -0.209 0.230 -1.440 -0.295 -0.206 -0.072 0.597
PERINC 24809 1.032 0.103 0.354 0.996 1.006 1.045 1.885
NONHOUSWLTH 24809 1.122 0.250 0.210 1.000 1.039 1.158 3.713
GOV ASSIST 24809 0.929 0.146 0.168 0.887 0.966 1.000 2.682
EARNPERJOB 24809 1.088 0.138 0.618 1.004 1.041 1.110 2.101
UNEMPRATE 24902 5.487 1.984 1.100 4.144 5.117 6.410 20.600
∆UNEMPRATE 24902 0.009 0.186 -0.487 -0.107 -0.044 0.067 1.330
Mortgage Portfolio Performance Measures
BSMORTPDUE < 90 15047 0.014 0.017 0 0.004 0.009 0.018 0.352
BSMORTPDUE ≥ 90 24801 0.003 0.011 0 0 0.000 0.002 0.464
BSMORTNACC 24816 0.011 0.023 0 0.001 0.004 0.012 0.678
BSMORTCHOFF 24723 0.003 0.025 -0.104 0 0.000 0.002 3.766
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Panel B: Securitizing vs. Non-securitizing BHCs
Non-securitizing BHCs Securitizing BHCs
N Mean St. Dev. Median N Mean St. Dev. Median
BHC-level MLRMs
AV GMRSCORE 19826 8.736 1.579 8.600 4983 8.713 1.349 8.574
SAV GMRSCORE 19826 0.998 0.029 0.999 4983 0.997 0.018 0.997
NHIGHRISK 19826 0.443 0.226 0.411 4983 0.421 0.169 0.392
$HIGHRISK 19826 0.409 0.237 0.362 4983 0.381 0.177 0.343
Individual Risk Characteristics
I.BLACK 19826 0.028 0.070 0.006 4983 0.029 0.068 0.014
I.HISPANIC 19826 0.035 0.089 0.008 4983 0.038 0.075 0.017
I.NOCOBORR 19826 0.429 0.181 0.413 4983 0.437 0.132 0.435
I.NOINCOME 19826 0.101 0.178 0.030 4983 0.102 0.148 0.048
I.NOTOWNOCC 19826 0.297 0.245 0.231 4983 0.222 0.174 0.175
I.LIFECY CLE 19826 0.575 0.263 0.596 4983 0.604 0.204 0.608
BLACKPERC 19826 0.078 0.092 0.047 4983 0.070 0.077 0.053
HISPANICPERC 19826 0.062 0.096 0.029 4983 0.061 0.076 0.037
MEDV ALUE 19826 1.091 0.244 1.056 4983 1.064 0.173 1.036
OWNRATE 19826 0.599 0.111 0.611 4983 0.611 0.092 0.620
POV ERTY 19826 9.873 4.559 9.177 4983 8.816 3.131 8.377
V ACRATE 19826 0.084 0.052 0.072 4983 0.079 0.037 0.072
INCOME 19648 1.087 0.497 1.058 4970 1.117 0.399 1.094
LTI 19648 2.491 3.404 1.960 4970 2.036 1.156 1.791
LOAN 19826 1.320 1.113 1.187 4983 1.280 0.506 1.221
LTMEDV 19826 0.959 0.990 0.900 4983 0.937 0.277 0.918
∆HPI1 19826 -0.041 0.056 -0.040 4983 -0.033 0.052 -0.035
∆HPI5 19826 -0.219 0.230 -0.212 4983 -0.172 0.230 -0.167
PERINC 19826 1.034 0.107 1.005 4983 1.025 0.086 1.009
NONHOUSWLTH 19826 1.125 0.256 1.034 4983 1.112 0.227 1.057
GOV ASSIST 19826 0.929 0.154 0.971 4983 0.928 0.110 0.949
EARNPERJOB 19826 1.090 0.143 1.036 4983 1.081 0.110 1.052
UNEMPRATE 19914 5.462 2.012 5.098 4988 5.587 1.865 5.213
∆UNEMPRATE 19914 0.011 0.185 -0.040 4988 0.003 0.190 -0.056
Mortgage Portfolio Performance Measures
BSMORTPDUE < 90 11493 0.014 0.017 0.009 3554 0.014 0.014 0.010
BSMORTPDUE ≥ 90 19821 0.002 0.009 0.000 4980 0.004 0.016 0.000
BSMORTNACC 19831 0.011 0.024 0.004 4985 0.013 0.021 0.007
BSMORTCHOFF 19747 0.002 0.008 0.000 4976 0.004 0.054 0.001
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the proposed BHC-level MLRMs, the individual risk
characteristics used in constructing these measures, and balance sheet mortgage portfolio performance
measures. Panel A presents the statistics for the whole sample of BHCs over the period 1993-2015, and
panel B presents the statistics separately for securitizing and non-securitizing BHCs over the same period.
Bold font indicates no significant difference across groups. All variables are as defined in appendix A.
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component characteristics. I perform the validity tests using the full sample of all BHCs
over the period 1993-2015. In contrast, the hypotheses test samples consist of matched
pairs of securitizing and non-securitizing BHCs over restricted test periods around the
effective dates of the accounting pronouncements. The broader validation sample allows
me to test the validity of my measures more generally, and on subsamples that are not
used to test the main hypotheses.
4.5.1 Individual Characteristics
I perform two tests to assess the validity of the individual characteristics. First, I test the
ability of the characteristics to predict mortgage portfolio performance over the following
four years. If the characteristics reflect underlying risk, I expect to find an association
between each characteristic and future mortgage delinquency or default. Second, I test
whether these characteristics are associated with the likelihood that a mortgage is a high-
yield mortgage with annual interest rate at least 3% greater than the yield on the treasury
security with a comparable maturity. I expect that each characteristic is positively associ-
ated with the likelihood that a mortgage is high-yield mortgage if the characteristic reflects
underlying risk and mortgage interest rates reflect lenders’ assessment of the underling risk.
4.5.1.1 Predicting Mortgage Portfolio Performance
To assess the ability of each component characteristic to predict subsequent mortgage
portfolio performance, I test the correlation between each trait and future on-balance-
sheet (BS) mortgage portfolio outcomes such as delinquencies and charge-offs. I focus on
BS mortgages because performance data for off-balance-sheet mortgages is not available
prior to 2001, and because it is sparsely populated when available in the post-2001 period.
I would ideally use the subsequent mortgage performance of on- and off-balance-sheet
mortgages because the combined pool better matches with mortgage originations, some of
which are kept on the balance sheet while other are securitized or sold. My validity test will
be weakened to the extent that on-balance-sheet mortgages performance measures capture
only part of the risk associated with mortgage origination. Assuming that the proposed
measures capture the risk in banks’ lending decisions, my on-balance-sheet mortgaged
performance based tests might understate the validity of my measures, if banks securitize
the riskiest loans. In contrast, these tests might overstate the validity of my measures, if
banks securitize the least risky loans. I perform these tests using BHC-level aggregations
because I cannot observe individual mortgage performance. For example, I assess the
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validity of INCOME by testing the correlation between the average INCOME and future
BS mortgage portfolio performance at the BHC-year level.
I measure mortgage performance using the amount of BS mortgages past due between
30 and 89 days (BSMORTPDUE < 90), the amount of BS mortgages past due for 90
or more days and still accruing (BSMORTPDUE >= 90), the amount of non-accrual
mortgages on the balance sheet (BSMORTNACC), and the amount of BS mortgage
net charge-off (BSMORTCHOFF ). I scale all these variables by the total amount of BS
mortgages. Appendix A.2 presents the description all loan portfolio performance measures.
I estimate the pairwise correlations between each component characteristic in year t
and BS mortgage performance in years t, t+ 1, t+ 2, t+ 3, and t+ 4. I choose a four-year
horizon based on prior literature. Elul et al. (2006) show that default rates increase in the
first several years, and Elul (2016) finds that mortgage default hazard increases over the
first two or three years and declines thereafter.
Table 4.2 presents a summary of the results from the pairwise correlation tests. Most
characteristics are positively associated with future BS mortgage delinquency and charge-
off, consistent with my expectation that the individual characteristics reflect mortgage risk.
I.LIFECY CLE and OWNRATE are negatively associated with subsequent mortgage
portfolio performance, contrary to my expectation that mortgages in mature neighborhoods
and in neighborhoods with high home ownership rate are riskier than those in developing
neighborhoods and in neighborhoods with low ownership rate, respectively. Recall that
Anacker (2015) finds that mortgages in mature census tracts and mortgages in census tracts
with high home ownership rate are riskier than mortgages in developing census tracts and
mortgages in census tracts with low home ownership rate. I conjecture that the conflicting
findings from my tests arise because I use a different setting than Anacker (2015). For
example, Anacker (2015) focuses on individual mortgage foreclosures during 2007-2008 in
the top 100 MSA, whereas I examine BS mortgage delinquencies and charge-offs during
the period 1993-2015.
Table 4.2 also shows that the correlations between the characteristics and
BSMORTPDUE > 90 are weak relative to the other mortgage performance measures.
This finding is consistent with the FR Y-9C reporting requirement that mortgages that are
past due for more than 90 days be classified as non-accrual mortgages unless the collateral
is well-secured and the lender is in the process of collection. Consistently, I find that the
correlations are strong for BSMORTNACC.
Overall, table 4.2 shows that the individual risk characteristics have some ability to
predict future BHC mortgage portfolio outcomes, which supports their use as components
in constructing mortgage lending risk measures. In untabulated analyses, I estimate multi-
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variate regressions with each loan portfolio performance measure as dependent variable and
all component characteristics as independent variables, and arrive at a similar conclusion.
Table 4.2: Individual Mortgage Characteristics and On-Balance-Sheet
Mortgage Portfolio Performance
BSMPDUE < 90 BSMPDUE ≥ 90
i=0 i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=0 i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4
I.BLACK *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** ***
I.HISPANIC *** *** *** *** ***
I.NOCOBORR *** *** *** *** *** ** *** *** ***
I.NOINCOME *** *** ***
I.NOTOWNOCC *** *** *** *** ***
I.LIFECY CLE (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
BLACKPERC *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
HISPANICPERC
MEDV ALUE *** *** *** *** *** ***
OWNRATE (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
POV ERTY *** *** *** *** *** ** *** ** **
V ACRATE *** *** *** *** ***
INCOME *** *** *** *** *** *** *** **
LTI
LOAN (***) (***) (***) (**) **
LTMEDV *** *
∆HPI1 *** *** *** (***) *** *** *
∆HPI5 *** *** (***) (***) *** *** *
PERINC *** *** *** *** ***
NONHOUSWLTH *** *** *** *** ***
GOV ASSIST *** *** ** *** **
EARNPERJOB *** *** *** *** *** * **
UNEMPRATE *** *** *** *** ***
∆UNEMPRATE *** *** *** (***)
Continued on next page–
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BSMNACC BSMCHOFF
i=0 i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=0 i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4
I.BLACK *** *** *** *** ***
I.HISPANIC *** ** *** *** ***
I.NOCOBORR *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
I.NOINCOME *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
I.NOTOWNOCC *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
I.LIFECY CLE
BLACKPERC *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
HISPANICPERC *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
MEDV ALUE *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
OWNRATE (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
POV ERTY * ** *** *** ***
V ACRATE *** **
INCOME *** *** *** *** *** **
LTI ***
LOAN * *** ***
LTMEDV *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
∆HPI1 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
∆HPI5 *** *** *** (***) *** *** *** (***) (***)
PERINC * *
NONHOUSWLTH ** ** *** ** ** *** ***
GOV ASSIST *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
EARNPERJOB
UNEMPRATE *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
∆UNEMPRATE *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Continued on next page–
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This table presents summary of the association tests between the individual character-
istics (e.g., borrower income) of mortgages approved by BHCs’ and on-balance-sheet
mortgage portfolio performance (e.g., proportion delinquent). I estimate the pair-wise
correlation between each mortgage characteristic observed in year t and each mortgage
portfolio performance measure observed in year t+ i where i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Since the
mortgage portfolio performance measures are observable at the BHC-level, I aggregate
the mortgage characteristics to the BHC-level. I specifically use the average value of
the characteristics for all approved mortgages. I then report in this table the sign and
significance of the pairwise correlations. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively, with Bonferroni adjustment. The asterisks in parenthesis
indicate negative correlation. For example, the ∗ ∗ ∗ in the first column and first row
indicates that the proportion of approved mortgages to Black borrowers is positively
correlated with the contemporaneous proportion of mortgages that are delinquent be-
tween 30 and 89 days, and that this correlation is significant at the 1% level. Similarly,
the (∗ ∗ ∗) in the first column and sixth row indicates that the proportion of approved
mortgages in mature neighborhoods is negatively correlated with the contemporane-
ous proportion of mortgages that are delinquent between 30 and 89 days and that this
correlation is significant at the 1% level. All variables are defined in appendix A.
4.5.1.2 Association with Mortgage Interest Rates
I create a mortgage-level indicator variable I.HIGHY IELD that equals one if the mort-
gage is a high-yield mortgage with an annual interest rate at least 3% more than that of
the comparable treasury security, and zero otherwise. I then perform a 2× 2 contingency
test of the association between I.HIGHY IELD and each individual characteristic as well
as the mortgage-level composite risk score MRSCORE.
Table 4.3 presents a summary of the results. Column (1) presents the contingency
coefficient, column (2) contains the odds ratio, and column (3) contains the p-values from
the χ2 test. The contingency coefficient is a scaled version of the χ2 statistic and reflects
the strength of the association being tested with 0% for no association and 100% for perfect
association.
The first observation from table 4.3 is that all the characteristics and MRSCORE are
significantly associated with I.HIGHY IELD. The second observation is that the contin-
gency coefficients range from 0.63% for I.NOTOWNOCC to 11.68% for I.HISPANIC,
which indicates that the associations between the individual characteristics and mortgage
yield are weak to moderate. The last observation is that most of the odds ratios are greater
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than one, while some are below one. The odds ratios that are greater than one are consis-
tent with my expectation because they suggest that mortgages with those specific traits
are more likely to be high-yield than those without the traits. For instance, the odds ratio
of 1.4 for I.MRSCORE indicates that mortgages with composite risk score above MSA
median are 1.4 times more likely to be high-yield mortgages than those with composite risk
score below MSA median. Conversely, the odds ratios that are below one are contrary to
my expectation as they indicate a negative association between those characteristics and
I.HIGHY IELD. For example, the odds ratio of 0.36 for I.NOINCOME suggests that
the likelihood that a mortgage with no reported borrower is a high-yield mortgage is only
0.36 times that of a mortgage with reported income.
One explanation for these negative associations between I.HIGHY IELD and the char-
acteristics is that those characteristics do not reflect mortgage risk as perceived by lenders.
For example, lenders may not report borrower income in their HMDA filings if income was
not part of the consideration in the approval process, for instance, because the borrower
is wealthy. In this case, the mortgage is less likely to be a high-yield mortgage. Another
explanation is that lenders approve mortgages with those characteristics only when they
believe that the loan is otherwise secured, for instance, by the rising value of the collateral,
as was the case prior to the 2007-2008 mortgage crisis. Stiglitz (2010) states that the
assumption that house values will keep rising led lenders to originate mortgages that were
equal to or more that 100% of the value of the house.
Overall, most individual characteristics are positively associated with mortgage yield,
suggesting that those characteristics reflect mortgage risk as assessed by lenders. The
negative association for 7 (out of 24) characteristics indicates either that lenders do not
believe these characteristics reflect mortgage risk, or that lenders take active measures to
reduce their exposure to these risk characteristics. In either case, the negative associations
with mortgage yield cast a doubt about the validity of these characteristics as input to a
mortgage lending risk measure. However, in section 4.5.1.1, none of the characteristics with
odds ratios below one exhibit a consistent negative association with subsequent BS mort-
gage performance, suggesting these characteristics may reflect mortgage risk that lenders
did not account for.
4.5.2 BHC-level Measures
This section presents the validity tests for the proposed BHC-level MLRMs (i.e.,
AV GMRSCORE, SAV GMRSCORE, NHIGHRISK, and $HIGHRISK). Similar to
section 4.5.1.1, I rely on the BHC-level MLRMs’ ability to predict subsequent BHC mort-
gage portfolio performances to assess whether these reflect the riskiness of BHCs’ lending
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Table 4.3: Individual Mortgage Characteristics and Mortgage Yield
(1) (2) (3)
Contingency
Coefficient
Odds
Ratio
P-value for
Pearson’s χ2 Test
I.MRSCORE 4.71% 1.4 < 0.0001
I.BLACK 11.03% 2.957 < 0.0001
I.HISPANIC 11.68% 2.731 < 0.0001
I.NOCOBORR 11.36% 2.382 < 0.0001
I.NOINCOME 6.92% 0.36 < 0.0001
I.NOTOWNOCC 0.64% 1.064 < 0.0001
I.LIFECY CLE 1.02% 1.077 < 0.0001
I.BLACKPERC 6.76% 2.241 < 0.0001
I.HISPANICPERC 4.73% 1.796 < 0.0001
I.MEDV ALUE 10.2% 2.219 < 0.0001
I.OWNRATE 4.38% 1.708 < 0.0001
I.POV ERTY 0.79% 1.695 < 0.0001
I.V ACRATE 1.24% 1.099 < 0.0001
I.INCOME 2.53% 1.201 < 0.0001
I.LTI 4.03% 1.343 < 0.0001
I.LOAN 13.85% 0.367 < 0.0001
I.LTMEDV 5.49% 0.675 < 0.0001
I.∆HPI1 6.63% 0.511 < 0.0001
I.∆HPI5 9.32% 0.213 < 0.0001
I.PERINC 2.23% 1.171 < 0.0001
I.NONHOUSWLTH 1.06% 1.078 < 0.0001
I.GOV ASSIST 2.45% 0.637 < 0.0001
I.EARNPERJOB 1.16% 0.914 < 0.0001
I.UNEMPRATE 3.23% 1.258 < 0.0001
I.∆UNEMPRATE 3.88% 0.656 < 0.0001
This table presents a summary of the results from the 2 contingency tests of the association be-
tween the high-risk indicator variables based on individual characteristics (e.g., I.INCOME)
and the high-yield indicator I.HIGHY IELD. The first column contains the contingency co-
efficient, which is a scaled version of the χ2 statistic and reflects the strength of the association
being tested with 0% for no association and 100% for perfect association. The second column
presents the odds ratio, which reflects the odds that a mortgage is a high-yield mortgage (i.e.,
I.HIGHYIELD = 1) given that it exhibits the high-risk characteristics (e.g., borrower income
below MSA median or I.INCOME = 1. Column (3) contains the p-values from the χ2 test.
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decisions. I use the mortgage portfolio performance measures described in section 4.5.1.1.
Similar to the component characteristics, I expect each of these composite measures to be
associated with subsequent mortgage portfolio delinquencies and charge-offs.
Table 4.4 presents the results for the full sample of all BHCs over the period 1993-2015.
AV GMRSCORE, NHIGHRISK, and $HIGHRISK are all significantly positively as-
sociated with subsequent mortgage portfolio delinquency and charge-offs for all years up
to four years ahead. These findings suggest that the measures reflect the risk underly-
ing the BHCs mortgage portfolio. However, except for a few cases, the scaled version of
the average risk score SAV GMRSCORE is not associated with future mortgage port-
folio performance. This finding suggests that SAV GMRSCORE does not reflect BHCs
risk-taking in their mortgage lending, which is consistent with the argument in section
4.3.2 that SAV GMRSCORE cannot reflect banks’ risk-taking through targeting risky
borrowers.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 present the results of similar tests using the securitizing and non-
securitizing subsamples for the period 1993-2015, respectively. In both cases, the inferences
about the validity of the proposed measures are similar to those above for the whole sample.
In untabulated analyses, I find similar results for the private- and public-BHC subsamples
over the period 1993-2015.
I also perform similar tests using three different sub-periods, namely 1993-1995, 2005-
2009, and 2012-2015. The 1993-1995 and 2012-2015 periods do not overlap with the hy-
potheses test periods, and provide an opportunity to assess the validity of my measures in
periods that are not directly related to my hypotheses. I use the 2005-2009 period to test
the validity of my measures around the 2007-2008 mortgage crisis. For the 2005-2009 and
2012-2015 periods, I find results that are similar to those in table 4.4 for the full sample
and support the validity of the MLRMs. Specifically, the results for the 2005-2009 period
suggest that the measures reflect BHCs’ risky lending decisions in the period immediately
prior to the crises. The result for the 2012-2015 period indicate that the validity of the
results holds outside my main test periods and in the post-crisis period.
I find that the associations between my measures and subsequent BHC mort-
gage portfolio performance are weak for the 1993-1995 period. SAV GMRSCORE,
NHIGHRISK, and $HIGHRISK are mostly unrelated to the mortgage performance
measures, while AV GMRSCORE is significantly associated with non-accrual mort-
gages (BSMORTNACC) for up to three years ahead and with mortgage charge-offs
(BSMORTCHOFF ) for up to two years ahead.
Overall, three of the proposed measures exhibit a reasonable ability to predict future
mortgage portfolio performance. I use AV GMRSCORE as the primary MLRM because
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it predicts mortgages performance in all the sub-sample tests, unlike NHIGHRISK and
$HIGHRISK that fail to do so in the 1993-1995 period.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter proposes and validates measures of risk-taking in residential mortgage lending
at the BHC level. I rely on prior literature to identify 24 individual factors associated with
mortgage risk. I combine these factors to obtain a mortgage-level composite risk score,
which I then aggregate to the BHC level to obtain the proposed measures. To ensure
that the measures allow comparison of BHCs that operating in different areas, I measure
the individual characteristics relative to local area averages. The validity tests generally
support the hypothesis that the individual characteristics and the composite measures
reflect mortgage risk. However, some individual characteristics fail one of the two validity
tests. In chapter 5, I test the sensitivity of my finding to excluding these characteristics
from the composite scores.
To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to propose comprehensive BHC-level mort-
gage lending risk measures based on mortgage-level data. Prior studies of bank mortgage
lending decisions focus on specific characteristics such as borrower credit score (Keys et al.
2010, Keys, Seru & Vig 2012) or on mortgage approval rates (Xie 2016, Dou et al. 2018).
In contrast, I consider multiple risk characteristics, enabling me to capture mortgage risk
that is not reflected in single characteristics such as borrower credit score or approval rates.
My measures, which are observable at origination, are also different from the outcome vari-
ables such as mortgage delinquencies and defaults subsequent to origination that are used
as bank risk-taking measures in prior research (Keys et al. 2010, 2012, Ertan et al. 2017).
Ertan et al. (2017) also explore the intensity of loan-level information collection by banks at
origination as a measure of loan quality. Measures that are observable at origination allow
researchers and regulators to assess bank risk-taking at the time of the lending decision.
69
Table 4.4: Mortgage Lending Risk Measures and Mortgage Portfolio
Performance - Whole Sample
Panel A: AV GMRSCORE
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
BSMPDUE < 90 0.157*** 0.154*** 0.139*** 0.109*** 0.064***
BSMPDUE ≥ 90 0.024** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.030** 0.032**
BSMNACC 0.236*** 0.264*** 0.278*** 0.253*** 0.211***
BSMCHOFF 0.217*** 0.231*** 0.223*** 0.201*** 0.145***
Panel B: SAV GMRSCORE
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
BSMPDUE < 90 −0.001 −0.001 0.007 0.020 0.014
BSMPDUE ≥ 90 −0.004 −0.006 −0.007 −0.005 0.022
BSMNACC −0.001 −0.019 0.009 0.010 0.028**
BSMCHOFF 0.012 0.010 0.026** 0.036*** 0.025
Panel C: NHIGHRISK
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
BSMPDUE < 90 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.134*** 0.137*** 0.107***
BSMPDUE ≥ 90 0.018 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.030** 0.028**
BSMNACC 0.058*** 0.076*** 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.090***
BSMCHOFF 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.081*** 0.091*** 0.070***
Panel D: $HIGHRISK
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
BSMPDUE < 90 0.113*** 0.108*** 0.135*** 0.137*** 0.118***
BSMPDUE ≥ 90 0.019* 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.030**
BSMNACC 0.061*** 0.078*** 0.102*** 0.109*** 0.102***
BSMCHOFF 0.065*** 0.061*** 0.090*** 0.105*** 0.095***
This table presents the univariate correlations between the proposed BHC-level MLRMs and the contem-
poraneous and subsequent performance of BHCs’ on-balance-sheet mortgages, up to four years ahead, for
the whole sample of BHCs over the period 1993-2015. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively, with Bonferroni adjustment.
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Table 4.5: Securitizing BHCs
Panel A: AV GMRSCORE
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
BSMPDUE < 90 0.208*** 0.202*** 0.160*** 0.102*** 0.060**
BSMPDUE ≥ 90 0.027 0.041** 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.071***
BSMNACC 0.329*** 0.348*** 0.338*** 0.274*** 0.203***
BSMCHOFF 0.042** 0.035 0.279*** 0.194*** 0.117***
Panel B: SAV GMRSCORE
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
BSMPDUE < 90 −0.011 −0.018 −0.001 0.025 0.054*
BSMPDUE ≥ 90 −0.027 −0.039* −0.036 −0.047* −0.045
BSMNACC 0.010 −0.005 0.017 −0.008 0.003
BSMCHOFF 0.001 0.005 0.002 −0.032 −0.006
Panel C: NHIGHRISK
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
BSMPDUE < 90 0.121*** 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.118***
BSMPDUE ≥ 90 0.014 0.013 0.024 0.042 0.034
BSMNACC 0.111*** 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.092*** 0.062***
BSMCHOFF 0.020 0.014 0.110*** 0.064*** 0.052**
Panel D: $HIGHRISK
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
BSMPDUE < 90 0.111*** 0.123*** 0.125*** 0.139*** 0.125***
BSMPDUE ≥ 90 0.005 0.004 0.017 0.039 0.029
BSMNACC 0.108*** 0.104*** 0.119*** 0.107*** 0.086***
BSMCHOFF 0.019 0.013 0.114*** 0.071*** 0.062***
This table presents the univariate correlations between the proposed BHC-level MLRMs and the contem-
poraneous and subsequent performance of BHCs’ on-balance-sheet mortgages, up to four years ahead, for
the subsample of securitizing BHCs over the period 1993-2015. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance at 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively, with Bonferroni adjustment.
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Table 4.6: Non-Securitizing BHCs
Panel A: AV GMRSCORE
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
BSMPDUE < 90 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.137*** 0.108*** 0.064***
BSMPDUE ≥ 90 0.037*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.026** 0.018
BSMNACC 0.242*** 0.278*** 0.283*** 0.242*** 0.202***
BSMCHOFF 0.214*** 0.236*** 0.221*** 0.184*** 0.133***
Panel B: SAV GMRSCORE
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
BSMPDUE < 90 0.008 0.010 0.014 0.018 0.009
BSMPDUE ≥ 90 0.003 0.003 −0.003 −0.005 0.013
BSMNACC 0.010 −0.005 0.017 0.014 0.032***
BSMCHOFF 0.012 0.017 0.030*** 0.036*** 0.024*
Panel C: NHIGHRISK
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
BSMPDUE < 90 0.123*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.130*** 0.103***
BSMPDUE ≥ 90 0.025*** 0.049*** 0.034*** 0.020 0.012
BSMNACC 0.065*** 0.086*** 0.101*** 0.086*** 0.083***
BSMCHOFF 0.061*** 0.067*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.064***
Panel D: $HIGHRISK
i = 0 i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
BSMPDUE < 90 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.129*** 0.125*** 0.110***
BSMPDUE ≥ 90 0.030*** 0.051*** 0.039*** 0.023* 0.016
BSMNACC 0.065*** 0.088*** 0.104*** 0.093*** 0.092***
BSMCHOFF 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.090*** 0.094*** 0.084***
This table presents the univariate correlations between the proposed BHC-level MLRMs and the contem-
poraneous and subsequent performance of BHCs’ on-balance-sheet mortgages, up to four years ahead, for
the subsample of non-securitizing BHCs over the period 1993-2015. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent significance
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, with Bonferroni adjustment.
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Chapter 5
Empirical Analyses
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the results of the empirical analyses. Section 5.2 discusses the de-
scriptive statistics of the risk measures (i.e., the dependent variables) for the matched
sample. Section 5.3 presents the results of the empirical analyses testing the main effect
of transparency on BHCs’ lending decisions as hypothesized in H1. Section 5.4 presents
the results of the empirical analyses testing the moderating effects of manager-shareholder
alignment (H2), regulatory oversight (H3) and market discipline (H4). Section 5.5 presents
additional analyses that test the robustness of my findings to alternative assumptions, al-
ternative research design, alternative matching method, and to specific subsamples and
sub-periods. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for the matched sample of securitizing BHCs (treat-
ment group) and non-securitizing BHCs (control group) for the period 1993-2015. Panel A
presents the statistics for the combined sample of securitizing and non-securitizing BHCs.
The mean and median values of 9.3 and 9.1, respectively for AV GMRSCORE indicates
that the typical approved mortgage exhibits 9 out of the 24 risk characteristics used to
construct the composite risk score MRSCORE. AV GMRSCORE ranges from low, 4.3,
to moderate, 15.4, on a scale of 24.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Whole Sample
N Mean St. Dev. Min P25 P50 P75 Max
AV GMRSCORE 6,477 9.285 1.292 4.333 8.388 9.150 10.092 15.385
SAV GMRSCORE 6,477 0.995 0.020 0.556 0.989 0.996 1.000 1.615
NHIGHRISK 6,477 0.386 0.168 0 0.287 0.365 0.463 1
$HIGHRISK 6,477 0.357 0.178 0 0.248 0.323 0.431 1
Panel B: Securitizing BHCs
N Mean St. Dev. Min P25 P50 P75 Max
AV GMRSCORE 3,824 9.263∗ 1.265 4.333 8.374 9.130∗ 10.052 15.013
SAV GMRSCORE 3,824 0.995 0.016 0.824 0.990 0.996 1.000 1.220
NHIGHRISK 3,824 0.386 0.157 0 0.293 0.365 0.457 1
$HIGHRISK 3,824 0.355 0.165 0 0.256 0.322 0.424 1
Panel C: Non-securitizing BHCs
N Mean St. Dev. Min P25 P50 P75 Max
AV GMRSCORE 2,653 9.317 1.329 5 8.417 9.196 10.154 15.385
SAV GMRSCORE 2,653 0.995 0.025 0.556 0.989 0.996 1.001 1.615
NHIGHRISK 2,653 0.386 0.182 0 0.271 0.365 0.472 1
$HIGHRISK 2,653 0.359 0.196 0 0.236 0.325 0.444 1
This table presents the descriptive statistics, across BHC-years, of the residential mortgage
lending measures for the matched sample of securitizing and non-securitizing BHCs. The
table shows the descriptive statistics for securitizing BHCs, non-securitizing BHCs, and the
combined samples. * in panel B indicates a p-value less than 10% from a t-test comparing the
means, or a rank-sum test comparing the medians, of the securitizing and non-securitizing
subsamples. All variables are as defined in appendix A.1.
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The mean and median values for SAV GMRSCORE are 0.995 and 0.996, respec-
tively, suggesting that the risk profile of loans approved by the average BHC is similar
to that of the risk profile of the BHCs’ application pools.1 The inter-quartile range of
SAV GMRSCORE is close to one, however, the tails show that approvals for some BHC-
years are substantially less risk than the applicant pool, and for others substantially more.
The mean and median value of 0.386 and 0.365, respectively for NHIGHRISK show
that approximately 38% of the mortgages approved by the average BHC have a risk score
above the MSA median. The minimum value of zero for NHIGHRISK indicates that
some BHCs approve only mortgages with MRSCORE below the MSA median, while the
maximum value of one indicates that others approve only mortgages with MRSCORE
above the MSA median. The descriptive statistics for $HIGHRISK lead to similar con-
clusions. Overall, panel A shows that BHCs in the test sample exhibit variations in their
lending decisions, which is crucial in testing my hypotheses.
Panels B and C present the statistics separately for securitizing and non-securitizing
BHCs, respectively. The two subsamples are comparable with respect to most of the
risk measures. The means and medians of SAV GMRSCORE, NHIGHRISK, and
$HIGHRISK for the securitizing BHCs are statistically indistinguishable from those
for non-securitizing BHCs. Both the mean and median of AV GMRSCORE for non-
securitizing BHCs are greater than those of securitizing BHCs, suggesting that the non-
securitizing BHCs originate more risky loans than securitizing BHCs. However, the mag-
nitude of this difference is relatively small, as the standardized mean difference is only 6%
of the standard deviation for the combined sample.
5.3 The Effect of Transparency on Bank Lending De-
cisions
To test the effect of transparency on bank risk-taking in residential mortgage lending (H1),
I estimate the difference-indifferences as the average of
(XTreatPost −XTreatPre )− (XControlPost −XControlPre )
where X is a mortgage lending risk measure around each accounting pronouncement. I then
test whether the DiD is significantly negative (positive) around transparency-enhancing (-
decreasing) events. Table 5.2 presents the results of these tests around each accounting
1Recall that SAV GMRSCORE is the average risk score of mortgages approved by a BHC in a given
year divided by the average risk score of all mortgage applications received by the BHC during the year.
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pronouncement using the combined sample of public and private BHCs, the public-BHCs-
only sample, and the private-BHCs-only sample. I distinguish between public and private
BHCs for two reasons. First, the two groups are different in size and complexity, among
other things, which may lead to differences in their lending decisions and in how they
respond to transparency changes. Second, the accounting pronouncements would affect
public BHCs’ transparency more than that of private BHCs, because they primarily apply
to public BHCs’ financial reporting, e.g., annual reports. Both public and private BHCs,
however, are affected by parallel changes in regulatory reporting standards that typically
mirror GAAP.
Table 5.2 panel A presents the results for the first transparency event, FAS 125. H1
predicts that securitizing BHCs increase risk-taking following FAS 125 relative to non-
securitzing BHCs (DiD>0), because FAS 125 decreases transparency. For brevity, I will
first discuss the results for the combined sample and highlight the differences for the public
BHCs and private BHCs sample. Contrary to H1, AV GMRSCORE decreased both for the
control and for the treatment groups, and significantly so for the treatment group, result-
ing in a negative DiD.2 SAV GMRSCORE increased for the control group and decreased
for the treatment group, again contrary to H1. Both NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK
decreased for both the treatment and control groups, with positive but statistically insignif-
icant DiDs. While a positive DiD is consistent with H1, the lack of statistical significance
means the full sample results do not support H1.
The results for the public and private BHCs subsamples lead to similar inferences,
except for $HIGHRISK for the public BHCs subsample. When looking at public BHCs
only, $HIGHRISK decreased for the control group and increased for the treatment group.
Consistent with H1, the DiD is positive and significant at 10% (one-tailed). Overall, except
for $HIGHRISK for public BHCs, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that securitizing
BHCs’ risk-taking in their mortgage lending decreases or remains the same following FAS
125, relative to risk-taking by non-securitizing BHCs. This result suggests that FAS 125
did not differentially affect securitizing BHCs’ lending decisions. It is possible that FAS
125 did not affect transparency, or that any change in transparency triggered by FAS 125
did not affect lending decisions.
Table 5.2 panel B presents the results for FAS 140. H1 predicts that securitizing
BHCs decrease risk-taking following FAS 140 more than non-securitizing BHCs (DiD<0)
because FAS 140 enhances transparency. AV GMRSCORE increased significantly both
for the treatment and for the control groups, and the DiD is positive but not significant.
2I use two-tailed significance for the pre-post differences for a single group (e.g., ∆Control for
AV GMRSCORE) because I do not have a directional prediction.
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SAV GMRSCORE decreased for both the treatment and the control groups, and the DiD
is positive, contrary to H1, with a p-value of less than 10%. NHIGHRISK decreased for
the control group and increased for the treatment group, resulting in a positive DiD with a
one-tailed p-value of less than 10%. $HIGHRISK increased for both the treatment and
the control groups, with a positive DiD. Since DiD is positive for all the risk measures, I
fail to reject the null hypothesis that risk-taking by securitizing BHCs increases or remains
the same subsequent to FAS 140, relative to risk-taking by non-securitizing BHCs. The
results are similar for the public and private subsamples. While the DiD for $HIGHRISK
for the private BHCs subsample is negative, it is not statistically significant. As with FAS
125, I find no evidence supporting H1 for FAS 140.
Table 5.2 panel C presents the results for the third transparency event, FIN 46 (R).
Similar to FAS 140, H1 predicts a negative DiD because FIN 46 (R) enhances transparency.
The DiD has the expected negative sign for all the risk measures for the combined sample
and the private BHCs sample, and for two of the risk measures for the public BHCs sample.
While some pre-post differences are significant, all the DiDs lack statistical significance.
These results suggest that FIN 46(R) did not differentially affect securitizing BHCs’ lending
decisions relative to that of the control group.
The last panel of table 5.2 presents the results for FAS 166 & 167. Similar to FAS 140
and FIN 46(R), H1 predicts a negative DiD around FAS 166 & 167. AV GMRSCORE
decreased significantly both for the treatment and for the control group, and more so for
the control group. The DiD is positive with a p-value of less than 10%. SAV GMRSCORE
increased significantly for the treatment group, resulting in a positive DiD with p-value less
than 5%. In both cases, the positive DiD is contrary to H1. None of the pre-post differences
or DiDs are significant for NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK in the combined sample.
While the results are largely the same when looking at private BHCs only, I find some
evidence that supports H1 from the public BHCs subsample. For the public subsample,
both NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK decrease significantly following FAS 166 & 167
with a negative DiD significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
In summary, I find some evidence that publicly traded BHCs increased their risk-taking
following FAS 125 by increasing their credit supply to high-risk borrowers and that they
deceased their risk-taking following FAS 166 & 167 by decreasing their credit supply to
high-risk borrowers. However, most of the tests fail to provide evidence supporting H1
that increasing (decreasing) transparency leads to lower (more) risk-taking by securitizing
BHCs than non-securitizing BHCs. Another interpretation of these results is that trans-
parency affects risk-taking but the accounting pronouncements do not significantly change
transparency or that they change transparency in a manner or direction that differs from
my expectation.
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Table 5.2: The Effect of Transparency on Bank Lending Decisions
Panel A: FAS 125 (DiD>0 Predicted)
I. Combined Sample of Public and Private BHCs
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Control Treat Control Treat ∆Control ∆Treat DiD
AV GMRSCORE 70 8.632 8.938 8.291 8.43 −0.341† −0.504∗∗ −0.163
SAV GMRSCORE 70 0.988 0.994 0.993 0.991 0.005∗ −0.003 −0.008†
NHIGHRISK 70 0.362 0.411 0.335 0.389 −0.027 −0.022 0.005
$HIGHRISK 70 0.329 0.361 0.306 0.347 −0.023 −0.014 0.009
II. Public BHCs Only
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Control Treat Control Treat ∆Control ∆Treat DiD
AV GMRSCORE 44 8.677 8.659 8.446 -0.207 −0.231 −0.420∗∗ −0.189
SAV GMRSCORE 44 0.989 0.995 0.992 -0.002 0.003 −0.006 −0.009
NHIGHRISK 44 0.378 0.359 0.362 -0.010 −0.016 −0.007 0.008
$HIGHRISK 44 0.341 0.306 0.313 -0.003 −0.027 0.004 0.031†
III. Private BHCs Only
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Control Treat Control Treat ∆Control ∆Treat DiD
AV GMRSCORE 26 8.555 9.409 8.028 0.735 −0.527 −0.647† −0.119
SAV GMRSCORE 26 0.988 0.992 0.995 -0.002 0.008† 0.002 −0.006
NHIGHRISK 26 0.335 0.499 0.289 0.163 −0.046 −0.047 −0.001
$HIGHRISK 26 0.308 0.453 0.294 0.115 −0.014 −0.044 −0.030
Continued on next page–
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Panel B: FAS 140 (DiD<0 Predicted)
I. Combined Sample of Public and Private BHCs
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Control Treat Control Treat ∆Control ∆Treat DiD
AV GMRSCORE 113 8.807 8.916 9.195 9.398 0.388∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.094
SAV GMRSCORE 113 0.996 0.994 0.989 0.993 −0.007∗∗ −0.0004 0.007∗
NHIGHRISK 113 0.360 0.352 0.352 0.370 −0.007 0.018 0.025†
$HIGHRISK 113 0.335 0.324 0.337 0.336 0.001 0.012 0.011
II. Public BHCs Only
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Control Treat Control Treat ∆Control ∆Treat DiD
AV GMRSCORE 60 8.795 8.831 9.131 9.380 0.336∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.213†
SAV GMRSCORE 60 0.998 0.994 0.996 0.996 −0.002 0.002 0.004
NHIGHRISK 60 0.363 0.358 0.358 0.370 −0.005 0.012 0.017
$HIGHRISK 60 0.323 0.324 0.331 0.334 0.007 0.011 0.003
III. Private BHCs Only
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Control Treat Control Treat ∆Control ∆Treat DiD
AV GMRSCORE 53 8.820 9.012 9.268 9.419 0.448∗∗ 0.407† −0.041
SAV GMRSCORE 53 0.993 0.994 0.981 0.991 −0.013∗∗∗ −0.003 0.010†
NHIGHRISK 53 0.356 0.345 0.346 0.371 −0.010 0.026 0.036
$HIGHRISK 53 0.349 0.323 0.343 0.338 −0.006 0.015 0.020
Continued on next page–
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Panel C: FIN 46(R) (DiD<0 Predicted)
I. Combined Sample of Public and Private BHCs
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Control Treat Control Treat ∆Control ∆Treat DiD
AV GMRSCOREr 112 9.270 9.338 8.932 8.834 −0.339∗∗ −0.504∗∗∗ −0.165
SAV GMRSCORE 112 0.994 0.996 0.993 0.994 −0.0002 −0.002 −0.002
NHIGHRISK 112 0.349 0.367 0.359 0.361 0.010 −0.007 −0.016
$HIGHRISK 112 0.334 0.350 0.334 0.334 0.000 −0.016 −0.016
II. Public BHCs Only
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Control Treat Control Treat ∆Control ∆Treat DiD
AV GMRSCORE 38 9.229 9.217 8.813 8.756 −0.416∗∗∗ −0.461∗∗∗ −0.045
SAV GMRSCORE 38 0.994 0.997 0.992 0.994 −0.002 −0.003∗ −0.001
NHIGHRISK 38 0.347 0.356 0.316 0.346 −0.031† −0.010 0.021
$HIGHRISK 38 0.324 0.336 0.282 0.309 −0.042∗ −0.027 0.016
III. Private BHCs Only
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Control Treat Control Treat ∆Control ∆Treat DiD
AV GMRSCORE 74 9.291 9.400 8.992 8.874 −0.2999† −0.526∗∗ −0.227
SAV GMRSCORE 74 0.994 0.996 0.994 0.994 0.001 −0.002 −0.002
NHIGHRISK 74 0.351 0.373 0.381 0.368 0.030 −0.005 −0.035
$HIGHRISK 74 0.339 0.358 0.360 0.347 0.022 −0.011 −0.032
Continued on next page–
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Panel D: FAS 166 & 167 (DiD<0 Predicted)
I. Combined Sample of Public and Private BHCs
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Control Treat Control Treat ∆Control ∆Treat DiD
AV GMRSCORE 174 10.939 10.657∗∗∗ 10.528 10.430 −0.411∗∗∗ −0.227∗∗ 0.185∗
SAV GMRSCORE 174 0.995 0.993 0.991 0.995 −0.003 0.002∗ 0.006∗∗
NHIGHRISK 174 0.433 0.423 0.425 0.409 −0.008 −0.013 −0.005
$HIGHRISK 174 0.388 0.393 0.389 0.383 0.0003 −0.010 −0.010
III. Public BHCs Only
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Control Treat Control Treat ∆Control ∆Treat DiD
AV GMRSCORE 61 10.900 10.580 10.519 10.372 −0.382∗∗ −0.207† 0.174†
SAV GMRSCORE 61 0.993 0.993 0.995 0.994 0.001 0.001 0.000
NHIGHRISK 61 0.454 0.406 0.447 0.370 −0.007 −0.036∗ −0.029∗
$HIGHRISK 61 0.399 0.367 0.403 0.328 0.004 −0.039∗∗ −0.043∗∗
III. Private BHCs Only
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Control Treat Control Treat ∆Control ∆Treat DiD
AV GMRSCORE 113 10.960 10.698 10.533 10.461 −0.427∗∗∗ −0.237† 0.190†
SAV GMRSCORE 113 0.995 0.993 0.989 0.996 −0.006∗∗ 0.003† 0.009∗∗∗
NHIGHRISK 113 0.422 0.431 0.412 0.430 −0.009 −0.001 0.008
$HIGHRISK 113 0.383 0.407 0.381 0.412 −0.002 0.005 0.007
This table presents the results of the DiD tests for H1 using the BHC-level measures of risk-taking in res-
idential mortgage lending. Obs reflects the number treatment-control pairs with observations in both the
pre and post periods. For each risk measure, ∆Control is the average value in the post-period minus the
average value in the pre-period for the control group. Similarly, ∆Treat is the pre-post difference for the
treatment group. DiD is the difference between ∆Treat and ∆Control. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, † represent p-values be-
low 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20%, respectively, from the mean tests comparing the corresponding values to zero.
All variables are as defined in appendix A.1.
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5.4 Moderators
The remaining hypotheses examine the moderating effects of corporate governance (H2),
regulatory oversight (H3), and market discipline (H4). To test each of these hypotheses,
I first obtain a proxy for the corresponding BHC characteristics, and partition the sample
in to Low and High groups, based on a median split. Similar to the main DiD design, I
form the groups in the year immediately prior to each pronouncement. I then compare the
difference in lending decisions between BHCs in the Low and High groups before and after
each treatment. I refer to this research design as a quasi difference-in-differences (QDiD)
design because, unlike a DiD design, the low and high groups are not matched to ensure
all other factors are comparable across groups.
QDiD = (XLowPost −XLowPre )− (XHighPost −XHighPre )
In each case, the Low group represents the sub-sample that faces more monitoring and
discipline from the corresponding stakeholder when transparency increases. Table 5.3 shows
the distribution of the moderating variables across the high and low groups. In all the cases,
both the mean and the median are significantly different across the two groups. In un-
tabulated analyses, I also test these hypotheses using a triple-differences design that relies
on the matched sample of non-securitizing BHCs as controls for each of the Low and High
groups. The findings from these triple-differences tests are qualitatively similar to those
presented below.
5.4.1 Corporate Governance
To test H2, I partition the sample of securitizing BHCs based on the proportion of man-
agerial ownership, using data from Compustat Executive Compensation (ExecuComp)
database. The maintained assumption is that high share ownership better aligns man-
agers’ incentives with those of current shareholders’ than low share ownership. This test
faces a challenge because ExecuComp covers only a small portion of public securitizing
BHCs in my sample, resulting in a very small sample to test H2. To address the sam-
ple size issue, I also test H2 using a different strategy. I compare the lending decisions
of all public securitizing BHCs with those of private securitizing BHCs. I expect that
private BHCs have greater manager-shareholder alignment because their ownership is less
dispersed, which should improve monitoring, relative to public BHCs’ dispersed ownership.
Table 5.4 panel A presents the results for FAS 125. H2 predicts that, because FAS
125 decreases transparency, securitizing BHCs with weak manager-shareholder alignment
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics for Moderating Variables
N Mean Median St. Dev.
Panel A: Whole Sample
MGTOWNERSHIP 914 0.021 0.009 0.084
TIER1CAPRATIO 5997 0.126 0.119 0.044
COREDEPRATIO 6489 0.848 0.867 0.090
Panel B: High Group
MGTOWNERSHIP 518 0.033 0.016 0.110
TIER1CAPRATIO 2581 0.157 0.146 0.045
COREDEPRATIO 3605 0.902 0.902 0.037
Panel C: Low Group
MGTOWNERSHIP 396 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002
TIER1CAPRATIO 3416 0.101*** 0.104*** 0.022
COREDEPRATIO 2884 0.781*** 0.800*** 0.092
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the moderating variables. Panel
A presents the statistics for all observations with non-missing value for each vari-
able. Panel B presents the statistics for BHC-year observations in the High groups
based the corresponding variables. For example, the MGTOWNERSHIP row
in panel B contains descriptive statistics of MGTOWNERSHIP for the High
management ownership group, i.e., above-median ownership. Similarly, panel C
contains the statistics for the Low groups based on the corresponding variables.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ in panel C represent p-values below 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively, from
the mean and median tests of the High versus Low groups. All variables are as
defined in appendix A.1
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decrease their risk-taking following FAS 125, while BHCs with strong manager-shareholder
alignment should show no change in risk-taking.
The first part of panel A shows that FAS 125 did not affect the low and high share
ownership groups differently, in the very small sample with ExecuComp data. The lack
of significance may arise from the small sample size. The test sample contains only four
BHCs in the high group and only five BHCs in the low group.
The second part of panel A presents the alternative test comparing public and private
securitizing BHCs. AV GMRSCORE decreased significantly for both private and public
BHCs following FAS 125, and it decreased more for the private BHCs. The QDiD is
positive and not statistically significant. The pre-post differences in NHIGHRISK and
$HIGHRISK are not significant, but the corresponding QDiDs are positive with one-
tailed p-value less than 10%. Since a positive QDiD is inconsistent with H2, the alternative
tests also fail to reject the null hypothesis that risk-taking by securitizing BHCs with greater
manager-shareholder alignment increases or remains the same following FAS 125, relative
to securitizing BHCs with lower manager-shareholder alignment.
Table 5.4 panel B presents the results for the second accounting pronouncement, FAS
140. Since I expect FAS 140 increases transparency, H2 predicts that securitizing BHCs
with weak manager-shareholder alignment increase their risk-taking, whereas BHCs with
strong manager-shareholder alignment do not change their lending decisions. The first
part of panel B shows that, contrary to my hypothesis, AV GMRSCORE increased both
for the high and for the low managerial ownership groups, and it increased more for the
high group, resulting in a negative QDiD. None of the pre-post differences or QDiDs are
significant for the other three risk measures. The results from the alternative test in panel
B are qualitatively similar to those in panel A. In summary, I find no evidence supporting
H2 around FAS 140.
Table 5.4 panel C presents the results for FIN 46(R). Similar to FAS 140, H2 predicts
greater risk-taking for BHCs with weak manager-shareholder alignment and no change
for BHCs with strong manager-shareholder alignment following FIN 46(R). The results
presented in panel C provide no evidence supporting H2 around FIN 46(R). While some
of the QDiDs in parts I and II are negative, which is consistent with H2, none of them are
statistically significant.
The results for FAS 166 & 167 are in table 5.4 panel D. Similar to FAS 140 and FIN
46(R), H2 predicts greater risk-taking for BHCs with weak manager-shareholder alignment
and no change for BHCs with strong manager-shareholder alignment following FAS 166
& 167. I find mixed results for FAS 166 & 167. In part I of panel D, the QDiD for
AV GMRSCORE is positive with and significant at 10% (one-tailed), however the result is
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driven by a decrease in AV GMRSCORE for the high group. None of the other differences
in part I of panel A are significant. In part II of panel D, the QDiD for NHIGHRISK and
$HIGHRISK is negative with one-tailed p-values of less than 10% and 5%, respectively.
In both cases, the negative QDiD is driven by a significant decrease for the public BHCs.
In summary, with one exception, the results do not support H2.
Overall, there is little evidence supporting H2, suggesting that the accounting pro-
nouncements did not affect securitizing BHCs with weak manager-shareholder alignment
differently than they affected securitizing BHCs with strong alignment. Moreover, in line
with the results for H1, there is little evidence supporting the hypothesized main effect of
transparency on BHCs’ lending decisions.
Table 5.4: The Moderating Role of Manager-shareholder Alignment
Panel A: FAS 125 (QDiD<0 Predicted)
I. Public Securitizing BHCs with High vs. Low Managerial Ownership
Obs Pre-period Post-period Differences
High Low High Low High Low ∆High ∆Low QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 4 5 8.909 8.880 8.585 8.284 −0.325 −0.596 −0.271
SAV GMRSCORE 4 5 0.998 0.992 0.992 0.998 −0.006 0.006 0.012
NHIGHRISK 4 5 0.431 0.339 0.433 0.380 0.002 0.041 0.039
$HIGHRISK 4 5 0.385 0.313 0.387 0.347 0.002 0.034 0.032
II. Public securitizing BHCs Vs. Private securitizing BHCs
Obs Pre-period Post-period Differences
Private Public Private Public Private Public ∆Private ∆Public QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 26 44 9.409 8.659 8.763 8.239 −0.647† −0.420∗∗ 0.227
SAV GMRSCORE 26 44 0.992 0.995 0.994 0.990 0.002 −0.006 −0.008
NHIGHRISK 26 44 0.499 0.359 0.451 0.351 −0.047 −0.007 0.040†
$HIGHRISK 26 44 0.453 0.306 0.409 0.310 −0.044 0.004 0.047†
Continued on next page–
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Panel B: FAS 140 (QDiD>0 Predicted)
I. Public Securitizing BHCs with High vs. Low Managerial Ownership
Obs Pre-period Post-period Differences
High Low High Low High Low ∆High ∆Low QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 13 13 8.844 8.975 9.474 9.276 0.631∗ 0.302† −0.329†
SAV GMRSCORE 13 13 0.999 0.992 1.000 0.992 0.001 0.001 0.000
NHIGHRISK 13 13 0.356 0.366 0.369 0.379 0.014 0.013 0.000
$HIGHRISK 13 13 0.316 0.323 0.324 0.333 0.008 0.010 0.002
II. Public securitizing BHCs Vs. Private securitizing BHCs
Obs Pre-period Post-period Differences
Private Public Private Public Private Public ∆Private ∆Public QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 53 60 9.012 8.831 9.419 9.380 0.407† 0.549∗∗∗ 0.142
SAV GMRSCORE 53 60 0.994 0.994 0.991 0.996 −0.003 0.002 0.005
NHIGHRISK 53 60 0.345 0.358 0.371 0.370 0.026 0.012 −0.014
$HIGHRISK 53 60 0.323 0.324 0.338 0.334 0.015 0.011 −0.004
Continued on next page–
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Panel C: FIN 46 (R) (QDiD>0 Predicted)
I. Public Securitizing BHCs with High vs. Low Managerial OwnershipCs
Obs Pre-period Post-period Differences
High Low High Low High Low ∆High ∆Low QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 8 7 9.324 9.205 8.971 8.697 −0.353 −0.508∗ −0.156
SAV GMRSCORE 8 7 0.998 0.996 0.996 0.999 −0.002 0.003 0.005
NHIGHRISK 8 7 0.308 0.359 0.356 0.363 0.047 0.004 −0.043
$HIGHRISK 8 7 0.293 0.338 0.305 0.321 0.012 −0.017 −0.029
II. Public securitizing BHCs Vs. Private securitizing BHCs
Obs Pre-period Post-period Differences
Private Public Private Public Private Public ∆Private ∆Public QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 74 38 9.400 9.217 8.874 8.756 −0.526∗∗ −0.461∗∗∗ 0.065
SAV GMRSCORE 74 38 0.996 0.997 0.994 0.994 −0.002 −0.003∗ −0.001
NHIGHRISK 74 38 0.373 0.356 0.368 0.346 −0.005 −0.010 −0.005
$HIGHRISK 74 38 0.358 0.336 0.347 0.309 −0.011 −0.027 −0.016
Continued on next page–
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Panel D: FAS 166 & 167 (QDiD>0 Predicted)
I. Public Securitizing BHCs with High vs. Low Managerial Ownership
Obs Pre-period Post-period Differences
High Low High Low High Low ∆High ∆Low QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 14 14 10.783 10.766 10.546 10.772 −0.236 0.006 0.242†
SAV GMRSCORE 14 14 0.993 0.993 0.995 0.995 0.001 0.002 0.001
NHIGHRISK 14 14 0.409 0.438 0.379 0.406 −0.030 −0.032 −0.002
$HIGHRISK 14 14 0.358 0.382 0.335 0.343 −0.023 −0.039 −0.016
II. Public securitizing BHCs Vs. Private securitizing BHCs
Obs Pre-period Post-period Differences
Private Public Private Public Private Public ∆Private ∆Public QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 113 61 10.698 10.580 10.461 10.372 −0.237† −0.207† 0.030
SAV GMRSCORE 113 61 0.993 0.993 0.996 0.994 0.003† 0.001 −0.001
NHIGHRISK 113 61 0.431 0.406 0.430 0.370 −0.001 −0.036∗ −0.035†
$HIGHRISK 113 61 0.407 0.367 0.412 0.328 0.005 −0.039∗∗ −0.045∗
This table presents the results of the quasi-DiD tests for H2. The High group is composed of securitizing
BHCs with above-median managerial ownership, and the Low group is composed of those with below-
median managerial ownership. Obs in columns (1) and (2) reflects the number observation in the high
and low groups with observations in both the pre and post periods, respectively. For each risk measure,
∆High is the average value in the post-period minus the average value in the pre-period for the high group.
Similarly, ∆Low is the pre-post difference for the low group. QDiD is the difference between ∆Low and
∆High. Similarly, for the private vs public comparisons in part II of each panel, ∆Private and ∆Public
refer to the pre-post change for private and public securitizing BHCs, respectively. QDiD refers to the
difference between ∆Private and ∆Public. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, † represent p-values below 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20%,
respectively, from the mean tests comparing the corresponding values to zero. All variables are as defined
in appendix A.1.
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5.4.2 Regulatory Oversight
To test H3, I partition the sample of securitizing BHCs into Low and High groups based
on their Tier 1 Capital ratio. BHCs with low Tier 1 Capital ratio (i.e., capital-constrained
BHCs) are more likely to face strict regulatory oversight than BHCs with high Tier 1 Capi-
tal ratio. Transparency would strengthen regulators’ ability to monitor capital-constrained
BHCs, leading to lower risk-taking by these BHCs.
As shown in table 5.3, the average Tier 1 Capital ratio for the Low group is significantly
lower than that of High group. However, the median Tier 1 capital ratio for the Low group
is 10%, indicating that most BHCs in this group are sufficiently capitalized. The ideal Low
group for this test is the set of BHCs that are close to violating the minimum Tier 1 Capital
requirement. The number of such cases in my test periods around the pronouncements is
limited, which why I decided to rely on the median split. I acknowledge that this reduces the
power of my test, and that I am trading-off lack of power from low number of observations
with lack of power from weak contrast between the Low and High groups.
Table 5.5 panel A presents the results for FAS 125. Under the maintained assump-
tion that FAS 125 reduces transparency, H3 predicts that BHCs with low Tier 1 Capital
ratio increase their risk-taking more that those with high Tier 1 Capital ratio, follow-
ing FAS 125. AV GMRSCORE decreased significantly for low group, and the QDiD
is negative with a one-tailed p-value of less than 10%, contrary to the prediction. The
results for NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK are similar. These results suggest that
more capital-constrained securitizing BHCs decreased their risk-taking more than less-
constrained BHCs, contrary to H3.
Table 5.5 panel B contains the results for FAS 140, which I expect increases trans-
parency. H3 predicts that securitizing BHCs in the low group decrease their risk-taking
following FAS 140 more than those in the high group. AV GMRSCORE increased signifi-
cantly for both the high and low Tier 1 Capital ratio groups, contrary to prediction. None
of the other pre-post differences or QDiDs are significant. These results suggest that FAS
140 did not differentially affect BHCs based on their Tier 1 Capital ratio.
The results in table 5.5 panel C reflect the effects of FIN 46(R) on securitizing BHCs
conditional on the levels of their TIer 1 Capital ratio. Similar to FAS 140, H3 predicts that
poorly capitalized securitizing BHCs decrease their risk-taking following FAS 125 more than
well-capitalized BHCs. Following FIN 46 (R), AV GMRSCORE decreased significantly
for both the high and the low groups, but the QDiD is not significantly different from zero.
I find no significant pre-post differences for the other risk measures. However, the QDiDs
for NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK are positive, contrary to H3, with a one-tailed p-
value of less 10%. These results suggest that securitizing BHCs with low Tier 1 capital
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ratio increased their risk-taking following FIN 46 (R), which is consistent with Acharya
et al. (2013) finding that banks with low Tier 1 leverage ratio used special securitization
conduits to avoid consolidation per FIN 46(R).
Table 5.5 panel D presents the results for FAS 166 & 167. Similar to FAS 140 and FIN
46(R), H3 predicts a negative QDiD around FAS 166 & 167. AV GMRSCORE decreased
significantly for well-capitalized BHCs, whereas the pre-post change is not significantly
different from zero for the low group. The QDiD is positive with a one-tailed p-value
less than 10%. SAV GMRSCORE did not change significantly for the high group, and it
increased significantly for the low group, resulting in a positive QDiD with a one-tailed
p-value less than 10%. The pre-post differences in NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK
are not statistically significant for both the high and low groups. However, the QDiD is
positive in both cases and has a one-tailed p-value less than 10% for $HIGHRISK. In
summary, the evidence in panel D does not support H3, as all the QDiDs are positive.
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Table 5.5: The Moderating Role of Regularity Oversight
Panel A: FAS 125 (QDiD>0 Predicted)
Pre-period Post-period Differences
High Low High Low High Low ∆High ∆Low QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 34 36 8.808 9.060 8.489 8.381 −0.319 −0.679∗∗ −0.361†
SAV GMRSCORE 34 36 0.991 0.996 0.994 0.988 0.003 −0.008 −0.011
NHIGHRISK 34 36 0.420 0.402 0.424 0.355 0.004 −0.047† −0.051∗
$HIGHRISK 34 36 0.374 0.348 0.384 0.312 0.009 −0.036 −0.045†
Panel B: FAS 140 (QDiD<0 Predicted)
Pre-period Post-period Differences
High Low High Low High Low ∆High ∆Low QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 56 57 9.019 8.815 9.510 9.288 0.491∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ −0.017
SAV GMRSCORE 56 57 0.994 0.994 0.992 0.995 −0.002 0.001 0.003
NHIGHRISK 56 57 0.356 0.348 0.368 0.372 0.012 0.024 0.012
$HIGHRISK 56 57 0.326 0.322 0.334 0.338 0.008 0.017 0.008
Panel C: FIN 46 (R) (QDiD<0 Predicted)
Pre-period Post-period Differences
High Low High Low High Low ∆High ∆Low QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 57 55 9.389 9.284 8.873 8.793 −0.516∗∗ −0.491∗∗ 0.025
SAV GMRSCORE 57 55 0.997 0.995 0.994 0.995 −0.003 −0.001 0.003
NHIGHRISK 57 55 0.386 0.348 0.355 0.367 −0.031 0.018 0.049†
$HIGHRISK 57 55 0.371 0.328 0.333 0.335 −0.039 0.007 0.046†
Panel D: FAS 166 & 167 (QDiD<0 Predicted)
Pre-period Post-period Differences
High Low High Low High Low ∆High ∆Low QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 93 81 10.687 10.622 10.352 10.519 −0.335∗∗ −0.102 0.233†
SAV GMRSCORE 93 81 0.993 0.992 0.994 0.996 0.001 0.004∗ 0.003†
NHIGHRISK 93 81 0.420 0.425 0.397 0.423 −0.023 −0.002 0.021
$HIGHRISK 93 81 0.391 0.395 0.365 0.403 −0.026 0.008 0.034†
Continued on next page–
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This table presents the results of the quasi-DiD tests for H3. The High group is composed of securitizing
BHCs with above-median Tier 1 Capital ratio, and the Low group is composed of those with below-median
Tier 1 Capital ratio. Obs in columns (1) and (2) reflects the number observation in the high and low
groups with observations in both the pre and post periods, respectively. For each risk measure, ∆High is
the average value in the post-period minus the average value in the pre-period for the high group. Sim-
ilarly, ∆Low is the pre-post difference for the low group. QDiD is the difference between ∆Low and
∆High. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, † represent p-values below 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20%, respectively, from the mean tests
comparing the corresponding values to zero. All variables are as defined in appendix A.1.
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5.4.3 Market Discipline
To test H4, I partition the sample of securitizing BHCs into low and high groups based
on their core deposit ratios. Core deposits, which include demand deposits, NOW ac-
counts, money market accounts, and time deposits less than $100,000 (raised to $250,000
in 2008), are primarily insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.3 Insured
depositors have no incentive to monitor, but other capital providers (uninsured depositors
and bondholders) have this incentive.
Table 5.6 panel A presents the results for FAS 125. H4 predicts that BHCs with low
core deposit ratios (i.e., high uninsured deposits ratio) would increase their risk-taking
following FAS 125 more than BHCs with high core deposits, leading to a positive QDiD.
Panel A shows that AV GMRSCORE significantly decreased for both the high and the
low core deposit ratio groups, and the QDiD is negative but insignificant. For the other
three risk measures, none of the pre-post differences and QDiDs are significant. In all
cases, the QDiD is negative, contrary to prediction.
H4 predicts that BHCs with low core deposit ratios decrease their risk-taking following
FAS 140 more than those with high ratios, leading to a negative QDID. Table 5.6 panel
B presents the results for FAS 140. AV GMRSCORE increased both for the high and
for the low groups, but the QDiD is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Similar to
FAS 125, the other three measures do not change significantly around FAS 140. I find no
evidence supporting H4 around FAS 140.
Table 5.6 panel C contains the results for FIN 46(R). As for FAS 140, H4 predicts that
BHCs in the low group decrease their risk-taking more than BHCs with in the high group.
As in the previous two cases, I do not find any evidence supporting H4 around FIN 46(R).
While AV GMRSCORE decreased significantly both for the high and for the low groups,
none of the other pre-post differences and QDIDs are statistically significant.
The results for FAS 166 & 167, presented in table 5.6 panel D, paint a similar picture.
I find no evidence supporting H4. The QDiDs for NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK
have one-tailed p-values less than 5% and 10%, respectively. However, both QDiDs are
positive, which is contrary to H4.
In summary, I find little evidence supporting the hypotheses that manager-shareholder
alignment (H2), regulatory ratios (H3), and market discipline (H4) moderate the effect
of transparency on bank lending decisions. These results are not surprising given that,
in section 5.3, I find little evidence supporting the main effect. The lack of evidence
3https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/ accessed on September 26, 2018.
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supporting my hypotheses can be due to the following reasons. First, it is possible that
transparency does not affect bank lending decisions as hypothesized. Second, it is possible
that the research design lacks power to identify the hypothesized effects. For example,
the propensity score matching may not lead to otherwise identical treatment-control pairs.
Third, the accounting pronouncements may not affect transparency, at least not in the
expected direction, and the transparency implications of the pronouncements may vary
across stakeholders. Last, despite the validation tests in chapter 4, the risk measures
may not capture the desired underlying construct, namely bank risk-taking in mortgage
lending. In the next subsection, I perform additional analyses to address these concerns to
the extent possible.
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Table 5.6: The Moderating Role of Market Discipline
Panel A: FAS 125 (QDiD>0 Predicted)
Pre-period Post-period Differences
High Low High Low High Low ∆High ∆Low QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 35 35 8.910 8.966 8.483 8.384 −0.427† −0.581∗ −0.154
SAV GMRSCORE 35 35 0.993 0.995 0.995 0.987 0.003 −0.008 −0.011
NHIGHRISK 35 35 0.422 0.399 0.407 0.370 −0.016 −0.029 −0.013
$HIGHRISK 35 35 0.380 0.342 0.370 0.323 −0.009 −0.019 −0.009
Panel B: FAS 140 (QDiD<0 Predicted)
Pre-period Post-period Differences
High Low High Low High Low ∆High ∆Low QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 53 60 8.889 8.940 9.323 9.464 0.435∗∗ 0.524∗∗ 0.089
SAV GMRSCORE 53 60 0.996 0.992 0.994 0.993 −0.002 0.001 0.002
NHIGHRISK 53 60 0.339 0.363 0.359 0.380 0.020 0.017 −0.003
$HIGHRISK 53 60 0.306 0.339 0.330 0.342 0.023 0.003 −0.020
Panel C: FIN 46 (R) (QDiD<0 Predicted)
Pre-period Post-period Differences
High Low High Low High Low ∆High ∆Low QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 60 52 9.223 9.471 8.802 8.870 −0.420∗∗ −0.601∗∗∗ −0.180
SAV GMRSCORE 60 52 0.996 0.996 0.994 0.994 −0.002 −0.002 0.001
NHIGHRISK 60 52 0.373 0.361 0.363 0.358 −0.009 −0.004 0.006
$HIGHRISK 60 52 0.359 0.340 0.337 0.331 −0.023 −0.009 0.014
Panel D: FAS 166 & 167 (QDiD<0 Predicted)
Pre-period Post-period Differences
High Low High Low High Low ∆High ∆Low QDiD
AV GMRSCORE 91 83 10.583 10.738 10.306 10.565 −0.276∗ −0.172 0.104
SAV GMRSCORE 91 83 0.992 0.994 0.994 0.996 0.002† 0.002 −0.001
NHIGHRISK 91 83 0.422 0.424 0.392 0.428 −0.030† 0.005 0.035∗
$HIGHRISK 91 83 0.396 0.390 0.368 0.400 −0.028 0.010 0.038†
Continued on next page–
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This table presents the results of the quasi-DiD tests for H4. The High group is composed of
securitizing BHCs with above-median core deposit ratios, and the Low group is composed of
those with below-median core deposit ratios. Obs in columns (1) and (2) reflects the number
observations in the high and low groups with observations in both the pre and post periods,
respectively. For each risk measure, ∆High is the average value in the post-period minus the
average value in the pre-period for the high group. Similarly, ∆Low is the pre-post difference
for the low group. QDiD is the difference between ∆Low and ∆High. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, † represent
p-values below 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20%, respectively, from the mean tests comparing the corre-
sponding values to zero. All variables are as defined in appendix A.1.
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5.5 Additional Analyses
In this section, I explore alternatives to some of my research design choices, to see whether
the choices affect my results. These alternatives include the length of the test window, the
method for matching treatment to control firms, and a statistical correction for overlap-
ping time intervals created by staggered events. I also explore an alternative definition of
the composite risk measure MRSCORE to test if my results are sensitive to excluding
individual components of MRSCORE that do not pass all validity tests in chapter 4.
5.5.1 Alternative Test Windows
The main analyses in the previous section uses a two-year test window. The post-event
period is the first calendar year an accounting pronouncement is effective, and the pre-
event year is the year immediately before the effective year. For example, for FAS 125
which was issued in 1996 and became effective in 1997, the two-year window is [1996,1997].
This primary test window has two potential weaknesses.
First, the pre-period of this test window is typically the year during which the ac-
counting pronouncement is issued. An implicit assumption in employing this window is
that BHCs do not change their lending behavior until the pronouncement is in effect. My
ability to identify the effect of transparency on BHCs lending decisions is reduced if banks
start changing their behavior during the issue year, i.e., the pre-period. To test the sen-
sitivity of my results to this assumption, I use an alternative two-year test window where
the pre-period is the year immediately before the issue year.
Second, another implicit assumption in defining the primary window is that one year is
sufficient to capture banks’ reaction to the change in securitization accounting. The DiD
research design would have low power to identify the hypothesized effects if banks cannot
significantly change their lending behavior in a single year. To address this concern, I use a
four-year window where the post-period is the first two years for which the pronouncement
is effective, and the pre-period is the immediately preceding two years. This four-year
window is similar to the primary window in that the issue year is included in the pre
period.
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Table 5.7: Alternative Test Windows
Panel A: Two-year Window
Excluding Issue-year Panel B: Four-year Window
FAS 125 FAS 140 FIN 46(R) FAS 166 FAS 125 FAS 140 FIN 46(R) FAS 166
I. : DiD for H1 (QDiD<0 Predicted)
Expected Sign + - - - + - - -
AV GMRSCORE −0.182† 0.137 0.021 0.119 −0.017∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
SAV GMRSCORE −0.009∗∗ 0.000 −0.003 0.005∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
NHIGHRISK 0.002 0.002 0.000 −0.001 0.007∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
$HIGHRISK −0.002 −0.011 0.013 0.000 0.008∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
II. QDiD for H2
Expected Sign - + + + - + + +
AV GMRSCORE −0.031 0.051 −0.149 −0.155 −0.628∗∗∗ −0.215 −0.348 −0.170
SAV GMRSCORE 0.012† −0.003 0.006 −0.003 0.007∗∗∗ 0.001 0.004 −0.001†
NHIGHRISK 0.038 −0.010 −0.039 −0.010 −0.041 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.072 −0.035
$HIGHRISK 0.048 −0.035 0.007 −0.035 −0.042 0.005† −0.054 −0.048
III. QDiD for H3
Expected Sign + - - - + - - -
AV GMRSCORE −0.011 −0.080 −0.246 0.299∗ −0.051† −0.145∗∗∗ 0.182† 0.191
SAV GMRSCORE 0.001 0.008∗ −0.007† 0.007∗∗ −0.004 0.002∗∗∗ 0.003† 0.005
NHIGHRISK −0.012 −0.008 0.010 0.015 −0.027 −0.022∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.023
$HIGHRISK −0.018 0.000 0.018 0.018 −0.011† −0.026∗∗∗ 0.043∗ 0.033
IV. QDiD for H4
Expected Sign + - - - + - - -
AV GMRSCORE −0.166 −0.058 −0.187 0.206 −0.072∗ 0.040 −0.048 0.076
SAV GMRSCORE −0.006 −0.001 0.000 0.002 −0.006 0.001∗ 0.000 0.001
NHIGHRISK 0.020 0.013 0.028 0.025 0.008 −0.005 0.017† 0.024
$HIGHRISK 0.035 −0.015 0.023 0.014 0.014∗ −0.027 0.021∗ 0.018
This table presents the results of the additional analyses using the alternative test windows. Panel A presents the results for
the two-year period excluding the year during which the accounting pronouncement is issued, and panel B contains the results
for the four-year period. I present only the DiDs for H1 and the QDiDs for H2, H3, and H4. Refer to tables 5.2 and 5.4 for
descriptions of DiD and QDiD, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, † represent p-values below 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20%, respectively, from
the mean tests comparing the corresponding values to zero. All variables are defined in appendix A.1.
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Table 5.7 presents the analyses using the alternative test windows. The results from
the two-year window excluding the issue year, presented in panel A, generally provide
similar conclusions to those of the main analyses in the previous section. In almost all
the cases, I fail to find support for my hypotheses using the alternative two-year test
window. The estimated effects are either statistically indistinguishable from zero or in the
opposite direction of my prediction, except for one case. Unlike the main results in table
5.2, SAV GMRSCORE decreased significantly (one-tailed p-value of less 10%) following
FIN 46(R), which is consistent with H3.
Table 5.7 panel B presents the results from the analyses using the four-year test window.
The signs of the DiD for H1 are similar to the signs in the main tests presented in table
5.2, however unlike the other test windows, all the DiDs for H1 are significantly different
from zero. This suggests that the four-year test window is more powerful than the two-year
windows because the longer pre- and post-periods allow sufficient time for the effect of the
accounting pronouncements to be observed, or because this window has more observations.
However, the signs of the DiDs are consistent with the directional prediction in H1 only
half the time. Consistent with H1: (i) NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK increased sig-
nificantly following FAS 125, (ii) all risk measures decreased significantly following FIN
46(R), and NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK decreased significantly following FAS 166
& 167. In all the other cases, the DiDs have the opposite sign to H1’s prediction.
The tests of H2, H3, and H4 using the four-year window do not differ substantially
from those using the primary test window. I find evidence in support of H2 only in two
of the cases: (i) AV GMRSCORE decreased significantly following FAS 125, and (ii)
$HIGHRISK increased significantly following FAS 140. I find evidence consistent with
H3 for AV GMRSCORE, NHIGHRISK, and $HIGHRISK following FAS 140. Only
the increase in $HIGHRISK following FAS 125 is consistent with H4. In each of the other
cases, the change in the risk measures around the accounting pronouncements is either not
significantly different from zero or it is in the opposite direction of the prediction.
5.5.2 Alternative Propensity Score Model Assumptions
This subsection assesses the sensitivity of the results to the two main assumptions in the
propensity score matching, namely matching with replacement, and the 10% tolerance. I
test the robustness of the results to matching without replacement, and to matching with
a narrower 3% caliper width. I only change one assumption at a time to isolate the effect,
if any, of changing of these assumptions. Table 5.8 panel A contains the results from the
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analyses using propensity score matching with a 3% caliper width but with replacement.4
Except for the increase in AV GMRSCORE following FAS 166 & 167 with one-tailed
p-value of less than 10%, all the changes in the risk measures around the accounting
pronouncements are either not significantly different from zero or they are in the opposite
direction of the prediction. Panel B presents the results when I perform the propensity
score matching without replacement, but using the same 10% caliper width as the main
tests.5 All the changes in risk-taking are either not significant or in the opposite direction
of my predictions. In summary, changing these assumptions the propensity score matching
did not results in different conclusions, when compared to the main test in earlier section
5.3.
4Narrowing the caliper width has a negligible effect on the number of observations, perhaps because I
match with replacement. The number of observations for FAS 140 decreased to 100, compared to 112 in
table 5.2. All the other numbers of observations for the other events remained the same.
5The effect of matching without replacement on the number of observations is similar to that of nar-
rowing the caliper as discussed in the previous footnote.
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Table 5.8: Alternative Propensity Score Matching Assumptions
Panel A: 3% Caliper Width Panel B: Without Replacement
FAS 125 FAS 140 FIN 46(R) FAS 166 FAS 125 FAS 140 FIN 46(R) FAS 166
I. : DiD for H1
Expected Sign + - - - + - - -
AV GMRSCORE −0.163 0.094 −0.165 0.185∗ −0.0163 0.094 −0.165 0.185∗
SAV GMRSCORE −0.008† 0.007∗ −0.002 0.006∗∗ −0.008† 0.007∗ −0.002 0.008∗∗
NHIGHRISK 0.005 0.027† −0.016 −0.005 0.005 0.026† −0.016 −0.005
$HIGHRISK 0.009 0.011 −0.016 −0.011 0.009 0.011 −0.016 −0.010
II. QDiD for H2
Expected Sign - + + + - + + +
AV GMRSCORE −0.271 −0.602∗∗ −0.156 0.242† −0.271 −0.329† −0.156 0.242†
SAV GMRSCORE 0.012 −0.001 0.005 0.001 0.012 −0.0002 0.005 0.001
NHIGHRISK 0.039 −0.038 −0.043 −0.002 0.039 −0.0005 −0.043 −0.002
$HIGHRISK 0.032 −0.019 −0.029 −0.016 0.032 0.002 −0.029 −0.016
III. QDiD for H3
Expected Sign + - - - + - - -
AV GMRSCORE −0.361† −0.043 0.025 0.233† −0.361† −0.017 0.025 0.233†
SAV GMRSCORE −0.011 0.005 0.003 0.003† −0.011 0.003 0.003 0.003†
NHIGHRISK −0.051∗ 0.006 0.049† 0.021 −0.051∗ 0.012 0.049† 0.021
$HIGHRISK −0.045† 0.004 0.046† 0.034† −0.045† 0.008 0.046† 0.034†
IV. QDiD for H4
Expected Sign + - - - + - - -
AV GMRSCORE −0.154 0.041 −0.180 0.104 −0.154 0.089 −0.180 0.104
SAV GMRSCORE −0.011 0.003 0.001 −0.001 −0.011 0.002 0.001 −0.001
NHIGHRISK −0.013 −0.016 0.006 0.035∗ −0.013 −0.003 0.006 0.035∗
$HIGHRISK −0.009 −0.036 0.014 0.038† −0.009 −0.020 0.014 0.038†
This table presents the results of the analyses using the alternative propensity score model assumptions. The results in
panel A are obtained when using a narrower 3% caliper width instead of the 10% caliper width in the main analyses.
Panel B contains the results obtained when the propensity score matching is performed without replacement. I present
only the DiDs for H1 and the QDiDs for H2, H3, and H4. Refer to tables 5.2 and 5.4 for descriptions of DiD and QDiD,
respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, † represent p-values below 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20%, respectively, from the mean tests comparing
the corresponding values to zero. All variables are as defined in appendix A.1.
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5.5.3 Alternative Definition of Composite Mortgage Risk Score
The validation of the BHC-level risk measures and their components in chapter 4 shows
that the relation between some components of the composite mortgage risk score and BHC-
level mortgage outcomes is inconsistent across mortgage outcome measures or contrary to
the predicted relation between mortgage lending risk and mortgage outcomes. In this
subsection, I test my hypotheses using an alternate definition of the risk measure, which
relies only on the components that consistently pass the validation tests. Table 5.9 presents
the results using the alternative risk measure. As in the main tests, the change in risk-
taking is not significantly different from zero in most cases, and it goes in the opposite
direction of the prediction when it is significantly different from zero. The overall conclusion
remains similar to that of the main analyses. There is no evidence that clearly shows a
significant change in risk-taking around the accounting pronouncements.
5.5.4 Alternative Matching Method
A growing literature expresses concern regarding the use of propensity score matching
(PSM). King & Nielsen (2016) assess the ability of PSM to reduce bias relative other
matching methods. They find that PSM may not reduce bias sufficiently, and that in some
cases it can increase bias. The poor performance of PSM can arise from the fact that a
match on the propensity score does not translate into a match on all covariates. Pruning
observation based on propensity score differences thus can exacerbate bias, by increasing
imbalance on important covariates. I follow best practices in selecting covariates with a
theoretical foundation, using a wider caliper (10%) to minimize the effect of data pruning,
and confirming bias reduction by comparing the covariates before and after matching.
Nevertheless, it may still be the case that PSM results in poor matching that affects my
results. To address this concern, this section tests the hypotheses using a form of coarsened
exact matching (CEM).
For each pronouncement, I select the three most important covariates in the propensity
score model by comparing their t-stats and partial R2s, and partition the sample in to
quintiles based on each of the selected covariates. I then match each securitizing BHC
with a non-securitizing BHC in the same quintile, for each of the three covariates. I
perform this matching sequentially based on the importance of the covariates. Similar to
the PSM, I perform this matching separately for each pronouncement during the year the
pronouncement is issued, and separately for public and private BHCs.
For example, for FAS 125 and public BHCs, I first match each securitizing BHC to
a pool of non-securitizing BHCs that are in the same size (i.e., LOGASSETS) quintile.
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Table 5.9: Alternative Definition of Composite Mortgage Risk Score
FAS 125 FAS 140 FIN 46(R) FAS 166
I. : DiD for H1
Expected Sign + - - -
AV GMRSCORE −0.093 0.156∗ −0.109 0.20∗∗
SAV GMRSCORE −0.007 0.009∗∗ −0.004 0.008∗∗
NHIGHRISK 0.004 0.022 −0.017 0.031∗∗
$HIGHRISK 0.002 0.007 −0.019 0.017
II. QDiD for H2
Expected Sign - + + +
AV GMRSCORE 0.048 −0.233 −0.055 0.090
SAV GMRSCORE 0.009 −0.007 0.015 0.001
NHIGHRISK 0.046 −0.009 −0.060† 0.006
$HIGHRISK 0.037 0.007 −0.046 −0.015
III. QDiD for H3
Expected Sign + - - -
AV GMRSCORE −0.224 0.049 0.022 0.153
SAV GMRSCORE −0.013 0.001 0.001 0.007∗∗
NHIGHRISK −0.010 0.003 0.007 0.037∗
$HIGHRISK −0.007 −0.012 0.019 0.044∗
IV. QDiD for H4
Expected Sign + - - -
AV GMRSCORE −0.185 −0.096 0.022 0.096
SAV GMRSCORE −0.011 0.001 −0.002 0.002
NHIGHRISK −0.032 −0.012 −0.017 0.027†
$HIGHRISK −0.031 −0.016 0.013 0.040∗
This table presents the results of the sensitivity analyses when using an alternative defi-
nition of composite mortgage risk score (MRSCORE), which relies only on components
that consistently pass all validation tests in chapter 4. Similar to the other sensitivity
tests, I present only the DiDs for H1 and the QDiDs for H2, H3, and H4. Refer to ta-
bles 5.2 and 5.4 for descriptions of DiD and QDiD, respectively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, † represent
p-values below 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20%, respectively, from the mean tests comparing the
corresponding values to zero. All variables are as defined in appendix A.1.
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I then restrict the pool to all non-securitizing BHCs that are in the same ROA quintile,
and finally to those in the same LEV ERAGE quintile. If multiple matches remain after
the three rounds of quintile matches, I choose the non-securitizing BHC in the pool with
the smallest difference in the third matching covariate (LEV RAGE in the above example)
with the treatment BHC. In all the cases, I find at least one matching non-securitizing
BHC after the first and second round of quintile matching. However, in some cases, I find
no matches after the third-level quintile matching. In this case, I select the matching BHCs
from the pool in the previous step by comparing actual values of the covariate for the third
step and choosing the non-securitizing BHC in the second pool with the smallest difference
in the third covariate. In the above example, if there are no matches on LEV ERAGE
quintiles, I select a control BHC in the pool of matching non-securitizing BHCs based on
the first two quintile (LOGASSETS and ROA) that has the closest LEV ERAGE value
to the treatment BHC.
Table 5.10 presents the results using the alternative matching strategy and the primary
two-year test window in panel A, and the alternative matching strategy and the four-year
test window in panel B. When using the two-year window, I find little evidence supporting
my hypotheses. As in the previous cases in tables 5.2 to 5.6, most of the DiDs or QDiDs
are not statistically significant or go in the opposite direction to my prediction. The only
exceptions are the positive DiD in NHIGHRISK around FAS 125, the positive QDiD in
AV GMRSCORE around FAS 166 & 167, and the negative QDiD in SAV GMRSCORE,
all which are significant at 10% (one-tailed). I find mixed evidence when using the four-
year test window. Consistent with H1, I find significantly positive DIDs around FAS 125
and significantly negative DIDs around FIN 46 for all risk measures. Contrary to H1, I
find positive DiDs around FAS 140 and FAS 166 & 167. The result for H2 are either
insignificant or contrary to the prediction. I find evidence supporting H3 around FAS
125 and FAS 140 but not around FIN 46 and FAS 166 & 167. The results for H4 are
almost always insignificant or contrary to my prediction. In general, similar to the other
sensitivity tests, changing the matching strategy does not seem to significantly change my
conclusions.
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Table 5.10: Alternative Matching Strategy
Panel A: Two-year Window Panel B: Four-year Window
FAS 125 FAS 140 FIN 46 FAS 166 FAS 125 FAS 140 FIN 46 FAS 166
I. : DiD for H1
Expected Sign + - - - + - - -
AV GMRSCORE 0.005 0.011 −0.097 −0.032 0.064∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
SAV GMRSCORE 0.001 −0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
NHIGHRISK 0.021† 0.015 0.000 −0.009 0.014∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
$HIGHRISK 0.011 0.002 −0.005 0.001 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
II. : Q-DiD for H2
Expected Sign - + + + - + + +
AV GMRSCORE 0.303 −0.199 −0.072 0.224† 0.216 −0.045 −0.175 0.203
SAV GMRSCORE 0.014 −0.007† −0.003 0.001 0.015 −0.007 0.000 0.008
NHIGHRISK 0.055 −0.038 −0.058∗ 0.002 0.044∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.054 0.023
$HIGHRISK 0.107 −0.030 −0.082∗∗ −0.014 0.088 −0.028∗∗ −0.074† 0.007
III. : Q-DiD for H3
Expected Sign + - - - + - - -
AV GMRSCORE 0.077 −0.128 0.129 0.115 0.135† −0.109∗∗ 0.048∗∗ −0.081
SAV GMRSCORE 0.004† 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗ 0.004
NHIGHRISK −0.009 0.004 0.051∗∗ 0.024 0.003† −0.014∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.026
$HIGHRISK −0.013 0.010 0.034 0.032† 0.002† −0.008∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.030
IV. : Q-DiD for H4
Expected Sign + - - - + - - -
AV GMRSCORE −0.049 −0.252 −0.050 −0.027 −0.113 −0.100∗ 0.093 −0.075
SAV GMRSCORE 0.000 0.000 −0.002 −0.003† −0.002† −0.003 −0.001 −0.003
NHIGHRISK −0.012 0.002 0.034† 0.020 −0.044 0.022 0.043∗∗ 0.013
$HIGHRISK −0.004 −0.026 0.039† 0.018 −0.038 0.012 0.055∗∗∗ 0.010
This table presents the results obtained when using the alternative matching technique in section 5.5.4. Panel A contains
the results when the alternative matching method is used with the primary two-year test window, and panel B presents
the results when the alternative matching method is used with the alternative four-year test window. I present only the
DiDs for H1 and the QDiDs for H2, H3, and H4. Refer to tables 5.2 and 5.4 for descriptions of DiD and QDiD, respec-
tively. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, † represent p-values below 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20%, respectively, from the mean tests comparing the
corresponding values to zero. All variables are as defined in appendix A.1.
105
5.5.5 Alternative Research Designs
FAS 140 (2000) and FIN 46 (R) (2003) are issued close together, so that the post period
for FAS 140 overlaps the pre-period for FIN 46 (R). This section adapts Bertrand & Mul-
lainathan’s (2003) implementation of difference-in-differences design for staggered events
to address this issue. I employ the following regression model.
RISKit = αi + αt + θjIjt + φSECINDit + βj(Ijt × SECINDit) + ΓXit + it
The subscripts i, j, and t index BHCs, accounting pronouncements, and year, respectively.
RISKit is a BHC-year level mortgage lending risk measure. Ijt is an indicator variable
that equals one if year t is greater than the issue year of pronouncement j. SECINDit
is an indicator variable that equals one if BHC i is securitizing in year t. Xit is a vector
of control variables, selected from the covariates used in the propensity score model. I
do not use regulatory capital variables as controls because of missing data prior to 1996.
The coefficient βj captures the effect of pronouncement j on BHCs’ risk-taking, while
controlling for the other pronouncements.
For each event, this research designs compares securitizing BHCs’ lending decisions
in the years after the event with the lending decision of securitizing BHCs prior to the
event, and of non-securitizing BHCs during the 1993-2015 period. For example for FAS
125, it compares the lending decisions of securitizing BHCs in the period 1997-2015 with
those of securitizing BHCs in the period 1993-1996, and of non-securitizing BHCs in the
period 1993-2015. This feature can allow me to better estimate the effects of events that
fall close together. Unlike the main design that is restricted to a narrow window around
each event, this research design can use the whole sample period, increasing the number of
observation available to estimate the effects if each event. However, using the full sample
period or the unmatched sample can lead to endogeneity issues that are mitigated by the
main research design by matching treatment and control groups on relevant variable to
establish comparable groups, and by narrowing the time period to limit the effects of other
potential events.
I estimate the above regression model over the period 1993-2015, both for the un-
matched and for the matched samples. As in Bertrand & Mullainathan (2003), the un-
matched sample contains all securitizing and non-securitizing BHCs with non-missing data
to estimate the above regression model. I form the matched sample by propensity score-
matching each securitizing BHC with a non-securitizing BHC for each year in the 1993-2015
period.
I limit the sensitivity analyses to H1, because implementing this approach for the other
hypotheses requires four three-way interactions for each hypothesis, which makes interpret-
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ing the results a daunting task. Table 5.11 presents the results. While all regressions in this
table contain control variables, I present only the estimated coefficients for the treatment
indicator, the event indicators, and their interactions. I will limit the discussion to the
interaction terms (βs), which are comparable to the DiD estimates in the main analyses
(table 5.2).
Table 5.11 panels A and B presents the results for the combined sample of public and
private BHCs. The results for the matched sample mostly lead to similar conclusions as
those from the DiD tests in table 5.2, however there are some differences in terms of the
sign and significance of the estimates. The interaction term for FAS 125 is negative for all
risk measures and significant for three out of four. Similar to the main tests, these results
are contrary to H1. The interaction term for FAS 140 is positive for all measures, which
is also contrary to H1’s prediction. The negative coefficients for FIN 46, while consistent
with H1, are not statistically significant. In these three cases, my conclusion is similar to
those from the main tests: I fail to find evidence in support of H1. Unlike the main tests,
I find some evidence supporting H1 around FAS 166 & 167. The interaction term for FAS
166 is negative and significant for two risk measures, NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK,
indicating that BHCs reduced their risk-taking following FAS 166 & 167 by reducing the
proportion of high-risk mortgages they approve. I arrive at similar conclusions when using
the unmatched sample, except for FIN 46. The interaction term is significantly negative
for all risk measures, supporting H1.
The results for the public BHCs sample are in Table 5.11 panels C and D. When
focusing on the matched sample of Public BHCs only, I find no significant interactions
for FAS 125, FAS 140, and FIN 46 while the interaction terms for FAS 166 & 167 are
significant negative for NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK. These results are comparable
to those from the main test in table 5.2. However, I find different results for FAS 125 when
using the unmatched sample of public BHCs. The interaction terms for AV GMRSCORE,
NHIGHRISK, and $HIGHRISK are positive and significant, supporting H1.
As presented in panels E and F, the results for the private BHCs sample also fail to
provide robust evidence supporting H1, except in few cases. For the unmatched sample,
I find negative and significant interactions for FAS 125 when using AV GMRSCORE,
NHIGHRISK, and $HIGHRISK, and for FAS 166 & 167 when using NHIGHRISK
and $HIGHRISK, all supporting H1. Only the significantly negative interaction for
AV GMRSCORE for FIN 46 is consistent H1. In all the other cases, the interaction is
either insignificant or opposite to H1’s prediction. In summary, the above results show that
the alternative research design does not lead to significantly different conclusions about the
effect of transparency on bank risk-taking.
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Table 5.11: Alternative Research Design
Panel A: Combined Public & Private BHCs Sample: Unmatched Sample
AV GMRSCORE SAV GMRSCORE NHIGHRISK $HIGHRISK
SECIND 0.091 0.003** 0.009 0.003
(0.265) (0.026) (0.424) (0.815)
IFAS125 0.123
† 0.0004 -0.082*** -0.077***
(0.140) (0.827) (<0.001) (<0.001)
IFAS125 × SECIND -0.018 -0.001 -0.001 0.004
(0.805) (0.474) (0.938) (0.726)
IFAS140 0.555*** 0.001 0.014
† 0.022**
(<0.001) (0.426) (0.153) (0.044)
IFAS140 × SECIND 0.024 0.0003 0.011 0.014
(0.705) (0.829) (0.261) (0.215)
IFIN46 1.627*** 0.001 0.096*** 0.093***
(<0.001) (0.466) (<0.001) (<0.001)
IFIN46 × SECIND -0.142** -0.003*** -0.022** -0.024**
(0.016) (0.002) (0.031) (0.029)
IFAS166 -1.782*** 0.003
† 0.003 0.021*
(0) (0.191) (0.770) (0.085)
IFAS166 × SECIND -0.059 0.002** -0.015** -0.022***
(0.233) (0.028) (0.046) (0.009)
Constant 9.388*** 0.979*** 0.405*** 0.475***
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 23,033 23,033 23,033 23,033
R-squared 0.357 0.006 0.046 0.035
Continued on next page–
108
– continued from previous page
Panel B: Combined Public & Private BHCs Sample: Matched Sample
AV GMRSCORE SAV GMRSCORE NHIGHRISK $HIGHRISK
SECIND 0.221† 0.004† 0.024 0.036†
(0.147) (0.176) (0.292) (0.111)
IFAS125 0.237 0.001 -0.071** -0.047
†
(0.254) (0.895) (0.035) (0.167)
IFAS125 × SECIND -0.296** -0.003 -0.044* -0.053**
(0.045) (0.314) (0.069) (0.034)
IFAS140 0.555*** 0.003 -0.005 0.014
(<0.001) (0.366) (0.830) (0.624)
IFAS140 × SECIND 0.078 0.0004 0.032† 0.026
(0.506) (0.871) (0.112) (0.251)
IFIN46 1.518*** -0.0002 0.096*** 0.090***
(<0.001) (0.932) (<0.001) (<0.001)
IFIN46 × SECIND -0.088 -0.002 -0.019 -0.016
(0.447) (0.371) (0.348) (0.448)
IFAS166 -1.634*** 0.003
† 0.018 0.028†
(0) (0.119) (0.332) (0.179)
IFAS166 × SECIND 0.003 0.001 -0.022* -0.024*
(0.973) (0.338) (0.07 ) (0.082)
Constant 8.846*** 1.027*** 0.369† 0.390†
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.142) (0.160)
Observations 5,764 5,764 5,764 5,764
R-squared 0.434 0.015 0.068 0.056
Continued on next page–
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Panel C: Public BHCs Sample: Unmatched Sample
AV GMRSCORE SAV GMRSCORE NHIGHRISK $HIGHRISK
SECIND -0.157† 0.003* -0.018 -0.021
(0.114) (0.093) (0.235) (0.210)
IFAS125 -0.056 -0.002 -0.097*** -0.101***
(0.730) (0.373) (<0.001) (<0.001)
IFAS125 × SECIND 0.253*** -0.002 0.023* 0.038**
(0.008) (0.429) (0.100) (0.017)
IFAS140 0.655*** 0.002 0.011 0.029
†
(<0.001) (0.282) (0.548) (0.129) )
IFAS140 × SECIND -0.079 0.0003 0.004 0.002
(0.405) (0.867) (0.770) (0.916)
IFIN46 1.412*** 0.001 0.074*** 0.060**
(<0.001) (0.534) (0.001) (0.011)
IFIN46 × SECIND -0.037 -0.002 -0.013 -0.018†
(0.665) (0.288) (0.345) (0.189)
IFAS166 -1.659*** 0.003 0.016 0.051**
(<0.001) (0.379) (0.413) (0.020)
IFAS166 × SECIND -0.035 0.0005 -0.023† -0.036**
(0.674) (0.792) (0.116) (0.022)
Constant 10.330*** 0.950*** 0.338 0.423
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.154) (0.104)
Observations 5,732 5,732 5,732 5,732
R-squared 0.443 0.018 0.066 0.052
Continued on next page–
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Panel D: Public BHCs Sample: Matched Sample
AV GMRSCORE SAV GMRSCORE NHIGHRISK $HIGHRISK
SECIND -0.046 0.0004 -0.011 0.010
(0.801) (0.892) (0.662) (0.697)
IFAS125 0.240 -0.006
† -0.045 -0.025
(0.392) (0.179) (0.286) (0.556)
IFAS125 × SECIND -0.072 -0.001 -0.025 -0.030
(0.701) (0.723) (0.400) (0.345)
IFAS140 0.809*** 0.006
† -0.017 -0.0004
(<0.001) (0.191) (0.653) (0.992)
IFAS140 × SECIND -0.018 0.002 0.029 0.0213
(0.929) (0.526) (0.347) (0.530)
IFIN46 1.007*** 0.0004 0.012 -0.008
(<0.001) (0.868) (0.722) (0.816)
IFIN46 × SECIND 0.211 -0.003 0.016 0.010
(0.266) (0.273) (0.567) (0.732)
IFAS166 -1.476*** 0.006** 0.040
† 0.052*
(<0.001) (0.046) (0.164) (0.089)
IFAS166 × SECIND -0.103 -0.001 -0.049** -0.051**
(0.421) (0.780) (0.017) (0.021)
Constant 8.743*** 1.001*** 0.118 0.075
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.785) (0.870)
Observations 2,072 2,072 2,072 2,072
R-squared 0.499 0.033 0.091 0.072
Continued on next page–
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Panel E: Private BHCs Sample: Unmatched Sample
AV GMRSCORE SAV GMRSCORE NHIGHRISK $HIGHRISK
SECIND 0.367** 0.005** 0.051** 0.042*
(0.026) (0.028) (0.012) (0.067)
IFAS125 0.198* 0.003 -0.070*** -0.060***
(0.072) (0.274) (<0.001) (0.002)
IFAS125 × SECIND -0.305** -0.002 -0.050** -0.048**
(0.035) (0.362) (0.011) (0.029)
IFAS140 0.508*** 0.002 0.025* 0.027*
(<0.001) (0.373) (0.065) (0.057)
IFAS140 × SECIND 0.033 -0.001 0.023† 0.019
(0.737) (0.818) (0.139) (0.248)
IFIN46 1.639*** 0.001 0.104*** 0.102***
(<0.001) (0.466) (<0.001) (<0.001)
IFIN46 × SECIND -0.139† -0.004** -0.024† -0.014
(0.131) (0.017) (0.132) (0.406)
IFAS166 -1.838*** 0.002 0.012 0.021
†
(<0.001) (0.255) (0.395) (0.185)
IFAS166 × SECIND 0.004 0.003*** -0.018* -0.021*
(0.958) (0.005) (0.079) (0.069)
Constant 9.319*** 0.983*** 0.400** 0.456**
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.024) (0.014)
Observations 14,639 14,639 14,639 14,639
R-squared 0.336 0.007 0.052 0.041
Continued on next page–
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Panel F: Private BHCs Sample: Matched Sample
AV GMRSCORE SAV GMRSCORE NHIGHRISK $HIGHRISK
SECIND 0.611*** 0.008* 0.071* 0.070*
(0.010) (0.077) (0.080) (0.08)
IFAS125 0.371 0.009
† -0.085† -0.069
(0.258) (0.162) (0.129) (0.229)
IFAS125 × SECIND -0.722*** -0.007† -0.099** -0.106**
(0.002) (0.146) (0.014) (0.012)
IFAS140 0.368* 0.001 0.004 0.020
(0.059) (0.821) (0.908) (0.59)
IFAS140 × SECIND 0.146 -0.004 0.041 0.039
(0.373) (0.917) (0.131) (0.200)
IFIN46 1.672*** 0.000 0.125*** 0.123***
(<0.001) (0.994) (<0.001) (<0.001)
IFIN46 × SECIND -0.194† -0.002 -0.025 -0.018
(0.194) (0.541) (0.318) (0.512)
IFAS166 -1.776*** 0.002 0.007 0.014
(<0.001) (0.578) (0.764) (0.620)
IFAS166 × SECIND 0.094 0.003† -0.007 -0.007
(0.310) (0.125) (0.625) (0.659)
Constant 9.381*** 1.025*** 0.465 0.489†
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.141) (0.161)
Observations 3,692 3,692 3,692 3,692
R-squared 0.421 0.022 0.087 0.078
Continued on next page–
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This table contains the results of the analyses using the alternative regression based re-
search design. I estimate the regression RISKit = αi + αt + θjIjt + φSECINDit + βj(Ijt ×
SECINDit) + ΓXit + it where the subscripts i, j, and t index BHCs, accounting pronounce-
ments, and year, respectively. RISKit is a BHC-year level mortgage lending risk measure. Ijt
is an indicator variable that equals one if year t is greater than the issue year of pronounce-
ment j. SECINDit is an indicator for securitizing BHCs in year t. Xit is a vector of control
variables, selected from the covariates used in the propensity score model. I exclude regula-
tory capital variables from the vector of controls because of missing data prior to 1996. The
coefficient βj captures the effect of pronouncement j on BHCs’ risk-taking, while controlling
for the other pronouncements. I expect β > 0 for FAS 125, and β < 0 for the other pronounce-
ments. p-values in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, † represent p-values below 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20%,
respectively, from the mean tests comparing the corresponding values to zero. All variables
are as defined in appendix A.1.
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5.5.6 Least-transparent Versus Most-transparent Periods
This section focuses on the least transparent period (pre-FAS 140) and the most transparent
period (post-FAS 166 & 167) to increase the power of my tests. As argued in chapter 2,
the effect of FAS 140 and FIN 46 (R) on transparency is not clear. Excluding the years
during which these standards were effective enhances the contrast between the low and
high transparency periods. I estimate the following regression model using unmatched
sample.
RISKit = αi + αt + θMTt + φSECINDit + β(MTt × SECINDit) + ΓXit + it
As in section 5.5.5, the subscripts i and t index BHCs and year, respectively. RISKit is
a BHC-year level mortgage lending risk measure. MTt is an indicator variable that equals
one for the most transparent period (t ≥ 2010), and zero for the least transparent period
(t ≤ 2000). I omit the period 2000-2010. I also consider an alternate definition of MTt
where the least transparent period is the pre-FAS 125 period (1993-1996) instead of the pre-
FAS 140 period (1993-2000). SECINDit is an indicator variable that equals one if BHC
i is securitizing in year t. Xit is a vector of control variables, selected from the covariates
used in the propensity score model. β < 0 would indicate that greater transparency leads
to lower risk-taking by securitizing BHCs.
Table 5.12 presents the results. The interaction coefficient β is significantly negative
except for SAV GMRSCORE, indicating that securitizing banks take less risk than non-
securitizing banks in the most transparent period, relative to the least transparent period.
These results support my hypothesis that greater transparency leads to lower risk-taking.
I find the strongest support to my hypothesis when comparing pre-FAS 125 and post-FAS
166 & 167 periods. This finding is consistent with the argument in chapter 2 that the early
securitization accounting standards may not have a clear effect on transparency because
some components enhance while others can diminish transparency. This result, however,
should be interpreted with caution because of the large gap between the least and most
transparent periods, during which many other events including the mortgage crisis have
occurred.
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Table 5.12: Least v. Most Transparent Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var. AV GMRSCORE SAV GMRSCORE NHIGHRISK $HIGHRISK
Least Transp. Period 1993-2000 1993-1996 1993-2000 1993-1996 1993-2000 1993-1996 1993-2000 1993-1996
SECIND 0.0773 0.269* 0.00283* 0.00316 -0.00429 0.0448** -0.00578 0.0361
(0.200) (0.0589) (0.0974) (0.447) (0.656) (0.0448) (0.587) (0.147)
MT 0.306** -0.316 0.0110** 0.0134* 0.0844*** 0.126*** 0.137*** 0.210***
(0.0492) (0.244) (0.0127) (0.0883) (0.000703) (0.00287) (6.37e-07) (9.08e-06)
MT × SECIND -0.172** -0.311** -0.00202 -0.00256 -0.0138 -0.0645*** -0.0196† -0.0606**
(0.0117) (0.0361) (0.295) (0.553) (0.205) (0.00547) (0.103) (0.0196)
Constant 10.05*** 14.37*** 0.976*** 0.968*** 0.387 0.675* 0.520** 1.151***
(0) (5.22e-10) (0) (0) (0.105) (0.0620) (0.0480) (0.00439)
Observations 9,752 9,752 9,752 9,752 9,752 9,752 9,752 9,752
R-squared 0.402 0.402 0.009 0.009 0.063 0.063 0.054 0.054
This table presents the results of the analyses comparing the least-transparent (1993-2000) and most-transparent (2010-2015)
periods. I estimate the regression
RISKit = αi + αt + θMTt + φSECINDit + β(MTt × SECINDit) + ΓXit + it
where RISKit is a BHC-year level mortgage lending risk measure for BHC i in year t. MTt is an indicator variable that equals
one for years in the most transparent period, and zero for years in the least transparent period. The least transparent period
is 1993-2010 for odd numbered columns, and 1993-1996 for even numbered columns. The most transparent period is 2010-2015
for all columns. SECINDit is an indicator variable that equals one if BHC i is securitizing in year t. Xit is a vector of control
variables, selected from the covariates used in the propensity score model. All regressions include control variables, and time
and firm fixed effects. P-values in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, † represent p-values below 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20%, respectively, from
the mean tests comparing the corresponding values to zero. All variables are as defined in appendix A.1
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5.6 Conclusion
The empirical analyses presented in this chapter provide little evidence supporting my
hypotheses. Below, I discuss several possible reasons for the lack of evidence supporting
my hypotheses. I plan to explore these further in future work.
First, it is possible that transparency as defined in this thesis does not affect bank lend-
ing decisions, or that it affects them differently from my predictions. Transparency refers
to the financial reporting transparency of securitization. I hypothesized that transparency
affects lending decisions though its effect on bank stakeholders’ (shareholders’, creditors’,
and regulators’) ability to monitor bank risk-taking. I did not consider how investors in the
securitization vehicles may have affected bank lending decisions, because I expect securiti-
zation accounting standards to have little effect on their decision to invest in asset-backed
securities and the expected returns they demand to do so. I conjecture that securitization
investors are more likely to rely on information about the composition of the securitized
assets and the structure of the transaction, which are not included in great detail in annual
reports or FR Y-9Cs. However, it is conceivable that the securitization investors and their
investment and pricing decisions play a primary role in affecting bank lending decisions,
resulting in little or no room for the other stakeholders considered in this thesis.
Second, it is possible that the research design lacks power to identify the hypothesized
effects. For example, the propensity score matching may not lead to otherwise identical
treatment-control pairs. In section 5.5, I performed additional analyses to test the sen-
sitivity of my results to alternative assumptions for the propensity score model, to an
alternative matching technique, and to an alternative research design that does not rely
on any matching method. The results, while different in some cases, lead to similar con-
clusions about my hypotheses, suggesting that the lack of results is likely not driven by
the specific research design.
Third, the accounting pronouncements may not affect transparency, or not in the direc-
tion I expected, and the transparency implications of the pronouncements may vary across
stakeholders. For example, contrary to my expectation, if FAS 125 introduced consistency
to securitization accounting, the benefits of that consistency may outweigh the negative
implications that arise from the financial components approach and QSPEs, resulting in
enhanced transparency in the post-FAS 125 period. For FAS 140, the negative effects of
the mandatory non-consolidation of QSPEs, which can allow easier off-balance-sheet treat-
ment, may overshadow the positive effects of enhanced transparency. Consistent with this
explanation, I find results supporting H1 when I limit my analyses to comparing the least
transparent period (pre-FAS 125 or pre-FAS 140) to the most transparent (post-FAS 166
& 167) period.
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Last, the risk measures may not capture the desired underlying construct of bank risk-
taking in mortgage lending. In section 5.5, I consider an alternative definition of the risk
measure, which excludes components with weak associations with BHC-level mortgage
performance measures in the validity tests. The results and conclusions remain similar
when using the alternative risk measure. However, I believe that this does not rule out the
possibility that the proposed risk measures lack power to identify annual changes in bank
lending decisions.
In summary, I find little evidence supporting my hypotheses and I identify several
explanations for this apparent lack of results. I believe that further research is needed: (i)
to develop better mortgage lending risk measures, (ii) on the effect of the securitization
accounting pronouncements on transparency, and (iii) on the mechanisms through which
transparency can affect bank lending decision. I find some evidence consistent with (ii).
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Chapter 6
Large Securitizing BHCs
6.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the lending behavior of the five large securitizing BHCs, hereafter
top-five BHCs, that are excluded from the main sample, focusing on potential differences
from the BHCs included in the sample. The top-five BHCs are among the largest and most
complex BHCs, ranking in the top 20 banks by total assets throughout my sample period
1993-2015. These BHCs also dominate the mortgage securitization market in the United
States, with their market share ranging from 40% in 1998 to 91% in 2008. I excluded the
top-five securitizing banks from the main sample because they are too different from the
other banks to find matching non-securitizing banks within a reasonable tolerance. For
instance, I fail to find matching control observations for most of the top-five BHC-years
using propensity score matching with a caliper width of 25%, which is considerably wider
than the 10% caliper I use in the main analyses in chapter 5, and the 1-3% caliper typically
used in the literature. In addition, the large jump in securitization activity in 2001, most
of which can be traced to these five banks, coincides with the effective date of FAS 140,
and with the new regulatory disclosure requirements. As a result including these BHCs in
the test sample may affect my ability to make inference around FAS 140.
I dedicate this chapter to examining these BHCs separately because they have a signifi-
cant market share in the securitization market and in the banking industry. Moreover, the
top-five BHCs are those most likely to benefit from explicit and implicit guarantees from
regulators and the government that are afforded to too-big-to-fail banks. These guarantees
can increase their appetite for risk-taking, making these banks likely to take advantage of
the opacity of securitization to increase their risk-taking in mortgage lending.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents a background
discussion about the top-five BHCs, and a brief review of the literature on too-big-to-fail
banks. Section 6.3 contains empirical analyses. Section 6.4 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Background and Literature
The main test sample used in previous chapters excludes the top-five securitizing BHCs,
namely Bank of America, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Countrywide
Financial. Countrywide was one of the largest mortgage lenders in the U.S. until Bank of
America acquired it in 2008. Countrywide was a BHC only over the period 2001-2006, prior
to which and immediately after, it was a “Domestic Entity Other”, an institution type that
is not required to file FR-YC.1 The top-five BHCs are among the largest and most complex
BHCs in terms of total assets. They rank in the top 20 banks by assets throughout my
sample period 1993-2015. As of December 31, 2017, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America,
Wells Fargo, and Citigroup were the top four BHCs with total assets of $2.53 trillions,
$2.38 trillions, $1.95 trillions, and $1.84 trillions, respectively. In comparison, the fifth-
ranked BHC Goldman Sachs has $0.916 trillions in total assets, half of the fourth-ranked
Citigroup.
Figure 6.1 presents the time series plot of the total outstanding amount of securitized
mortgages as reported in FR-Y9C for all BHCs, for the top-five BHCs, and for non-top-five
BHCs in my sample. The figure shows that the top-five BHCs as a group dominate the
mortgage securitization market, particularly after 2001. While the scale in figure 6.1 makes
it difficult to see, the top-five BHCs do not dominate the securitization market prior to
2001 in a similar manner. Their combined outstanding securitized mortgages range from
a low 40% in 1998 to a high 91% in 2008, as a proportion of total outstanding securitized
mortgages for all BHCs in my sample.
1As defined by the FFIEC, the Domestic Entity Other category contains “domestic institutions that en-
gage in banking activities usually in connection with the business of banking in the United States”. https:
//www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/content/help/institution%20type%20description.htm accessed April
16, 2018.
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Figure 6.1: Outstanding Securitized Mortgages
This figure presents a time series plot of total outstanding securitized mortgages over the period
1993-2015 by all BHCs filing FR-Y9C (solid blue line), by the five BHCs excluded from the main sample
(dashed orange line), and by BHCs in the main sample (dotted gray line).
These BHCs are also responsible for large jumps in securitization activity in 2001, 2007
and 2008. The total amount of outstanding securitized mortgages jumped significantly
in 2001. A large proportion of this jump is due to increases in reported securitization
by the top-five BHCs, which are also responsible for the large changes in 2007 and in
2008. The large jump in securitization volume in 2001 mostly happened in quarters 2-4
of 2001, immediately after FAS 140 became effective in the second quarter of 2001 (i.e for
securitizations that occurred after March 31, 2001).
It is possible some of the increase in securitization volume was driven by the new
reporting regulatory standards that accompanied FAS 140, which may have forced BHCs
to report previously undisclosed securitization. However, I manually checked the annual
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reports of the top-five BHCs in 2001, and I find that the jump is mostly driven by new
securitization by the top-five BHCs during the last three quarters of 2001. For instance,
Securitized mortgages reported on FR Y9C by Bank of America increased by $60 billion
from 2000 to 2001. Bank of America reports in its 2001 annual report to shareholders that
“During the fourth quarter of 2001, $17.5 billion of subprime loans were securitized and
retained in the available-for-sale securities portfolio” (p. 88), and that it “converted a total
of $52.9 billion of residential first mortgages into mortgage-backed securities issued through
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae and Bank of America Mortgage Securities” (p.95).
In its annual reports, Citi discloses new mortgage securitizations of approximately $12
billion and $24 billion in 2000 and 2001, respectively. The majority of Citi’s securitizations
were issued in quarters 2-4 of 2001. Citi’s quarterly report for the first quarter of 2001
discloses only $4 billion in mortgage securitization. Consistent with a significant increase
in new securitizations after FAS 140 became effective, Chernenko, Hanson & Sunderam
(2013) document a sharp rise in new non-prime mortgage securitization in 2001Q4 and
thereafter.
Countrywide became a BHC in 2001, adding its stock of mortgage securitizations of
$287 billions, including $103 billions in new securitization, to the FR Y9C database. Coun-
trywide is responsible for the drop in 2007 as it reverted to the category Domestic Entity
Other, dropping out of the FR Y-9C database. The large increase in 2008 can also be
explained by activities related to the same institution. Bank of America acquired Coun-
trywide in 2008, which led to the re-inclusion of its securitized assets in the FR Y-9C
database.
An alternative explanation for this jump in reported securitization is the change in the
operating definition of recourse for regulatory reporting. It is possible that securitizing
BHCs did not consider credit enhancements as risk retention in the pre-FAS 140 period,
resulting in unreported securitizations in the period. This would result in a jump in the
post-FAS 140 period, when credit enhancements are explicitly included in the definition
of risk retention. In the pre-FAS 140 period, the form Y-9C requires BHCs to report
assets sold with recourse, which are defined as assets “transferred with recourse or some
other form of risk retention by the bank holding company or a consolidated subsidiary
in transactions reported as sales in accordance with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples.” [emphasis added] (Instructions for Preparation of Consolidated Financial State-
ments for Bank Holding Companies: Reporting Form FR Y-9C, March 1999, p.HC-F-5)
In contrast, in the post-FAS 140 period, the form Y-9C requires BHCs to report “assets
sold and securitized with servicing retained or with recourse or other seller-provided credit
enhancements.”[emphasis added] (Instructions for Preparation of Consolidated Financial
Statements for Bank Holding Companies: Reporting Form FR Y-9C, March 2001, p.HC-
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S-2) The instruction also provides a detailed definition of ‘recourse or other seller-provided
credit enhancements’.
The top-five securitizing BHCs are also among the banks that are considered too-big-to-
fail (TBTF). Prior literature examines the effect of these guarantees on bank risk-taking.
The TBTF practice goes back to at least the 1950s where regulators bailed out large failing
U.S. banks (e.g., Hetzel 1991, Prescott, Nurisso et al. 2017), and continues to the present
day with the more recent episode involving the bailouts during the financial crisis in the
late 2000’s (e.g., Bordo 2008).2 The expectation that banks will be bailed out reduces
creditors’ and investors’ incentives to monitor banks, dampening market discipline and
potentially leading to greater bank risk-taking.
This TBTF problem is similar to the agency problem that arises from deposit insurance,
which reduces insured depositors’ incentive to monitor bank risk-taking. Merton (1977),
Goldberg & Hudgins (2002), Hovakimian, Kane & Laeven (2003), and Nier & Baumann
(2006), among others study the effect of deposit insurance on bank risk-taking though its
effect on depositors’ monitoring incentives. While these agency problems may exist without
deposit insurance or even in non-bank firms, deposit insurance exacerbates the inherent
moral hazard problem in the banking industry. Merton (1977) provides a theoretical foun-
dation for the above argument that deposit insurance can reduce depositor monitoring and
lead to greater bank risk-taking. Hovakimian et al. (2003) argue that deposit insurance
leads to risk shifting where insured banks take more risk at the expense of the insuring
party, i.e., the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Detra-
giache (2002), Hovakimian et al. (2003), and Laeven & Levine (2009) provide empirical
evidence that shows deposit insurance leads to greater bank risk-taking.
Similarly, explicit and implicit guarantees afforded to TBTF banks can result in even
greater moral hazard problems whereby these banking institutions take greater risk. Dam
& Koetter (2012) examine a sample of German banks over the 1995-2006 period, and
they show that higher bailout expectation leads to greater bank risk-taking. Duchin &
Sosyura (2014) examine banks that applied to get assistance from the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP), and they find that bailed-out banks increased their risk-taking in
the same asset classes that led to the need for the bailout in the first place.
In general, the literature provides both theoretical and empirical support that expec-
tations and realizations of bailouts lead to greater bank risk-taking. As a result, it is
2A detailed description of the bank bailout during the crisis, through the Troubled Assets Relief Pro-
gram (TARP), including the list of TARP recipients and the amount they received, is available on the
U.S. Treasury Department’s website https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/
TARP-Programs/bank-investment-programs/Pages/default.aspx
123
reasonable to expect that the top-five BHC have greater incentive to take more risk than
most of the other BHCs in the main sample because they are among the most likely banks
to be bailed out. The fact that these five BHCs dominate the mortgage securitization
market makes them interesting to explore further. Their response to transparency changes
can be different from the other BHCs because they have different risk-taking incentives and
because they are large and more complex institutions that may be operating differently
than the other BHCs.
6.3 Analyses of Large BHCs
This section presents empirical analyses of the lending decisions of the top-five BHCs
around the accounting pronouncements, as measured by the risk measures developed in
chapter 4, focusing on potential differences from the other BHCs in the main sample. I
look for lending behavior by the top-five BHCs that may provide evidence supporting (or
contradicting) my hypotheses. I also examine non-top-five BHCs in the top securitization
volume decile (top-decile BHCs) because they are more likely to be TBTF than the rest
of the securitizing BHCs. This comparison sample allows me to test whether the largest
securitizers behave differently around transparency changes than other securitizing BHCs.
I form securitization volume deciles annually, based on reported outstanding amount of
securitized mortgages as of the December 31 of each year.
6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 6.1 contains descriptive statistics across BHC-year for the top-five securitizing
BHCs, for the top-decile securitizing BHCs, non-top decile securitizing BHCs, and non-
securitizing BHCs. The top-five banks have more assets (LNASSETS), have more cash
(LNCASH), have more loans (LNLOANS) on their balance sheet that grow at a higher
rate (LOANGR), securitize more mortgages (LNSECURITIZEDMORT ), service more
mortgages (LNSERV ICEDMORT ), and have more employees (NUMEMPLOY EE),
than all the other groups of BHCs, indicating that these BHCs are on average larger and
more complex than the other BHC subsamples. The average number of employees for
the top-five BHCs is more than three times greater than that of the top-decile banks, an
indication of how different the top-five banks are relative to the other banks. They also
have higher market valuation (MV ) and higher analyst coverage (COV ERAGE) than the
other BHCs.
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The top-five BHCs have greater loan-to-deposit ratio (LOAN/DEPOSIT ) than non-
top decile securitizing BHCs and non-securitizing BHCs, indicating that they rely less
on deposits to finance their loans. While the mean and median of loan-to-deposit ratio
for top-five BHCs are greater than those of the top-decile securitizing BHCs, the differ-
ences are not statistically significant. The top-five BHCs have lower loan-to-assets ratio
(LOAN/ASSETS), lower deposit-to-assets (DEPOSIT/ASSETS), and lower core de-
posit ratio (COREDEPRATIO) than the other BHCs, which suggests that they may
engage in more non-traditional banking activities. The top-five banks are less capitalized
(TIER1CAPRATIO) but they have more liquid assets (LIQRATIO) than the other
banks.
All the above observation are consistent with my argument that they are too different
from the rest of the BHCs to find suitable matches in the main sample. The BHCs in
the top securitization decile, except the top-five, are included in the main sample. While
the BHCs in the top decile are larger than other securitizing and non-securitizing BHCs,
they are smaller and less complex than the top-five BHCs. Moreover, it is possible to
find matching non-securitizing BHCs for the non-top-five banks in the top decile using the
propensity score matching. Hence, the top-five banks are uniquely different from the rest,
and warrant a separate examination.
Compared to the other BHCs, the top-five BHCs have more provisions (PROV ISION)
and allowances (ALLOWANCE) for loan losses, have more non-performing loans
(NPL/LOANS), and have more charge-offs (CHARGEOFF ) as a proportion of
total on-balance-sheet loans. They also have more non-accrual on-balance-sheet
mortgages (BSMORTNACC) and have more on-balance-sheet mortgage charge-offs
(BSMORTCHOFF ). All the mean and median differences between the top-five banks
and the other groups for these loan and mortgage outcome measures are statistically signifi-
cant, except for the difference in BSMORTNACC between the top-five and the top-decile
securitizing BHCs. These descriptive statistics indicate that, relative to the BHCs included
in the main sample, the top-five BHCs carry riskier loans on their balance sheet.3 Riskier
mortgages on the balance sheet can arise from risky lending behavior, which I attempt to
capture by the four mortgage lending risk measures. However, table 6.1 shows that the
means and medians of the mortgage lending risk measures for the top-five BHCs are not
statically different from those of the other groups of BHCs, except for NHIGHRISK and
$HIGHRISK.
Overall, table 6.1 shows that the five BHCs that are excluded from the main sample
3Recall that I consider risk-taking in mortgage lending through both direct mortgage origination and
purchase of mortgages originated by third parties. See section 3.2.
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are larger, are more complex, and have riskier loans on their balance sheet than the BHCs
that were included in the main sample. However, these five BHCs differ significantly in
only two attributes of risk-taking in their mortgage lending, when viewed across all years.
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Panel B:
Top 5 Securitizing BHCs Top Decile Securitizing BHCs
N Mean Median N Mean Median
LNASSETS 97 20.331 20.463 356 17.193 17.314
LNCASH 97 17.345 17.372 356 14.034 13.936
LNLOANS 97 19.511 19.781 356 16.586 16.784
LOANGR 96 0.190 0.057 341 0.109 0.065
LNSECURITIZEDMORT 97 17.206 18.058 356 14.480 14.042
LNMORTSERV ICED 97 19.519 19.621 338 16.016 16.299
MV 97 18.178 18.470 307 15.411 15.622
BTM 97 0.852 0.679 307 0.938 0.712
COV ERAGE 74 24.878 25.500 281 15.278 16.000
NUMEMPLOY EE 97 173,355 167,084 356 18,444 9,832
LOAN/DEPOSIT 97 0.931 0.900 356 0.928 0.927
LOAN/ASSETS 97 0.460 0.447 356 0.592 0.633
DEPOSIT/ASSETS 97 0.516 0.533 356 0.649 0.680
COREDEPRATIO 97 0.654 0.741 356 0.823 0.856
LIQRATIO 97 0.388 0.407 356 0.254 0.224
TIER1CAPRATIO 85 0.099 0.087 312 0.115 0.108
PROV ISION 97 0.012 0.009 356 0.008 0.005
ALLOWANCE 97 0.024 0.022 356 0.017 0.015
NPL/LOANS 97 0.032 0.021 356 0.029 0.016
CHARGEOFF 97 0.012 0.009 356 0.008 0.005
BSMORTNACC 97 0.027 0.016 356 0.022 0.010
BSMORTCHOFF 97 0.007 0.002 355 0.006 0.002
AV GMRSCORE 97 9.310 9.103 356 9.497 9.285
SAV GMRSCORE 97 0.994 0.994 356 0.996 0.995
NHIGHRISK 97 0.365 0.355 356 0.404 0.388
$HIGHRISK 97 0.321 0.317 356 0.368 0.344
Continued on next page–
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Panel C: Panel D:
Non-Top Decile Securitizing BHCs Non-Securitizing BHCs
N Mean Median N Mean Median
LNASSETS 4642 14.324 13.943 19914 13.272 13.137
LNCASH 4642 11.076 10.798 19914 10.053 9.852
LNLOANS 4642 13.864 13.501 19913 12.793 12.665
LOANGR 4505 0.118 0.080 18403 0.124 0.092
LNSECURITIZEDMORT 4101 8.828 9.118
LNMORTSERV ICED 3561 11.701 11.910 8044 10.416 10.867
MV 2170 13.109 12.965 5946 11.920 11.751
BTM 2170 0.870 0.680 5946 0.888 0.689
COV ERAGE 1710 7.932 5.000 3888 4.099 3.000
NUMEMPLOY EE 4642 2,253 326 19914 391 160
LOAN/DEPOSIT 4641 0.845 0.846 19913 0.805 0.791
LOAN/ASSETS 4642 0.646 0.660 19914 0.636 0.650
DEPOSIT/ASSETS 4642 0.777 0.797 19914 0.815 0.832
COREDEPRATIO 4641 0.850 0.868 19913 0.846 0.865
LIQRATIO 4638 0.240 0.225 19859 0.246 0.234
TIER1CAPRATIO 4128 0.125 0.118 17254 0.134 0.121
PROV ISION 4642 0.006 0.003 19902 0.006 0.003
ALLOWANCE 4642 0.016 0.014 19913 0.015 0.013
NPL/LOANS 4642 0.016 0.009 19882 0.015 0.008
CHARGEOFF 4642 0.005 0.002 19901 0.006 0.002
BSMORTNACC 4639 0.013 0.007 19831 0.011 0.004
BSMORTCHOFF 4631 0.004 0.001 19747 0.002 0.000
AV GMRSCORE 4637 9.250 9.125 19826 9.141 9.014
SAV GMRSCORE 4637 0.995 0.996 19826 0.993 0.996
NHIGHRISK 4637 0.384 0.365 19826 0.379 0.350
$HIGHRISK 4637 0.354 0.322 19826 0.357 0.317
This table presents the descriptive statistics, across BHC-years, for the top-five securitizing BHCs and other
groups of non-top-five BHCs. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the top-five banks. Panel B
presents the statistics for securitizing BHCs in the top mortgage securitization decile. BHCs are assigned
to mortgage securitization decile annually based on their outstanding amount of securitized mortgages re-
ported for each year. In panel C, I report the statistics for securitizing BHCs that are not in the top decile.
Panel D contains the descriptive statistics for non-securitizing BHCs. All variables are as defined in ap-
pendix A.1. The means and medians for the top-five banks are statistically different from those of the other
groups at least at the 10% level, except for those cases presented in bold font.
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6.3.2 Mortgage Lending Around Standard Changes
While the top-five BHCs, on average over the period 1993-2015, appear similar to the other
BHCs in terms of mortgage lending behavior, it is possible that they behave differently
within narrow windows around the accounting standards, which is more relevant to my
thesis. Figure 6.2 presents time series plots of AV GMRSCORE, SAV GMRSCORE,
NHIGHRISK, and $HIGHRISK over the period 1993-2015 for the top-five securitizing
BHCs, for non-top-five securitizing BHCs, and non-securitizing BHCs. I first discuss the
changes in the risk measures around the years, in which the accounting pronouncements
became effective (indicated by the vertical lines). I then discuss the difference between the
time series dynamics of the top-five BHCs and that of the other BHCs.
The time series plots of AV GMRSCORE in Figure 6.2 panel (a) show that
AV GMRSCORE for the top-five banks decreases over the period 1996-1998, however
this decline in risk appears to be a continuation of a trend that goes back at least to
1994. Hence, it is less likely that the decrease in AV GMRSCORE is driven by FAS 125,
which was issued in 1996 and became effective in 1997. AV GMRSCORE for the top-five
banks increased in the pre-FAS 140 period up to and including the first year in which FAS
140 was effective (1998-2001), it remained stable for the second year of the post-FAS 140
period (2002), and it declined from 2002 to 2005, which spans the pre- and post-FIN 46
periods. These results suggest that the top-five BHCs did not change their lending behav-
ior immediately after FAS 140 became effective, and that FAS 140 may have contributed
to halt the increase in risk-taking by these top-five banks. AV GMRSCORE then declines
during the post-FIN 46 period (2003-2005), suggesting that the large banks reduced their
risk-taking following FIN 46. AV GMRSCORE increases rapidly from 2006-2009, and
declined sharply in the following years. While the switch from increasing to decreasing
AV GMRSCORE happens in 2009, the issue year of FAS 166 & 167, it also coincides with
the financial crisis, which makes it difficult to attribute this change to either the standards
or the economic climate.
The average changes in AV GMRSCORE around the four accounting pronouncement
events for the non-top-five banks are similar to those for the top-five banks described in
the previous paragraph, suggesting that the top-five banks did not behave differently in
their mortgage lending than the other banks. It is possible that the time series fluctuations
in AV GMRSCORE for all groups of banks are driven by other economic factors such as
aggregate mortgage demand, the financial crises, or business cycles.
Similarly, the graphs for SAV GMRSCORE, NHIGHRISK, and $HIGHRISK in
panels (b), (c), and (d), respectively, provide no clear evidence that shows the top-five
BHCs behaved differently around the accounting standard changes. SAV GMRSCORE
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Figure 6.2: The time series of mortgage lending risk
(a) AV GMRSCORE
(b) SAV GMRSCORE
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(c) NHIGHRISK
(d) $HIGHRISK
This figure presents the time series plots of the average mortgage lending risk measures for
three groups of BHCs, namely the top-five securitizing BHCs (dashed red line), non-top-five
securitizing BHCs (solid blue line), and non-securitizing BHCs (dotted green line) over the
period 1993-2015. Panels (a), (b), (c), and (d) present the graphs for AV GMRSCORE,
SAV GMRSCORE, NHIGHRISK, and $HIGHRISK, respectively.
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fluctuates year to year for all groups of banks, much less so for non-securitizing banks,
making a reasonable inference about lending behavior around standard changes difficult.
NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK fluctuate less frequently, but they do not show different
risk-taking behavior between the top-five banks and the other banks. Since NHIGHRISK
and $HIGHRISK exhibit similar patterns, I discuss only the case for NHIGHRISK.
During the period leading up to and immediately after FAS 125, NHIGHRISK de-
creased for all groups of BHCs, suggesting FAS 125 did not affect bank risk-taking. For
both groups of securitizing BHCs, NHIGHRISK increased over the pre-FAS 140 pe-
riod starting in 1998 up until 2000/2001, and remained relatively constant over the post-
FAS 140 period (2001-2005), which also encompasses the pre- and post-FIN 46 period.
These observations suggest that securitizing BHCs slowed down their risk-taking follow-
ing FAS 140, but FIN 46 did not influence their behavior. For the non-securitizing BHCs,
NHIGHRISK increased from 1999 to 2004, suggesting that, unlike for securitizing BHCs,
neither FAS 140 nor FIN 46 had an impact on the non-securitizing BHCs’ lending behavior.
NHIGHRISK increased for all groups of BHCs from 2005 to 2008, followed by further
increase in 2009 for the non-top-five BHCs but by sharp decline for the top-five BHCs over
the same year. The average NHIGHRISK for the top-five BHCs remains below that
of the non-top-five BHCs for the entire post-crisis period. This result suggests that the
top-five BHCs reduced their risk-taking immediately after the financial crises.
Overall, the graph for NHIGHRISK shows that there are some potential differences
in lending behavior between the top-five banks and other banks in the main sample. I
use a quasi-DiD design similar to that of the main test for H2 through H4 (section 5.4),
to test if these potential differences are statistically significant. I find that the differences
are mostly insignificant, supporting the original conclusion that the top-five BHCs did not
behave differently than the other BHCs. I arrive at similar conclusion using a regression
framework similar to the one presented in section 5.5.5.
Table 6.2 presents the results of statistical tests of changes in risk-taking around the
accounting pronouncements for the top-five BHCs as well as top decile BHCs and other
securitizing BHCs. As in section 5.5, I use a four-year window around each pronouncement
with two years in the pre-period and two years in the post-period. For each group of
BHCs, I use a t-test to compare the top-five BHCs’ average risk-taking before and after
each pronouncement. I also use a t-test to assess whether the change in the top-five BHCs’
risk-taking around each pronouncement differs from that of the non-top-five securitizing
BHCs. The design for this test is similar to that of the tests for H2-H4, and I again refer to
the difference between pre-post changes for the top-five and non-top-five BHCs as QDiD.
Panel A shows that none of the risk measures changed significantly around FAS 125
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for the top-five BHCs, compared to a significant decrease in NHIGHRISK for non-top-
five securitizing BHCs. The differences between the top-five and non-top-five BHCs, i.e.,
QDiDs, are not statistically significant. These results suggest that the top-five BHCs did
not change their lending decisions in response to FAS 125, and that they did not differ
from the non-top-five BHCs in their lending decision around FAS 125.
As shown in panel B, AV GMRSCORE increased significantly around FAS 140 for
both groups. SAV GMRSCORE, NHIGHRISK, and $HIGHRISK did not change
significantly for the top five BHCs, while SAV GMRSCORE decreased and $HIGHRISK
increased for the non-top-five BHCs. In all the cases, the QDiDs are not significant,
indicating that FAS 140 did not affect the top-five BHCs differently than the other BHCs.
Panel C shows that AV GMRSCORE decreased significantly around FIN 46 for both
the top-five BHCs and non-top-five BHCs groups, but the differences between the two
groups is not significant. For SAV GMRSCORE, NHIGHRISK, and $HIGHRISK,
none of the pre-post changes and QDiDs are significant. Once again, these results show no
change in the top-five BHCs’ lending decision around FIN 46 and that their behavior was
not significantly different from that of non-top-five BHCs.
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Table 6.2: Transparency and Risk-taking by Top-five BHCs
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Non-Top 5 Top 5 Non-Top 5 Top 5 ∆Non-Top 5 ∆Top 5 QDiD
Panel A: FAS 125
AV GMRSCORE 977 9.324 9.110 8.700 8.805 −0.624 −0.305 −0.152
SAV GMRSCORE 615 0.993 0.996 0.993 0.996 0.000 0.000 −0.0002
NHIGHRISK 615 0.411 0.420 0.385 0.340 −0.026∗∗ −0.080 −0.054
$HIGHRISK 615 0.361 0.371 0.344 0.305 −0.017 −0.066 −0.048
Panel B: FAS 140
AV GMRSCORE 977 8.516 8.487 9.156 9.271 0.64∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.144
SAV GMRSCORE 703 0.996 0.992 0.994 0.993 −0.002∗ 0.001 0.004
NHIGHRISK 703 0.350 0.326 0.368 0.381 0.018 0.055 0.038
$HIGHRISK 703 0.314 0.287 0.342 0.325 0.028∗∗ 0.0380 0.009
Panel C: FIN 46(R)
AV GMRSCORE 977 9.324 9.490 8.856 8.846 −0.468∗∗∗ −0.644∗∗∗ −0.176
SAV GMRSCORE 977 0.995 0.995 0.993 0.993 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001
NHIGHRISK 977 0.369 0.366 0.368 0.342 −0.001 −0.024 −0.022
$HIGHRISK 977 0.347 0.330 0.346 0.287 −0.001 −0.043 −0.042
Continued on next page–
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Panel D: FAS 166 & 167
AV GMRSCORE 928 10.01 10.33 10.58 10.82 0.570∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗ −0.069
SAV GMRSCORE 928 0.993 0.990 0.995 0.993 0.002 0.003 0.002
NHIGHRISK 928 0.379 0.374 0.413 0.349 0.034∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.060∗∗∗
$HIGHRISK 928 0.357 0.343 0.383 0.302 0.026∗∗ −0.041 −0.066∗∗
This table presents the average changes in risk-taking by the top-five securitizing BHCs excluded from the main
sample around the accounting pronouncements. The table also contains the average changes in risk-taking by non-
top-five securitizing BHCs, i.e. BHCs in the main sample, for comparison. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, represent p-values below 1%,
5%, 10% , respectively, from the mean tests comparing the corresponding values to zero. All variables are as defined
in table 5.1 or appendix A.1.
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Panel D shows that AV GMRSCORE increased significantly following FAS 166 & 167
for both the top-five and non-top-five BHCs, but the QDiD is insignificant, suggesting
that there was no significant difference in how top-five and non-top-five securitizing BHCs
reacted to FAS 166 & 167. However, the results for NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK
suggest otherwise. Both NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK increased significantly for
non-top-five BHCs but not for the top-five BHCs, resulting in a significantly negative
QDiD.
In summary, while there is some evidence that suggests the top-five BHCs increased
their risk-taking following FAS 140 and FAS 166 & 167, and decreased their risk-taking
following FIN 46, this evidence is limited to only one of the four risk measures. All the
other risk measures show no significant change around the pronouncements for the top-
five BHCs. Moreover, in almost all the cases, the top-five BHCs’ risk-taking around the
pronouncements is not significantly different from that of non-top-five BHCs. The only
exceptions of significant QDiDs for NHIGHRISK and $HIGHRISK around FAS 166
& 167 arise from significant changes in non-top-five BHCs’ lending decision relative to no
change by the top-five BHCs.
Table 6.3 presents a similar set of tests for BHCs in the top securitization decile. The
results are mostly similar to those in table 6.2 for the top-five securitizing BHCs. As in
the case of the top-five BHCs, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that BHCs in the
top securitization decile did not change their lending behavior significantly following the
accounting pronouncements. The table provides some evidence that suggests BHCs in the
securitization decile 1 to 9 changed their lending behavior following the pronouncements.
However, the difference in risk-taking between top-decile and non-top-decile BHCs is not
significant in almost all cases.
6.4 Conclusion
The evidence presented in this chapter leads to the conclusion that the top-five securitizing
BHCs excluded from the main sample do not differ from the BHCs in the main sample
in a way that affects my conclusions about the effect of transparency on bank risk-taking.
This conclusion is supported by untabulated additional analyses that show no statistically
significant difference in the riskiness of new loans between the top-five BHCs and BHCs
in my main ample, even after controlling for other relevant factors. However, as shown in
figure 6.1, the top-five BHCs increased their securitization activity immediately after FAS
140 became effective. Further research is required to asses whether FAS 140 in fact drives
this jump in securitization activity.
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Table 6.3: Transparency and Risk-taking by BHCs in the Top Securitization Decile
Pre-period Post-period Differences
Obs Non-Top Top Non-Top Top ∆Non-Top ∆Top
Decile Decile Decile Decile Decile Decile QDiD
Panel A: FAS 125
AV GMRSCORE 977 9.295 9.056 8.673 9.018 −0.622∗ −0.038 0.131
SAV GMRSCORE 615 0.993 0.994 0.993 1 0.000 0.006∗ 0.006*∗
NHIGHRISK 615 0.409 0.438 0.381 0.420 −0.028∗∗ −0.018 0.011
$HIGHRISK 615 0.360 0.377 0.338 0.388 −0.022 0.011 0.032
Panel B: FAS 140
AV GMRSCORE 977 8.479 8.922 9.126 9.539 0.647∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ −0.029
SAV GMRSCORE 703 0.996 0.997 0.994 0.995 −0.002∗ −0.002 0.001
NHIGHRISK 703 0.344 0.411 0.363 0.425 0.019 0.014 −0.005
$HIGHRISK 703 0.308 0.372 0.338 0.387 0.03∗∗ 0.015 −0.015
Panel C: FIN 46(R)
AV GMRSCORE 977 9.295 9.700 8.840 9.017 −0.455∗∗∗ −0.683∗∗∗ −0.228
SAV GMRSCORE 977 0.995 0.995 0.993 0.994 −0.002 −0.001 0.001
NHIGHRISK 977 0.365 0.415 0.367 0.374 0.002 −0.041 −0.043
$HIGHRISK 977 0.343 0.386 0.345 0.341 0.002 −0.045 −0.048
Continued on next page–
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Panel D: FAS 166 & 167
AV GMRSCORE 928 9.994 10.25 10.55 10.84 0.556∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.028
SAV GMRSCORE 928 0.993 0.993 0.994 0.994 0.001 0.001 0.001
NHIGHRISK 928 0.379 0.376 0.415 0.385 0.036∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.026
$HIGHRISK 928 0.358 0.343 0.385 0.343 0.027∗ 0.000 −0.027
This table presents the average changes in risk-taking by the BHCs in the top securitization decile around the
accounting pronouncements. For each year, I assign securitizing BHCs into deciles based on their securitiza-
tion volume, measured by the outstanding amount of securitized mortgages reported in that year. The top-five
securitizing BHCs are included in the top decile. The table also contains the average changes in risk-taking
by securitizing BHCs in the other deciles for comparison. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, represent p-values below 1%, 5%, 10% ,
respectively, from the mean tests comparing the corresponding values to zero. All variables are as defined in
table 5.1 or appendix A.1.137

Chapter 7
Discussion and Conclusion
This thesis examines whether and how financial reporting transparency affects banks’ op-
erating decisions, a question with both academic and practical relevance. As discussed in
greater detail in chapter 2, a vast academic literature in accounting, finance, and economics
examines transparency and its effects on banks’ operating decisions, with particular inter-
est in the role of transparency in promoting sound operating decisions such as avoiding
excessive risk-taking. Standard setters and regulators who are responsible for establish-
ing the accounting and reporting standards that shape banks’ FRT should benefit from
understanding the effects of transparency on bank operating decisions. Bank regulators
and supervisors, responsible for ensuring the soundness of reporting institutions, can ben-
efit from understanding the effects of specific accounting standards and transparency on
bank operating decisions such as risk-taking in mortgage their lending. Policy makers can
benefit from my research question in their effort to ensure a stable financial system.
I explore the research question in a residential mortgage lending and securitization
setting, in which prior research (e.g., Keys et al. 2010) documents a relation between se-
curitization and bank risk-taking in mortgage lending without a particular attention to
transparency. I hypothesize that the financial reporting transparency for securitization
influences this relation because transparency influences external stakeholders’ ability to
monitor managers’ risk-taking behavior. I exploit five FASB securitization accounting
pronouncements to identify the effect of transparency on banks’ mortgage lending deci-
sions. The pronouncements provide four distinct transparency shocks during my sample
period, dividing the period into multiple sub-periods with varying levels of transparency.
I construct new measures of bank risk-taking in mortgage lending using publicly available
loan-level data from the HMDA database, which I validate using BHC-level on-balance-
sheet mortgage delinquencies and charge-offs reported on the FR Y-9C form.
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The empirical results do not support my hypotheses, with most of the estimated effects
either statistically indistinguishable from zero or in the opposite direction of the prediction.
These results, which are robust to multiple sensitivity tests, suggest that transparency as
defined in this thesis does not affect bank lending decisions as measured by the proposed
risk-taking measures in the predicted directions. This observation is counter-intuitive and
it is contrary to FASB’s and bank regulators’ intention for issuing financial and regula-
tory reporting standards that require more transparent reporting of securitization activity.
FASB states that one of its primary purposes is “to establish and improve financial ac-
counting and reporting standards to provide useful information to investors and other users
of financial reports”1 and the Federal Reserve Board states that it publicly releases certain
regulatory reports “so investors, depositors, and creditors can better assess the financial
condition of the reporting banks”.2 In both cases, greater transparency is presumed to lead
to better stakeholder monitoring of bank decision making. The null results in this thesis
suggest that transparency changes following new accounting pronouncements did not influ-
ence bank lending decisions, which in turn suggests either that banks sound make lending
decisions regardless of transparency, or that the pronouncements did not enhance trans-
parency sufficiently for external stakeholders to efficiently monitor banks’ lending decisions.
In hindsight, we know the first case not to be true at least in the early- to mid-2000s.
I identify the following alternative explanations for the null results. First, the account-
ing pronouncements may not affect transparency, at least not in the manner assumed in this
thesis, because banks may restructure their operations to subvert the new tighter report-
ing standards (Bens & Monahan 2008). I find some evidence supporting this explanation.
More specifically, I find that securitizing banks take lower risk than non-securitizing banks
in the most transparent period compared to the least transparent period. Further research
investigating the effect of the pronouncements on the financial reporting transparency of
securitizing can address this concern.
Second, the research design may lack power to identify the hypothesized effects in the
specific settings considered in this thesis because the setting is too broad or the matching
techniques do not provide a good control group. In this case, identifying a narrower setting
and/or a better research design might yield results supporting the hypotheses. Another
alternative avenue to increase the power of my tests is to identify BHCs that took relatively
too much risk in the pre-periods, and compare their lending decisions in the pros-periods
with BHCs that took relatively less risk in the pre-periods. However, any power gained
from this strategy could be reduced by the decrease in power as a result of focusing on
1http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495, accessed May 16, 2018.
2https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/reporting.htm, accessed May 16,
2018.
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a small proportion of banks from an already small sample. It is also possible that any
decrease in a risk-taking following too much risk-taking can be a result of reversion to the
mean, and not driven by transparency.
Third, it is possible that identifying securitizing banks using the outstanding balance
of securitized mortgages may not correctly identify banks actively securitizing when the
mortgages are originated. A textual analysis of BHC annual and quarterly reports to
identify new securitization activity in a given year, as in Niu & Richardson (2006) might
improve the identification of securitizing BHCs.
Fourth, the risk measures may not capture the desired underlying construct of bank
risk-taking in mortgage lending. Since the measures have demonstrated some level of va-
lidity, future research with refined mortgage lending risk measures would need to improve
upon the measures used here. For example, the current measures assume that all individ-
ual risk characteristics are equally important throughout the sample period. Identifying
the relative relevance of these characteristics and implementing a potentially time-varying
weighting scheme reflecting their relative importance might improve the performance of
the composite measures. I scale dollar-valued characteristics by the corresponding MSA-
averages to account for local area socio-economic differences. However, this geographic
adjustment may obscure bank risk-taking through more lending in risky neighborhoods.
Alternative risk measures without geographic adjustments might also improve the mea-
sures.
Last, this thesis focuses on the financial reporting transparency of individual BHCs and
its effect on their individual lending decisions. However, the effect of FASB pronounce-
ments and regulatory disclosure requirements can go beyond individual BHCs. Improving
the transparency of individual BHCs can enhance the transparency of financial markets.
For example, greater securitization transparency by individual BHCs can improve the
transparency, and thereby the efficiency, of ABS and stock markets. This can improve
investors’ ability to understand and price their risk exposure as a result of securitization,
and lead to better sharing of the underlying risk among market participants. In this case,
enhancing the transparency of individual BHCs may not lead to lower risk-taking if the
risk is properly priced and distributed across the economy, reducing any single party’s
exposure.
This thesis is related to and contributes to the following streams of literature. First, I
propose new measures of bank risk-taking in mortgage lending using the publicly available
mortgage-level HMDA database together with the Census and other local area socioeco-
nomic databases. Prior literature examining banks’ mortgage lending decisions (e.g., Mian
& Sufi 2009, Keys et al. 2010, Agarwal et al. 2012, Jiang et al. 2014b) combines these
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datasets with commercial or proprietary datasets to construct risk measures based on bor-
rowers’ FICO scores and ex post delinquency rates. My proposed measures, unlike those in
the literature, are entirely ex ante and based on publicly accessible databases. Other stud-
ies such as Loutskina & Strahan (2009), Xie (2016), and Dou et al. (2018) use the HMDA
dataset to examine banks’ overall mortgage approval rates. While bank mortgage approval
rate is an important lending decision, it does not completely capture banks’ risk-taking in
their mortgage lending. For instance, an increase in approvals of high-quality mortgages
can lead to a higher approval rate, without greater risk-taking. My measures are based
on the mortgage-level borrower and property characteristics, and they can differentiate
between approvals of high- and low-quality mortgages.
Second, this thesis is related to the stream of literature examining the effect of secu-
ritization on banks’ incentives to screen and monitor borrowers (e.g., Mian & Sufi 2009,
Keys et al. 2010, 2012, Wang & Xia 2014). I extend this literature by examining the role of
transparency for bank risk-taking in mortgage lending. By comparing securitizing banks’
lending decision before and after transparency shocks with that of non-securitizing banks
during the same periods, I can disentangle the effect of the securitization activity from
the effect of transparency. My findings, with the caveats discussed above, suggest that
transparency does not affects the extent to which securitization reduces banks’ screening
and monitoring incentives.
Third, I contribute to prior research that examines the effect of transparency on bank
risk-taking. Bushman & Williams (2012) and Bushman & Williams (2015) find that banks
with greater FRT for loan losses have lower overall bank risk. This thesis adds to this
literature by examining transparency and bank risk-taking in a specific operating activity,
namely lending decisions. In this respect, my thesis is closely related to Ertan et al. (2017),
who find that enhancing loan-level disclosures for securitized loans improves banks’ lending
standards for those loans in the EU. In contrast to Ertan et al. (2017), I examine FRT
as opposed to loan-level disclosure, the US as opposed to the EU, and borrower screening
for both securitized and retained loans as opposed to only securitized loans. Unlike Ertan
et al. (2017), who show that transparency enhances the quality of loans, I find no evidence
that transparency affects banks’ risk-taking in their mortgage lending.
Fourth, this study contributes to a growing stream of literature on the real effects of
accounting on banks’ operating activities. Xie (2016), and Dou et al. (2018) find that fair
value accounting and the consolidation of securitization conduits per FAS 166 & 167 affect
banks’ credit supply decisions. I add to this literature by exploring the riskiness of the
mortgages that banks originate, a dimension of lending decisions that is not explored in
this literature.
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Last, this thesis contributes to the literature examining the effects of pool-level (e.g.,
Schmidt & Zhang 2018) or asset-level disclosures (e.g., Neilson et al. 2018) by issuers of
SEC-registered ABS on ABS investors’ trading behavior and the valuation of ABS by
investors and credit rating agencies, respectively. I add to this literature by examining the
effects of BHC-level transparency as opposed to ABS-level transparency, and by focusing
on bank lending decisions instead of those of ABS market participants.
Moreover, my thesis uses loan-level data for all mortgage originations by a BHC, which
is complementary to the pool- or loan-level data for securitization entities used in Ertan
et al. (2017), Neilson et al. (2018), and Schmidt & Zhang (2018). The ABS pool- or loan-
level data account only for a fraction of a the sponsoring BHCs’ mortgage originations. I
believe future research examining the effects of such asset-level disclosures (e.g., Reg AB
II) on bank lending decisions can be fruitful.
My findings and their implications to the literature should be interpreted with caution
because of the caveats discussed above. Further research is required to develop better
mortgage lending risk measures, to examine the effect of the accounting pronouncements
on transparency, and to investigate how transparency affects banks’ mortgage lending
decisions.
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Appendix A
Variable Descriptions
A.1 Mortgage Lending Risk Measures
Variable Description Data Sources
Panel A: Composite Measures
MRSCORE
The mortgage-level composite risk score, which is
the sum of all high-risk indicators based on the
individual characteristics described in Panel B
below.
HMDA, HMDA/CRA
Census, BEA Personal
Income, FHFA House
Price Index
AV GMRSCORE
The BHC-year average MRSCORE for all
mortgages approved by the BHC during the year
divided by the BHC-year average MRSCORE for
all applications received by the BHC during the
year.
Same as above
NHIGHRISK
The number of high-risk approved mortgages
divided by the total number of approved mortgages,
where high-risk mortgages are those with above
MSA-median MRSCORE.
Same as above
$HIGHRISK
The total dollar amount of high-risk approved
mortgages divided by the total dollar amount of all
approved mortgages, where high-risk mortgages are
those with above MSA-median MRSCORE.
Same as above
Continued next page–
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Variable Description Data Sources
Panel B: Individual Borrower Characteristics
I.BLACK
An indicators variable that equals one if the
borrower is Black, and zero otherwise.
HMDA
I.HISPANIC
An indicators variable that equals one if the
borrower is Hispanic, and zero otherwise.
HMDA
I.NOCOBORR
An indicators variable that equals one if there is no
co-borrower, and zero otherwise.
HMDA
INCOME
The inverse of borrower income divided by local
area median income.
HMDA, HMDA/CRA
Census
LTI
The borrower’s loan-to-income ratio divided by
local area median loan-to-income ratio, where
loan-to-income ratio is the loan amount divided by
the borrower income.
HMDA
Panel C: Individual Loan Characteristics
LOAN
The dollar amount of the mortgage divided by the
local area median mortgage amount.
HMDA
LTMEDV
The ratio of the loan amount to the estimated local
area median house value. I estimate the local area
median house value in a given year by adjusting the
corresponding median house value from
HMDA/CRA census database for changes in
MSA-level house price indexes.
HMDA, HMDA/CRA
Census, FHFA HPI
I.NOINCOME
An indicators variable that equals one if there is no
reported borrower income, and zero otherwise.
HMDA
Panel D: Individual Property Characteristics
I.OWNOCC
An indicators variable that equals one if the
property is owner-occupied, and zero otherwise.
HMDA
Panel E: Individual Geographic Characteristics
BLACKPERC
The percentage of Black population in the census
tract (county).
HMDA/CRA Census
EARNPERJOB
The county average earnings per job divided by the
MSA average earnings per job.
BEA Personal Income
Continued next page–
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Variable Description Data Sources
GOV ASSIST
The county per capita government benefits divided
by the MSA per capita government benefits.
BEA Personal Income
HISPANICPERC
The percentage of Hispanic population in the
census tract (county).
HMDA/CRA Census
I.LIFECY CLE
An indicator variable for census tracts in central
cities or mature suburbs. I obtain an indicator for
census tracts in central cities from HMDA and I
create an indicator for mature suburbs based on the
median year housing units were built available from
HMDA/CRA Census.
HMDA, HMDA/CRA
Census
MEDHHINC
The census tract median household income divided
by the MSA average of the census tract median
house hold income.
HMDA/CRA Census
MEDV ALUE
The logarithm of the estimated census tract median
house value. I estimate the census tract median
house value by adjusting the median value from the
HMDA/CRA database for changes in house price
indexes.
HMDA/CRA Census,
FHFA HPI
MINORITY
The percentage of monitory population in the
census tract (county).
HMDA/CRA Census
NONHOUSWLTH
The county per capita income from dividends,
interest, and rent divided by the corresponding
MSA value.
BEA personal income
OWNRATE
The homeownership rate in the census tract
(county).
HMDA/CRA Census
UNEMPRATE
The county unemployment rate from Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
BLS Employment
Database
PERINC The county per capita personal income. BEA personal income
POV ERTY
The percentage of census tract (county) population
under the poverty line.
HMDA/CRA Census
V ACRATE The census tract (county) home vacancy rate. HMDA/CRA Census
∆HPIi
Change in MSA house price index over the previous
i years, where i = 1, 3, 5.
FHFA HPI
∆UNEMPRATE The annual change in UNEMPRATE.
BLS Employment
Database
This table presents the description of mortgage risk characteristics used to construct the composite mortgage
risk measures, grouped into borrower characteristics (Panel A), loan characteristics (Panel B), property char-
acteristics (Panel D). The first column contains the name of the characteristics. The second column provides
the definition and the third column contains the name(s) of the data source(s).
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A.2 Loan Portfolio Performance Measures and Other
Variables
Variable Name Description
Panel A: Balance Sheet Mortgage Performance Measures
BSMORTPDUE < 90
The total on-balance-sheet mortgages secured by single family
residential properties in the U.S excluding lines of credit that are
past due 30 through 89 days (BHCKC236 + BHCKC238) divided
by total on-balance-sheet single family residential mortgages
(BHCK5367+BHCK5368).
BSMORTPDUE ≥ 90
The total on-balance-sheet mortgages secured by single family
residential properties in the U.S excluding lines of credit that are
past due 90 days or more and still accruing (BHCKC237 +
BHCKC239) divided by total on-balance-sheet single family
residential mortgages (BHCK5367+BHCK5368).
BSMORTNACC
The total on-balance-sheet mortgages secured by single family
residential properties in the U.S excluding lines of credit that are
not accruing (BHCKC229 + BHCKC230) divided by total
on-balance-sheet single family residential mortgages
(BHCK5367+BHCK5368).
BSMORTCHOFF
The net charge-off associated with on-balance-sheet mortgages
secured by single family residential properties in the U.S. excluding
lines of credit ((BHCKC234+BHCKC235) -
(BHCKC218+BHCKC218)) divided by total on-balance-sheet single
family residential mortgages (BHCK5367+BHCK5368).
Panel B: Regulatory Capital Ratios
TIER1CAPRATIO The ratio of Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets
TIER1LEV RATIO The ratio of Tier 1 capital to average total assets
TOTALCAPRATIO The ratio of total capital to total risk-weighted assets
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Appendix B
Matching FR Y-9C and HMDA
Datasets
This appendix describes the procedure for matching the BHCs from the FR Y-9C dataset
with the mortgage-level data from the HMDA dataset. I first identify subsidiaries and
their branch offices of each BHC. To do so, I use the FFIEC’s Relationships file, which
provides the history of ownership between two financial institutions. Since the relationship
file provides only direct ownership history, I trace relationships iteratively until I reach
the bottom of the organizational structure. This allows me to map all direct and indirect
subsidiaries to the top-tier BHC. I use FFIEC’s Attributes files to get more information
about the characteristics of these subsidiaries. I identify branch offices for each subsidiary
using FFIEC’s Branch Attributes file, which provides information about branch offices
including the head office identifier.
The next step is to identify which subsidiaries and branches of the BHCs file HMDA
reports. The main challenge in doing so is matching the unique identifier codes in the
two databases. The HMDA database identifies entities by a combination of Agency Code
and Respondent ID. Agency code is a unique code that identifies the regulator to which
the entity sends its HMDA filing. Respondent ID is either an identifier code assigned to
the entity by its direct regulator, or the entity’s federal Tax-ID. The FR Y-9C database
identifies entities by the Federal Reserve identification number, RSSD ID.
Beginning 2004, the HMDA Respondent Panel files contain the RSSD IDs for most
HMDA reporters. Since no such link between the two databases exists for the pre-2004
period, I use the following strategy to link the HMDA and FR Y-9C databases in this
period. Since both RSSD IDs and HMDA IDs are unique and stable overtime, any post-
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2004 match between the two sets of identifiers also applies to the pre-2004 period. Applying
the post-2004 match to the pre-2004 period provides RSSD IDs for approximately half of
the HMDA filing institutions for the period 1993-2003. This procedure fails to identify the
RSSD IDs of for entities that ceased to exist before 2004 because of failures or mergers.
For these cases, I manually collect their RSSD IDs from FFIEC’s “Institution Search”
webpage: https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/SearchForm.aspx. To ensure I
get the correct matches, I check if the historical location and type of the institutions are
identical in the two datasets.
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Appendix C
Propensity Score Matching
To create a matched pair of treatment and control BHCs, I first estimate the logistic
regression model in equation C.1. I estimate the model separately for privately held and
publicly traded BHCs because private and public BHCs are economically different from
each other and because I can improve the performance of the model for public BHCs by
including market-based variables.
SECBANKit = αt + β1tFUNDINGit + β2tREGCAPITALit (C.1)
+ β3tRISKTRANSFERit + β4tPERFORMANCEit
+ β5tOTHERSit
The dependent variable SECBANKit is a securitization indicator that takes the
value one if BHC i has outstanding securitized residential mortgages over the three-
year period that ended in year t and zero otherwise. I select the covariates based
on prior literature (e.g., Affinito & Tagliaferri 2010, Cardone-Riportella et al. 2010,
Minton et al. 2004, Uzun & Webb 2007) that examines determinants of securitization.
The literature identifies four incentives for engaging in securitization: (i) funding and
liquidity (FUNDINGit), (ii) transferring risk and reducing cost of financial distress
(RISKTRANSFERit), (iii) regulatory capital arbitrage (REGCAPITALit), and (iv)
enhancing performance (PERFORMANCEit). OTHERSit includes variables such as
size, book-to-market, volatility, and analyst following that are used in similar propensity
score models in prior work (e.g., Oz 2016). Table C.1 defines each of the covariates used
in the propensity score model.
Table C.2 presents the estimation results for the propensity score model. The adjusted
pseudo-R2 ranges between 22% and 34% for public BHCs and between 7% and 14% for
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private BHCs. The pseudo-R2 for the public BHCs is consistent with Oz (2016) who
applies propensity score matching in a similar context around FAS 166 & 167. However,
the pseudo-R2 for the private BHCs is lower, suggesting the propensity score matching
may not provide a sufficiently balanced matched sample. As a result, I test the robustness
of my results to excluding the private BHC sample.
I match each securitizing BHC to the non-securitizing BHC with the closest propensity
score.1 I perform a one-to-one matching with replacement, imposing a 10% caliper. In
comparison, most studies in the literature (e.g., Casu et al. 2013, Lawrence et al. 2011, Oz
2016) use a small caliper width (typically less than 5%), while others (e.g., Christensen
2016) use a caliper width equal to 0.2 times the standard deviation of the logit of propen-
sity scores (approximately 25% in my setting). A smaller caliper reduces the likelihood of
matching a treatment BHC to a control BHC with a significantly different propensity score
(i.e., bad matches). However, a small caliper can also lead to loss of more observations
at the higher end of the propensity score distribution. King & Nielsen (2016) show that
pruning more observations can result in greater biases. I argue that a very small caliper
(e.g., < 5%) is not ideal for my setting because I have a relatively small number of securi-
tizing BHCs in my treatment group, making my setting more sensitive to data pruning. In
untabulated results, I find that there is no improvement in the number of matched pairs or
covariate balance when using a 25% caliper, relative to the 10% used in this thesis. I also
find that the 10% caliper results in more observations than the 3% or 5% calipers. I use
matching with replacement to retain as many observations as possible. In section 5.5, I
check the robustness of my results to the choices I made here. I reproduce the main findings
using 3% and 5% calipers, and using matching without replacement. I also reproduce the
main results using a coarsened exact matching based on select covariates to ensure that
my results are not driven by the propensity score matching.
I present the descriptive statistics before and after matching only for the matching
(event) years to assess the success of the matching process in improving the covariate
balance between the treatment and control groups immediately before the events. Table
C.3 panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the unmatched sample for the matching
years (i.e., 1996, 2000, 2002, and 2009). The asterisks in columns (10) and (11) indicate
statistically significant differences between the means and medians of the securitizing and
non-securitizing subsamples. The securitizing and non-securitizing subsamples have sig-
nificantly different mean and median for most of the covariates, underscoring the need to
perform the matching process to reduce the difference between the treatment and control
groups. Securitizing BHCs have lower total deposits and greater loan-to-deposits ratio
1I use the Stata command psmatch2 developed by Leuven & Sianesi (2003) to perform the matching.
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than non-securitizing BHCs, suggesting that securitizing BHCs rely less on regular de-
posits to finance their lending activity. Securitizing BHCs have lower interbank ratio and
higher leverage, which indicates that they rely more on the interbank lending market and
other non-deposit credit markets. The table also shows that securitizing BHCs have lower
regulatory capital ratios than non-securitizing BHCs, consistent with regulatory capital
management being an incentive for securitization (). The securitizing BHCs also have more
provisions and allowances for loan losses as well as more write-offs, indicating that their
loans are riskier than those of non-securitizing BHCs. Moreover, Securitizing BHCs are
larger, more liquid (stock market), and have greater analyst coverage than non-securitizing
BHCs.
Table C.3 panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the matched sample. Com-
parison of the two panels reveals that the matching procedure has decreased the covariate
imbalance between the securitizing and non-securitizing sub-samples. The only significant
differences after matching are the mean differences for LOGASSETS and the median dif-
ferences for MV . However, these differences are not economically significant. For example,
the mean different for LOGASSETS, which equals 0.21 (or $256,066), is only a fraction of
the standard deviation of LOGASSETS (1.323). I also assess the standardized percentage
bias, which is the difference between the means of the treatment and control groups as a
percentage of the square root of the average of the variances in the treatment and control
groups. Figure C.1 presents the distribution of standardized percentage bias across the
covariates before and after matching. The standardized percentage bias is the difference
between the means of the treatment and control groups as a percentage of the square root
of the average of the variances in the treatment and control groups. A value of zero for the
standardized percentage bias indicates reflects bias, whereas deviations from zero in either
direction reflect bias, and the greater the deviation the greater the bias. The distribution
of the standardized percentage bias for the unmatched sample (first part of figure C.1) has
long and fat tails with a large deviation from zero, whereas the distribution for the matched
sample shows the observations are concentrated close to zero. These findings show that
the matching process has significantly reduced the bias.
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Table C.1: Covariates Description
Incentive Variable Description
Data
Source
Funding and
Liquidity
COREDEPRATIO
The ratio of core deposits (i.e., demand deposits, NOW
accounts, money market accounts, and time deposits less
than $100,000) to total deposits
FR Y-9C
DEPOSIT/ASSETS The ratio total deposits to total assets FR Y-9C
FUNDINGCOST
The ratio of interest expense to the sum of total deposits,
total money market funds and other interest-bearing funds
FR Y-9C
INTERBANK
The ratio of lending to other banks to the sum of borrowings
from other banks and lending to other banks
FR Y-9C
LOAN/ASSETS The ratio of net loans to total assets FR Y-9C
LOAN/DEPOSIT
The ratio of net loans to the sum of deposits and other
short-term funds
FR Y-9C
LOANGR The logarithmic growth in loans FR Y-9C
LEV ERAGE The ratio of total liability to average total asset FR Y-9C
LIQRATIO
The sum of cash, securities held for sale, trading assets,
federal funds sold, and securities purchased with the intent
to resale divided by total assets
FR Y-9C
Regulatory
Capital
Management
TIER1CAPRATIO The ratio of Tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets FR Y-9C
TIER1LEV RATIO The ratio of Tier 1 capital to average total assets FR Y-9C
TOTALCAPRATIO The ratio of total capital to total risk-weighted assets FR Y-9C
Risk Transfer
ALLOWANCE The ratio of loan loss allowances to total loans FR Y-9C
CHARGEOFF The ratio of net charge-offs to total assets FR Y-9C
NPL/LOANS The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans FR Y-9C
PROV ISION The ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets FR Y-9C
Performance
Boosting
INTINCRATIO
The ratio of gross interest income to gross outstanding ac-
counts
FR Y-9C
ROA Return on Assets FR Y-9C
Others
AV GV OLUME
The average daily trading volume over the previous calen-
dar year
CRSP
BTM
The ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity
at the preceding December 31
FR Y-9C
& CRSP
COV ERAGE
The number of analyst following the BHC in the previous
calendar year
IBES
Continued on next page–
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Incentive Variable Description Source
LOGASSETS The natural logarithm of total assets FR Y-9C
MV
The natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the
preceding December 31
CRSP
V OLATILITY
The standard deviation of daily stock returns over the pre-
vious calendar year
CRSP
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Table C.2: Propensity Score Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Public BHCs Panel B: Private BHCs
1996-
2015
Match-
ing
Years
(Pooled)
1996
(FAS
125)
2000
(FAS
140)
2002
(FIN 46)
2009
(FAS
166 &
167)
1996-
2015
Match-
ing
Years
(Pooled)
1996
(FAS
125)
2000
(FAS
140)
2002
(FIN 46
2009
(FAS
166 &
167)
LOGASSETS 1.13*** 1.25*** 0.13 2.40** 0.86 2.59*** 0.60*** 0.69*** 0.65*** 0.77*** 0.61*** 0.39**
(7.94) (3.55) (0.07) (2.09) (0.50) (3.17) (18.59) (8.33) (2.72) (4.67) (3.92) (2.00)
LIQRATIO -1.77*** -1.21 1.49 -1.53 -5.38* -2.51 0.34 1.55* 3.41 2.37 0.55 1.59
(-3.11) (-0.93) (0.55) (-0.45) (-1.77) (-0.62) (0.93) (1.69) (1.40) (1.14) (0.36) (0.70)
LOANGR 0.049 -0.013 0.81 -0.66 1.32 1.48* -0.39*** -0.78** 0.050 -0.28 0.15 -1.75**
(0.31) (-0.03) (0.84) (-0.73) (1.14) (1.79) (-2.89) (-2.02) (0.07) (-0.32) (0.34) (-2.04)
LOAN/DEPOSITS -0.66*** 0.57 5.52 -3.38 2.09 -1.09 -1.83*** -0.79 -0.039 0.053 3.52 -6.75
(-4.46) (0.33) (0.64) (-0.47) (0.52) (-0.80) (-3.14) (-0.76) (-0.00) (0.04) (0.85) (-0.76)
LOAN/ASSETS 1.41** 0.67 -1.14 7.61 -7.47 0.44 2.44*** 2.18 8.01 1.94 -8.56 9.46
(2.31) (0.23) (-0.10) (0.76) (-1.11) (0.10) (2.95) (1.29) (0.45) (0.68) (-1.52) (0.84)
DEPOSITS/ASSETS -3.89*** -1.84 6.16 -7.08 -0.64 -7.06* -5.78*** -4.98*** -4.62 -1.76 0.18 -11.2
(-6.95) (-0.66) (0.61) (-0.67) (-0.09) (-1.88) (-7.00) (-3.04) (-0.29) (-0.60) (0.04) (-1.12)
COREDEPRATIO 2.23*** 2.37*** 4.11 0.41 2.89 4.25** 1.69*** 0.017 -3.87 -0.82 -0.69 3.57**
(6.13) (2.72) (1.53) (0.20) (1.30) (2.16) (5.58) (0.02) (-1.32) (-0.42) (-0.45) (2.17)
FUNDINGCOST 6.02 17.7 93.8* 1.73 38.2 -33.9 1.93 -10.7 -0.56 -5.96 -18.8 64.7**
(0.84) (1.03) (1.72) (0.04) (0.82) (-0.69) (0.41) (-0.92) (-0.01) (-0.22) (-0.71) (2.27)
INTERBANK -2.30*** -2.33 -1.94 -4.17 -1.36 3.88 0.81 1.73 -2.34 3.62 2.66 -3.57
(-3.11) (-1.36) (-0.46) (-1.06) (-0.31) (0.72) (1.31) (1.19) (-0.49) (1.19) (0.99) (-0.92)
LEV ERAGE 5.89** 8.22 69.0** -2.18 26.0 12.4 1.61 7.61 28.8 0.17 9.32 -11.7
(2.54) (1.28) (2.03) (-0.10) (1.29) (1.08) (0.86) (1.42) (1.43) (0.01) (0.64) (-1.28)
NPL 5.95** 6.95 60.7* 65.4* 82.4*** -11.2 -1.11 2.80 9.28 -0.70 -0.011 -2.44
(2.34) (1.11) (1.79) (1.78) (2.92) (-1.34) (-0.87) (0.92) (0.40) (-0.04) (-0.00) (-0.58)
PROV ISION -30.7*** -36.8 -123 58.6 -196*** -50.6 -6.03 -27.1* 5.59 -83.4 -64.1 -11.1
(-3.18) (-1.37) (-1.38) (0.57) (-2.74) (-1.05) (-1.13) (-1.71) (0.09) (-1.58) (-1.34) (-0.49)
ALLOWANCE 15.7** 8.11 -53.1 14.7 125** 25.5 9.76*** 13.6 37.6 31.4 15.2 15.1
(2.14) (0.44) (-1.20) (0.25) (2.31) (0.63) (2.58) (1.34) (1.21) (1.16) (0.55) (0.88)
CHARGEOFF 27.2*** 39.9 208 -101 42.4 62.3 0.13 7.92 64.0 74.0 11.7 -14.6
(2.69) (1.44) (1.62) (-0.80) (0.58) (1.42) (0.02) (0.54) (0.96) (1.09) (0.26) (-0.76)
INTINCRATIO 4.29 -10.1 -12.2 -1.80 17.5 15.8 -24.4*** -6.90 -5.46 3.20 29.1 -15.6
(0.68) (-0.65) (-0.30) (-0.05) (0.36) (0.45) (-5.85) (-0.67) (-0.14) (0.18) (1.25) (-0.74)
ROA 1.07 7.10 -27.2 42.5 -40.5 -5.85 8.59*** 8.72 116* 14.8 -3.84 23.6*
(0.19) (0.60) (-0.41) (0.62) (-0.52) (-0.39) (2.76) (1.27) (1.91) (0.68) (-0.23) (1.90)
TIER1LEV RATIO 0.45 3.35 -0.016 -0.041 0.24 -0.47* 9.04*** 13.8** 7.06 3.60 32.2* -0.78
(0.13) (0.36) (-0.08) (-0.15) (0.73) (-1.79) (3.51) (1.98) (0.37) (0.21) (1.78) (-0.06)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Public BHCs Panel B: Private BHCs
1996-
2015
Match-
ing
Years
(Pooled)
1996
(FAS
125)
2000
(FAS
140)
2002
(FIN 46)
2009
(FAS
166 &
167)
1996-
2015
Match-
ing
Years
(Pooled)
1996
(FAS
125)
2000
(FAS
140)
2002
(FIN 46
2009
(FAS
166 &
167)
TIER1CAPRATIO 7.76* 4.29 2.05 -1.58 -1.30 -0.0072 -12.3*** -18.4** 30.7 -12.1 -17.8 -36.7**
(1.75) (0.40) (0.61) (-1.00) (-0.58) (-0.03) (-4.32) (-2.27) (1.01) (-0.54) (-0.97) (-2.55)
TOTCAPRATIO -6.81 -3.38 0.052 0.070 0.11 -0.13* 3.69 11.5 -24.2 8.11 -0.81 23.5**
(-1.61) (-0.36) (0.88) (1.03) (1.38) (-1.95) (1.43) (1.55) (-0.82) (0.39) (-0.05) (2.02)
AV GV OLUME -0.081* -0.012 0.88 -1.71 -0.55 -0.51
(-1.87) (-0.12) (0.45) (-1.55) (-0.34) (-0.76)
BTM 0.044 0.0033 11.0 -7.05 -79.4* -3.00
(0.58) (0.02) (0.30) (-0.25) (-1.76) (-0.18)
COV ERAGE -0.0097 0.0097 46.0 13.9 3.20 5.38
(-0.85) (0.37) (1.39) (0.57) (0.13) (0.28)
MV -0.26** -0.43 16.8 10.7 -4.65 17.9
(-2.13) (-1.41) (0.65) (0.39) (-0.18) (0.68)
V OLATILITY -10.7** -16.4* -16.3 -25.0 13.2 -13.9
(-2.57) (-1.73) (-0.74) (-0.95) (0.58) (-0.58)
Constant -18.2*** -22.4*** -96.8*** -8.23 -33.2* -36.5*** -6.49*** -14.9*** -38.6 -12.5 -17.4 10.3
(-7.20) (-3.34) (-2.70) (-0.35) (-1.71) (-2.81) (-3.12) (-2.60) (-1.58) (-0.97) (-1.07) (0.77)
Observations 4,958 1,018 255 260 259 244 13,210 2,644 504 739 875 526
Pseudo R-squared 0.18 0.22 0.34 0.28 0.32 0.22 0.096 0.094 0.14 0.070 0.078 0.12
This table presents the logistic propensity score models estimated over the 1996-2015 period and the matching years, namely 1996 (FAS 125), 2000 (FAS 140),
2002 (FIN 46), and 2009 (FAS 166 & 167). I start in 1996 instead of 1993 because I cannot observe regulatory capital ratios prior to 1996. Panel A presents the
logistic models for public BHCs and Panels B presents the models for private BHCs. In both panels, the dependent variable SECBANKt equals one if the BHC
has outstanding securitized mortgages in the three-year period ending in year t, and zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table C.1.
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Table C.3: Covariate Balance
Panel A: Before Matching
All BHCs Non-securitizing BHCs Securitizing BHCs
Obs Mean Median St.Dev. Obs Mean Median St.Dev. Obs Mean Median St.Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LOGASSETS 4578 13.363 13.085 1.252 3814 13.128 12.937 0.960 764 14.533*** 14.068*** 1.775
LIQRATIO 4550 0.258 0.244 0.112 3789 0.258 0.246 0.112 761 0.254 0.237 0.109
LOANGR 4231 0.119 0.089 0.225 3487 0.124 0.096 0.223 744 0.093*** 0.062*** 0.234
LOAN/DEPOSITS 4578 0.801 0.802 0.206 3814 0.789 0.791 0.188 764 0.862*** 0.855*** 0.273
LOAN/ASSETS 4578 0.638 0.654 0.119 3814 0.638 0.653 0.120 764 0.641 0.660 0.116
DEPOSITS/ASSETS 4578 0.808 0.826 0.090 3814 0.817 0.834 0.080 764 0.761*** 0.783*** 0.115
COREDEPRATIO 4578 0.844 0.861 0.089 3814 0.845 0.861 0.088 764 0.840 0.858 0.093
FUNDINGCOST 4578 0.029 0.029 0.010 3814 0.029 0.029 0.010 764 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.011
INTERBANK 4532 -0.005 0.000 0.054 3773 -0.001 0.000 0.052 759 -0.026*** -0.015*** 0.061
LEV ERAGE 4578 0.909 0.912 0.033 3814 0.909 0.912 0.033 764 0.911* 0.914** 0.029
NPL 4565 0.016 0.008 0.026 3801 0.015 0.007 0.026 764 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.026
PROV ISION 4572 0.008 0.004 0.015 3808 0.007 0.003 0.016 764 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.014
ALLOWANCE 4578 0.016 0.014 0.010 3814 0.015 0.013 0.011 764 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.008
CHARGEOFF 4574 0.006 0.002 0.013 3810 0.005 0.002 0.014 764 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.012
INTINCRATIO 4523 0.067 0.067 0.014 3765 0.067 0.068 0.014 758 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.013
ROA 4578 0.008 0.010 0.014 3814 0.008 0.010 0.013 764 0.007* 0.010 0.017
TIER1LEV RATIO 4555 0.088 0.085 0.031 3791 0.088 0.085 0.032 764 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.027
TIER1CAPRATIO 4555 0.129 0.118 0.060 3791 0.131 0.119 0.063 764 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.041
TOTCAPRATIO 4555 0.143 0.132 0.059 3791 0.145 0.133 0.063 764 0.135*** 0.129*** 0.038
AV GV OLUME 1513 9.555 9.137 2.191 1105 8.996 8.808 1.816 408 11.068*** 10.83324*** 2.397
BTM 1510 0.991 0.693 1.058 1102 0.990 0.717 0.920 408 0.992 0.624*** 1.365
COV ERAGE 1048 5.260 3.000 6.093 708 3.613 2.000 3.874 340 8.688*** 6.000*** 8.119
MV 1510 12.059 11.729 1.779 1102 11.608 11.415 1.394 408 13.277*** 13.149*** 2.108
V OLATILITY 1513 0.030 0.025 0.020 1105 0.030 0.025 0.019 408 0.030 0.023* 0.021
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Panel B: After Matching
All BHCs Non-securitizing BHCs Securitizing BHCs
Obs Mean Median St.Dev. Obs Mean Median St.Dev. Obs Mean Median St.Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LOGASSETS 994 14.063 13.791 1.323 419 13.907 13.690 1.232 575 14.177* 13.882 1.376
LIQRATIO 994 0.253 0.238 0.108 419 0.253 0.243 0.113 575 0.252 0.233 0.105
LOANGR 994 0.100 0.064 0.234 419 0.103 0.066 0.222 575 0.097 0.063 0.242
LOAN/DEPOSITS 994 0.832 0.838 0.169 419 0.819 0.821 0.171 575 0.841 0.846 0.167
LOAN/ASSETS 994 0.644 0.658 0.115 419 0.642 0.654 0.119 575 0.646 0.663 0.112
DEPOSITS/ASSETS 994 0.783 0.802 0.091 419 0.791 0.810 0.085 575 0.777 0.797 0.095
COREDEPRATIO 994 0.839 0.857 0.090 419 0.841 0.859 0.083 575 0.838 0.855 0.095
FUNDINGCOST 994 0.027 0.025 0.011 419 0.027 0.026 0.011 575 0.027 0.025 0.011
INTERBANK 994 -0.020 -0.012 0.057 419 -0.017 -0.012 0.055 575 -0.022 -0.012 0.058
LEV ERAGE 994 0.910 0.913 0.027 419 0.910 0.912 0.028 575 0.911 0.914 0.026
NPL 994 0.019 0.010 0.029 419 0.019 0.009 0.036 575 0.018 0.011 0.023
PROV ISION 994 0.009 0.004 0.012 419 0.008 0.004 0.012 575 0.009 0.004 0.013
ALLOWANCE 994 0.016 0.014 0.008 419 0.016 0.014 0.008 575 0.016 0.014 0.008
CHARGEOFF 994 0.006 0.003 0.011 419 0.006 0.003 0.011 575 0.007 0.003 0.011
INTINCRATIO 994 0.064 0.062 0.013 419 0.063 0.062 0.013 575 0.064 0.062 0.013
ROA 994 0.007 0.009 0.012 419 0.007 0.009 0.012 575 0.007 0.009 0.012
TIER1LEV RATIO 994 0.087 0.083 0.025 419 0.087 0.083 0.027 575 0.086 0.083 0.024
TIER1CAPRATIO 994 0.122 0.115 0.041 419 0.124 0.115 0.044 575 0.121 0.114 0.039
TOTCAPRATIO 994 0.138 0.130 0.039 419 0.139 0.130 0.042 575 0.137 0.130 0.036
AV GV OLUME 422 10.642 10.415 1.929 163 10.423 10.324 1.720 259 10.779 10.506 2.041
BTM 422 0.998 0.641 1.116 163 0.996 0.646 1.099 259 1.000 0.635 1.129
COV ERAGE 422 5.633 4.000 5.392 163 5.031 4.000 4.823 259 6.012 4.000 5.698
MV 422 12.870 12.845 1.582 163 12.698 12.798 1.519 259 12.978 12.897* 1.614
V OLATILITY 422 0.029 0.025 0.016 163 0.028 0.025 0.015 259 0.029 0.025 0.016
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the covariates used in the propensity score model before (Panel A) and after
(Panel B) matching. For these tables, I pool the private and public BHCs for all matching years together. Columns (1)-(4)
present the statistics for all BHCs, columns (5)-(8) present the statistics for the non-securitizing subsample, and columns
(9)-(12) show the statistics for the securitizing subsample. ***, **, and * in columns (10) and (11) represent two-tailed
p-values of < 0.01, < 0.05, and < 0.1 from mean and Wilcoxon rank-sum test, respectively. In panel B, I used a paired version
of both tests. All Variables are as defined in Table C.1.
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Figure C.1: Covariate Balance Before and After Matching
This figure presents the distribution of the standardized percentage bias across the
covariates used in the propensity score matching, measured before and after matching. I
generated this graph using the Stata command pstest from Leuven & Sianesi’s (2003)
package. The standardized percentage bias is the difference between the means of the
treatment and control groups as a percentage of the square root of the average of the
variances in the treatment and control groups.
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Appendix D
Determinants of Mortgage Risk:
Literature Summary
The appendix presents the list of risk factors prior research examines as determinants
of mortgage termination risk. I group the factors into borrower characteristics (Panel
A), loan characteristics (Panel B), property characteristics (Panel D). The first column
contains the name of the characteristics. The second column provides the description of
how the characteristics is related to mortgage risk. The third column contains a list of
papers that examine the relation between the characteristic and mortgage risk. The last
column provides the names of variables used in this thesis to capture the characteristics.
Section 4.3.2 and Appendix A.1 present the exact definition of these variables. I do not
include some of characteristics listed in this table in the development of the proposed
mortgage lending risk measures because of lack of data or because they are not observable
at origination.
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Summary of Mortgage Risk Factors from Prior Research
Characteristics Description Papers Variables
Names
Panel A: Borrower Characteristics
Age
Young borrowers are riskier than older
borrowers.
Morton (1975),
Canner, Gabriel &
Woolley (1991)
Co-borrower
Borrowers with no co-borrower are riskier
than those with a co-borrower.
Chan et al. (2013) I.NOCOBORR
Credit card
utilization
Borrowers with high credit card utilizations
are riskier than those with low utilization.
Elul et al. (2010),
Jagtiani & Lang
(2011)
Debt Burden
Borrowers with high debt burden are riskier
than those with low debt burden.
Demyanyk et al.
(2010), Chan et al.
(2013)
ITL
FICO Scores
Borrowers with low FICO (credit) scores
are riskier than those with high FICO score.
Elul et al. (2010),
Jagtiani & Lang
(2011), Demyanyk
et al. (2010), Chan
et al. (2013), Elul
(2016)
Government
assistance
Borrowers receiving government assistant
are riskier than borrowers who are not on
government assistance.
Canner et al. (1991) GOV ASSIST
Continued next page–
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Summary Mortgage Risk Factors from Prior Research (continued)
Characteristics Description Papers Variables
Income
Low income borrowers are riskier than
medium and high-income borrowers.
Vandell & Thibodeau
(1985), Lambrecht,
Perraudin & Satchell
(1997), Demyanyk
et al. (2010)
INCOME
Income volatility
Borrowers with more volatile income are
riskier than those with less volatile income.
Morton (1975)
Length of
employment in
current job
Borrowers with short history in their
current job are riskier than those with long
history.
Vandell & Thibodeau
(1985)
Marital status
Divorced Borrowers are riskier than other
borrowers.
Morton (1975),
Vandell & Thibodeau
(1985), Lambrecht
et al. (1997), Canner
et al. (1991)
Non-
discretionary
spending
Borrowers with more non-discretionary
spending (e.g., other debt payments and
medical bill) are riskier than those with less
non-discretionary spending.
Vandell & Thibodeau
(1985)
Non-housing
wealth
Borrowers with less non-housing wealth are
riskier than those with more non-housing
wealth.
Vandell & Thibodeau
(1985)
NONHOUSWLTH
Number of
dependents
Borrower with more dependents are riskier
than those with fewer or no dependents.
Morton (1975)
Continued next page–
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Summary Mortgage Risk Factors from Prior Research (continued)
Characteristics Description Papers Variables
Occupation
Borrower with more stable occupations such
as professionals and executives are less risky
than borrowers with less stable occupations
such as self-employment and salespersons.
Morton (1975),
Vandell & Thibodeau
(1985)
Race Minority borrowers are riskier.
Chan et al. (2013),
Canner et al. (1991)
I.BLACK,
I.HISPANIC
Second Mortgage
Borrowers with a second mortgage are
riskier than those with no second mortgage.
Elul et al. (2010),
Chan et al. (2013)
Panel B: Loan Characteristics
Loan amount Larger loans are riskier than smaller loans.
Vandell & Thibodeau
(1985), Elul et al.
(2010), Elul (2016)
LOAN
Low
documentation
Low documentation loans such as those
with missing income are riskier than loans
with proper documentation.
Elul et al. (2010)
Chan et al. (2013),
Elul (2016)
I.NOINCOME
Continued next page–
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Summary Mortgage Risk Factors from Prior Research (continued)
Characteristics Description Papers Variables
Loan-to-value
(LTV)
Mortgages with higher LTV are riskier than
those with lower LTV.
Sandor & Sosin
(1975), Morton
(1975), Campbell &
Dietrich (1983), Deng
et al. (2000),
Clauretie (1990), Elul
et al. (2010), Jagtiani
& Lang (2011),
Demyanyk et al.
(2010), Elul (2016),
Jackson & Kaserman
(1980)
LTMEDV ,
AV GLTP , LTAV GP
Mortgage Age Mortgages are riskier in the early years.
Elul et al. (2006),
Elul (2016)
Term-to-maturity Conflicting evidence.
Morton (1975),
Campbell & Dietrich
(1983), Jackson &
Kaserman (1980)
Panel C: Property Characteristics
Age
Mortgages secured by older properties are
riskier than those secured by recently built
properties.
Vandell & Thibodeau
(1985)
MEDHOUSAGE
Continued next page–
177
Summary Mortgage Risk Factors from Prior Research (continued)
Characteristics Description Papers Variables
Owner occupancy
Mortgages secured by owner-occupied
properties are riskier than those secured by
investment properties.
Chan et al. (2013)
I.OWNOCCUPIED
Property
condition
Mortgages secured by properties in a good
condition are less risky than those secured
by properties in poor condition.
Sandor & Sosin
(1975)
Property value
Mortgages secured by properties with
greater valuations are less risky than those
secured by properties with lower valuation.
Sandor & Sosin
(1975), Vandell &
Thibodeau (1985)
MEDV ALUE
Panel D: Geographic Characteristics
Current and
expected housing
market
conditions
The current and expected housing market
conditions in the local area are negatively
associated with mortgage risk.
Sandor & Sosin
(1975)
∆HPI
Current and
expected
neighborhood
conditions
The current and expected neighborhood
conditions are negatively associated with
mortgage risk.
Vandell & Thibodeau
(1985)
Home ownership
rate
Mortgages in neighborhoods with higher
home ownership rate are riskier than those
in neighborhoods with lower home
ownership rate.
Anacker (2015) OWNRATE
Continued next page–
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Summary Mortgage Risk Factors from Prior Research (continued)
Characteristics Description Papers Variables
Local area
unemployment
Mortgages in areas with high
unemployment are riskier than those in low
unemployment areas.
Vandell & Thibodeau
(1985), Elul et al.
(2010)
UNEMPRATE,
∆UNEMPRATE
Median house
value
Mortgages in neighborhoods with low
median house value are riskier than those in
neighborhoods with high median house
value.
Anacker (2015) MEDV ALUE
Median house age
Mortgages in neighborhoods with higher
median house age are riskier than those in
neighborhoods with lower median house age.
Anacker (2015) MEDHOUSAGE
Median income
Mortgages in areas with low median income
are riskier than those in areas with high
median income.
Chan et al. (2013)
MEDBORRINC,
MEDFAMINC,
MEDHHINC
Minority
percentage
Mortgages in neighborhoods with higher
minority percentages are riskier that those
with lower minority percentages.
Chan et al. (2013),
Anacker (2015)
MINORITY ,
BLACKPERC,
HISPANICPERC
Neighborhood
desirability
Mortgages in more desirable neighborhoods
are less risky than those in less desirable
neighborhoods.
Sandor & Sosin
(1975)
POV ERTY ,
MEDFAMINC,
MEDHHINC,
UNEMPRATE,
MINORITY ,
BLACKPERC,
V ACRATE
Neighborhood
life-cycle
Mortgages in central cities and mature
suburbs are riskier than those in developing
suburbs.
Anacker (2015) I.LIFECY CLE
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Summary Mortgage Risk Factors from Prior Research (continued)
Characteristics Description Papers Variables
Percentage of
vacant units
Mortgages in neighborhoods with higher
percentage of vacant units are riskier than
those in neighborhoods with lower
percentage of vacant units.
Anacker (2015) V ACRATE
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